Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK312
2007-04-23 15:14:00
UNCLASSIFIED
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNSC: CONSULTATIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI 
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VZCZCXYZ0015
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DE RUCNDT #0312/01 1131514
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231514Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1743
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1220
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6221
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0057
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0852
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE 0473
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000312 

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: UNSC: CONSULTATIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA

REF: STATE 52614

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000312

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: UNSC: CONSULTATIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA

REF: STATE 52614


1. Summary: In an April 20 briefing on the situation in
Western Sahara that he shared with Special Representative
(SRSG) Julian Harston, Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum
reiterated the Secretary-General's call on Morocco and the
Polisario Front to engage in "direct negotiations without
preconditions, with a view to a just, lasting and mutually
acceptable political solution that will provide for the
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara." Van
Walsum argued that the Security Council's preference for a
"consensual solution" made this recommendation the only
reasonable course of action given Morocco's refusal to accept
the Baker Plan. On the Moroccan and Polisario proposals that
had been submitted to the Secretary-General, Van Walsum said
the MINURSO report had to treat them with formal equivalency
lest characterizing the Moroccan proposal positively have
suggested UN support for the Moroccan sovereignty implicit in
the proposal. Council members generally agreed that the
Security Council should not become too wrapped up in the
discussions about the documents and that the Council should
encourage the parties to enter negotiations without
preconditions and with the aim of providing for the exercise
of self-determination. Some members counseled that that
nothing should impede the parties from negotiating -- a
reference to positive French and U.S. statements on the
Moroccan proposal and recent Algerian/Polisario lobbying for
equal treatment of the proposals in the MINURSO renewal
resolution. End Summary.


2. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for
Western Sahara and Head of the United Nations Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Julian Harston and the
Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Peter

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van Walsum jointly briefed the Security Council April 20 on
the Secretary-General's April 13 "Report of the
Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara"

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(Document S/2007/202 available at
www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07). In his remarks, SRSG Julian
Harston highlighted MINURSO's proposal to establish a joint
military verification commission, a proposal that has been

welcomed by the Polisario, but not yet addressed by the Royal
Moroccan Army; underscored the importance of, funding for,
and dangers attached to MINURSO's demining activities; and
appealed for continued support for voluntary funding for the
UNHCR Confidence-building measures program for which MINURSO
provides logistical assistance.


3. Personal Envoy (PE) Peter Van Walsum sought to clarify
remarks in the April 13 MINURSO report, specifically the para
47 recommendation that "the Security Council call on the
parties, Morocco and the Frente Polisario, to enter into
negotiations without preconditions, with a view to a just,
lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that will
provide for the self-determination of the people of Western
Sahara"; and that "the neighboring countries, Algeria and
Mauritania, should also be invited to these negotiations and
be consulted separately on issues directly affecting them..."
He noted that the recommendations were not new -- that they
were the same as those put forth in the October 2006 MINURSO
report. Van Walsum explained that the original
recommendation had been based on the assumption the Security
Council would not impose a solution for Western Sahara and
had taken such a position since 1975. He said that when the
Green March occurred and Algeria had appealed to the Security
Council, the Council only "deplored" the march and called on
Morocco to withdraw its marchers. That, he said was typical
Chapter 6 language to which the Council has since adhered.
Thus, van Walsum said, he had concluded on solid ground that
the Security Council was committed to a "consensual
solution." Van Walsum further argued that, when the Baker
Plan, supported by the Security Council, was rejected by
Morocco in 2003 on the grounds that it did not guarantee
Moroccan sovereignty, the Security Council did not react. He
said that it did not have to react because the Security
Council's support of the Baker Plan in 2003 had been
conditioned on the agreement between the two parties, which
no longer pertained.


4. These factors, van Walsum concluded, were the only reasons
the Secretary-General had concluded that only two options
existed: (1) to call for negotiations without preconditions;
or (2) to accept an indefinite and prolonged impasse. In
both April and October 2006, the Secretary-General had
suggested the call for negotiations with out preconditions.
The Security Council had not yet acted on the recommendation,
van Walsum said, but there have been new developments, namely

the proposals the parties had put on the table. These
proposals had been mentioned in the report, although not in
para 47, a fact that some have regretted.


5. On the Moroccan and Polisario proposals, Van Walsum
observed that the Moroccan proposal had been in process for a
period of time going back at least to King Mohammed VI's
November 6, 2006 confirmation of an autonomy proposal and was
a product of extensive international consultations, while the
Polisario's April 10 submission seemingly came out of the
blue. Nevertheless, van Walsum said, for the
Secretary-General there had to be formal equivalency between

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the two proposals. Van Valsum said that both proposals
contained implicit preconditions. He reiterated that there
could not be a "precondition" of Moroccan sovereignty any
more than there could be a "precondition" of a referendum
with independence as an option. Rather, Van Walsum said, the
Security Council should focus the energies of the parties on
negotiating during this small window of opportunity.
Cautioning against excessive enthusiasm for the Moroccan
effort, van Walsum said that "there may were be an inverse
relations between giving satisfaction to Morocco and getting
the Polisario to the negotiating table."

Security Council Members Comment
--------------


6. All Council members made statements following the MINURSO
briefing. There was general agreement that the Council
should not become too wrapped up in the discussions about the
documents and how to address them; that it was not up to the
Council to take a position on the documents; that the Council
should focus on passing a renewal of the MINURSO mandate; and
that the Council should encourage the parties to enter
negotiations without preconditions and with the aim of
providing for the exercise of self-determination. Some
members counseled that that nothing should impede the parties
from negotiating -- a reference to positive French and U.S.
statements on the Moroccan proposal and recent
Algerian/Polisario lobbying for equal treatment of the
proposals in the MINURSO renewal resolution.

On the Moroccan and Polisario Proposals
--------------


7. There was a range of opinion as to how the Moroccan and
Polisario proposals should be treated. In their statements,
South Africa, Panama and Indonesia stressed that the Security
Council should resist characterizing either of the proposals
in any way. South Africa said the proposals should be treated
equally and that the fact that Morocco may have devoted
months to the preparation of its submission was irrelevant.
Panama said that both proposals were efforts which should be
treated equally by the Council. Panama warned against giving
greater weight to the Moroccan proposal than to the Polisario
proposal, which was based on the Council-supported Baker Plan.


8. France and the U.S. delivered positive statements on
behalf of the Moroccan proposal. France noted that Morocco
had responded to the Council's call to end the status quo by
delivering a proposal for autonomy that the Council should
seriously consider. It was a plan that had been carefully
developed, was the product of the commitment of Moroccan
society and based on broad domestic and international
consultations. Moreover, the Moroccan plan respected the
right of self-determination. Finally, France argued, the
proposal was meant to be the basis of negotiation and
compromise and not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. Speaking
for the U.S., Ambassador Sanders noted that the Moroccan
initiative represented a serious and credible proposal to
provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara and represented
the way out of the stalemate, which should spur talks, not
preclude them. She called for direct negotiations as the
best way forward between the parties without preconditions
and pledged to support any mutually agreed solution on the
final status of the Western Sahara.


9. Belgium, UK and Italy sought to express support for the
Moroccan proposal without damaging the prospects for direct
negotiations. Saying it was pleased to see fresh movement by
the parties, Belgium observed that neither of the two
proposals were necessarily the basis for negotiations, but
were elements that could be mentioned in negotiations "in a
slightly differentiated way." The UK characterized the
Moroccan proposal as a "serious effort", but cautioned that,
if the Council wanted to refer to recent developments, the UK
hoped it would do so in a manner that did not hinder but

instead helped negotiations and did not put one at risk by
trying to solve problems that did need to be addressed.
Similarly, Italy said that the Polisario had to be brought
onboard if negotiations were to be held and that members
should abstain from doing anything that would discourage
bringing the Polisario onboard. Italy said that the Moroccan
proposal was a positive development, but that it should not
be the basis for discussion. Both plans, Italy said, should
be considered working hypotheses.

Negotiations; Self-Determination, Mutual Acceptability
-------------- --------------


10. There was strong support (South Africa, Slovakia, Congo,
Italy, Peru, Indonesia) for the Secretary-General's call for
direct negotiations between the parties in accordance to para
47 of the MINURSO report. South Africa pronounced itself
pleased that the Secretary-General had called for
negotiations without preconditions to secure
self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. Congo
also saw the primary purpose of negotiations as leading to a
solution to the problem of self-determination. Belgium said
the Council should call for direct negotiations without
preconditions to discuss mutually acceptable solution that
incorporated self-determination.


11. South Africa, Indonesia and Panama argued that the
Western Sahara issue remained on of decolonization. South
Africa argued that any solution for the Western Sahara had to
be consistent with the UN Charter: autonomy was not
self-determination. South Africa noted that the African
Union (AU) of which both South Africa and the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR) are members adhered to the
principle and sanctity of inherited colonial borders. Panama
said that the process in Western Sahara was a developing one
that remained one of decolonization: that the Western Sahara
is a territory of the Sahrawi people represented by the
Polisario Front but controlled by a Morocco that wants to
impose autonomy. Panama said that the Security Council had
to decide whether it wanted a referendum or a continuation of
a policy of constructive ambiguity that gave lip service to
self-determination without specifying how it was to be
achieved. For Panama, the only solution was a referendum
that included independence as an alternative. Indonesia said
that the Security Council should not impose any solution and
that any solution had to have international legitimacy.
Russia, UK and Congo stressed the importance of "mutually
acceptable solutions."


12. South Africa, Slovakia, Congo, Italy, Qatar, Indonesia,
Peru and China all supported the Secretary-General's call for
a six-month extension of the MINURSO mandate.
KHALILZAD