WOLFF-FASSI FIHRI MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000283

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MO AG WS
SUBJECT: WOLFF-FASSI FIHRI MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS


Classified By: Classified by Amb. Alex D. Wolff. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4
(B&D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: April 11 was a day of intense activity on the
Moroccan Western Sahara initiative. In a meeting with
Ambassador Wolff, MFA Minister Delegate Fassi Fihri requested
US assistance in helping solidify Moroccan public and
political party opinion in support of this initiative by
convincing the SYG to include a positive reference to it in
his forthcoming report in conjunction with the next MINURSO
extension and to append its text to the report as an annex.
Ambassador Wolff agreed to work on both issues, but urged
Fassi Fihri to prepare to send the text to the President of
the Security Council for distribution before the SYG's report
in the event that efforts to get it appended to that report
did not succeed. Wolff and Fassi Fihri reviewed the likely
positions of the various Council members; Wolff noted that
the submission of a Polisario proposal could well complicate
matters both with the UN Secretariat, which would want to
equate the two plans, and with those members of the Council
most committed to the Baker approach. Wolff praised the work
that Morocco had done to date with many Council members,
urged that it continue, recommended additional efforts with
states outside the Council, suggested that the Moroccans
include the SYG's envoy for the Western Sahara in their
contacts, since he was responsible for producing the first
draft of the SYG's report and it would be best for a positive
reference to the Moroccan initiative to be included from the
beginning, and cited the importance of mounting an intensive
media campaign in support of Morocco's moves. Fassi Fihri
agreed to take these steps and expressed the belief that
Morocco already enjoyed the support of Qatar, the EU
countries, Ghana, the Congo, and Indonesia, that it appeared
to have convinced Russia to be supportive, but that it had
achieved less success with China.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINEUD: Since this meeting, the French
PermRep has suggested to Ambassador Wolff that we convince
the SYG to transmit the Moroccan text to the President of the
Security Council under a positive cover note. Ambassadors
Wolff and Sanders have pursued the Moroccan requests and the
French suggestion with the SYG, his Deputy Chief of Staff,
and other senior members of the Secretariat. The Deputy
Chief of Staff reported that the request for a positive
reference in the SYG's report was under active consideration
and that he would look into having the SYG transmit the
report under a positive cover note. He volunteered that the
existence of a separate proposal from the Polisario would
have to be considered; Wolff rejoined that the two documents
were different -- one new, the other a rehash of old
positions -- and that the SYG should find a way to address
this. Ambassador Wolff has briefed Fassi Fihri on these
contacts and urged him to have King Mohammed VI call the SYG
to reinforce the importance of the Moroccan requests. We
will continue to press the SYG and the Secretariat. END
SUMMARY.


3. (U) Ambassador Wolff, accompanied by Ambassador Sanders,
Ambassador (ret.) Chris Ross, and USUN/POL officer Ang, met
with a Moroccan delegation led by MFA Minister Delegate Taleb
El Fassi Fihri and hosted by Moroccan PermRep El Mostapha
Sahel, for one hour April 11.


4. (C) Fassi Fihri did all the talking on the Moroccan side,
opening with a long exposition on Morocco's attempts to
normalize relations with Algeria, which Algeria rebuffed
pending resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, its
subsequent unsuccessful attempts to talk directly to the
Polisario, and its ultimate resort to "a domestic approach to
the self-determination principle" which, he stated would
ultimately be put to a referendum. He expressed regret that
Morocco had been denied a chance to present "the new Morocco"
to the Polisario in the process.


5. (C) Fassi Fihri then moved to recent developments on the
issue; King Mohammad VI had agreed to the word changes
proposed by U/S Burns, and Ambassador Sahel had presented the
revised Moroccan proposal to SYG Ban this morning. However,
the Moroccan delegation was concerned about what it had heard
from U/SYG Guehenno and others in the UN Secretariat
regarding the difficulty of annexing the Moroccan proposal to
the SYG's impending report in conjunction with consideration
of another extension of MINURSO. UN interlocutors had posed
both technical and political issues, notably that by annexing
the Moroccan proposal the report would appear to endorse it.


6. (C) This, Fassi Fihri said, was not what Morocco was
looking for. It merely wanted some kind of positive
recognition from the international community and the U.S. to
validate the King's decision to work on this proposal in the
eyes of Moroccan public and party opinion. It was after all,
"a credible, open-minded, lawful, and constructive proposal
open to negotiation," even though the Algerian government had

termed it "unilateral and unlawful" and had darkly predicted
that it would create "a new Darfur."


7. (C) Fassi Fihri continued that, last night, the Moroccan
delegation had heard that the Polisario Front had put
something forward. It was nothing new -- the Polisario
stated that it was ready to negotiate the implementation of
the Baker Plan. And it said negative things about Morocco.
(To buttress his point, Fassi Fihri handed Ambassador Wolff
the French text of the Polisario proposal.) This approach,
he said, looked to the past, while Morocco was looking to the
future, to the best possible Maghrib, and to the well being
of the Sahrawis, two-thirds of whom are happy and one-third
of whom need to be reconciled.


8. (C) Fassi Fihri then requested US assistance with the SYG
to ensure that Morocco's proposal was handled in a way that
would satisfy public and party opinion in Morocco and the
Sahrawis in the south that making this "important effort" had
been worthwhile. Assuming the correct handling by the SYG,
the members of the Security Council could then welcome his
report and agree that a two-month extension of MINURSO was
reasonable, as the Department had told Fassi Fihri, to
exploit the current momentum and push for the opening of
negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. U/S Burns
had made clear that, if in two months the Polisario was still
refusing to be constructive, the USG would draw the
conclusion that Morocco's plan was the best solution.


9. (C) Fassi Fihri repeated that it was very important to
have the SYG put Morocco's initiative into his report to the
Council. Then, France, Spain, the UK, and the US could
cooperate to create an international coalition within the
Council in support. While Morocco knew that Saudi Arabia and
Panama were elsewhere on the issue, Qatar and the EU
countries (Belgium) were supportive. Ghana and the Congo
were also supportive, albeit more discreetly; they preferred
to follow the lead of the US and others on this issue.


10. (C) Ambassador Wolff thanked Fassi Fihri for his clear
and cogent presentation. He then reviewed the operational
steps that were required:. USUN would follow up with the
SYG's office on his report from two angles -- making the
Moroccan proposal an annex and ensuring positive treatment of
the proposal in the body of the report. He noted that we
would see what could be done on both issues. We were agreed
that some acknowledgment of Morocco's initiative was needed,
and we hoped it would be positive. Beyond the text of the
SYG's report itself, however, the Moroccan delegation should
remember that it has the right to send its proposal to the
President of the Security Council for transmission to the
members. This being the case, getting the proposal to
Council members would not be a problem, but the Moroccans
should be prepared for that contingency.


11. (C) Turning to attitudes among the Council members,
Ambassador Wolff urged the Moroccans not to be too rosy or
too dark in their assessment. That said, the makeup of the
Council was problematic. Guehenno's reaction was indicative
in this regard. Within the UN Secretariat and among certain
members of the Council, there was significant investment in
the Baker approach, and getting a different approach blessed
would not be easy. In this regard, Morocco's openness to
discussions with the Polisario without preconditions would
help the USG work with Council members. Ambassador Wolff
confirmed that the time frame for the extension of MINURSO
that we would propose would be two months. We would see
whether the Polisario engaged with Morocco during that period
and then draw our conclusions. While we had not yet seen the
Polisario's plan, the conclusion we drew from press reports
is the same as Morocco's. Nonetheless, its mere existence
would complicate matters with the UN Secretariat, which would
want to equate the two plans, especially given the commitment
of some Security Council members to the Baker approach.


12. (C) Ambassador Wolff stressed that, in raising these
concerns, he was not being reticent, but merely realistic.
The Secretariat would be looking for the easiest way out, but
we would confront this posture. As for the members of the
Council, South Africa's position was well known, and it
carried weight among the other members. Morocco's
discussions with Ghana and the Congo were encouraging. If
other undecided members saw other Africans supporting
Morocco's initiative, South Africa's influence could be
mitigated. Indonesia and Panama could be on the fence; what
was Morocco's understanding of Indonesia's position? Fassi
Fihri replied that they had given Foreign Minister Ben Issa a
commitment to be positive. Ambassador Wolff asked about the
Russians and Chinese. Fassi Fihri affirmed that Morocco had
convinced Russia that it was worthwhile for Morocco to try to
create a new dynamic without forcing a choice between Rabat
and Algiers. If the Russians felt that there was agreement
among Washington, Paris, London, and Madrid, they would not
oppose what would be presented as an attempt to create a new

dynamic and open negotiations, not to impose a solution.
China, said Fassi Fihri, was more complicated. The Chinese
saw the conflict as being very young and suggested that
Morocco could wait 100 years, but they did know that Morocco
was ready for negotiations.


13. (C) Looking beyond the Council, Ambassador Wolff
suggested that efforts with the Arab League and others to
create a foundation of support would buttress US efforts in
this regard. Fassi Fihri noted that all members of the Arab
League, other than Syria, Libya, and Mauritania, recognize
Morocco's sovereignty over the Western Sahara, but Qadhafi
was becoming more neutral and Asad had closed the Polisario's
office in Damascus. Ambassador Wolff reiterated the need to
be active in building support, because Algeria would be very
active on the other side. Morocco could count on US support,
and we would work closely with the French in following up
immediately with the SYG. Fassi Fihri asked whether the US
could get a response from the SYG in the next few hours, and
Ambassador Wolff confirmed that we would push for one.


14. (C) Ambassador Wolff suggested that, meanwhile, in
addition to its previous contacts, the Moroccan delegation
should talk to Van Walsum, the SYG's envoy for the Western
Sahara. Fassi Fihri indicated that Ambassador Sahel had
already talked to him, but it was not clear where he stood.
Ambassador Wolff encouraged the Moroccan delegation to keep
its pressure on him, because he is the drafter of the SYG's
report and it would be best for him to agree to a positive
reference to the Moroccan initiative from the beginning,
before the report when to Guehenno and others for clearance.


15. (C) Ambassador Wolff reiterated that the Moroccan
delegation should be ready to transmit its proposal through a
letter to the president of the Security Council on Friday,
April 13, if the issue of annexing it to the SYG's report had
not been resolved. A positive reference in the report,
coupled with transmission to Council members, would give
Morocco's initiative the political recognition it needed for
domestic purposes. Fassi Fihri cautioned that, by Monday,
April 16, Moroccan public opinion would be looking to see
whether the SYG's report mentioned the proposal. If it did
not, the proposed two-month extension of MINURSO would be
seen as pressure on Morocco, not the Polisario.


16. (C) Ambassador Wolff raised another interim step -- how
to generate international media coverage of Morocco's
initiative. This could be done, not necessarily on the basis
of the SYG's report, but on the basis of what Council members
said. Fassi Fihri agreed that good work in managing public
opinion could be done in the coming "many days."


17. (C) As the meeting ended, Fassi Fihri noted that the
Secretary had asked Algerian Foreign Minister Bedjaoui to

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help get the Polisario to talk to Morocco about its
initiative. It remained to be seen whether Bedjaoui would be
successful.


18. (C) COMMENT: In parallel consultations with the French,
who are also pressing the Secretariat for a positive
reference to the Moroccan initiative in the SYG's report,
Ambassador de la Sabliere suggested that the SYG could also
transmit the Moroccan text to the Council, perhaps with a
cover note that took a positive tack. After a phone call
with the SYG, Ambassador Wolff went over the Moroccan request
and French recommendation in detail with Ban's Deputy Chief
of Staff, Ambassador Kim. He stressed Morocco's domestic
need for a positive reference to the Moroccan initiative in
the SYG's upcoming report and mentioned the possibility that
the SYG could transmit the Moroccan text to the President of
the Security Council with a positive cover note. Kim
indicated that the Moroccans had already approached him on
including a reference to their initiative in the report and
that their request was under consideration. On having the
SYG transmit the Moroccan text to the Council with a positive
cover note, Kim said that he would look into this
possibility, but gave no commitment. He then noted that the
Polisario had submitted its own plan and that this would have
to be considered. Ambassador Wolff rejoined that the two
documents could not be compared -- the Moroccan effort was
something new; the Polisario effort merely repeated old
positions, and it would not be appropriate to give them equal
treatment. He urged Kim to help the SYG find a way to
address this difference.


19. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We will continue to press these
points with the Secretariat at every opportunity. Ambassador
Wolff has just briefed the Fassi Fihri by phone on our
efforts and urged that he consider asking King Mohammed V
call the SYG to press the importance of a positive welcoming
reference to their initiative in the SYG's report both for
Morocco and for the negotiating effort. Fassi Fihri wanted
to know whether we could guarantee the outcome of such a
call. Our sense is that, in the absence of such a guarantee,
which is not ours to give, it is unlikely that Fassi Fihri
will ask the King's to call. END COMMENT.

























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