SE AHTISAARI AND AMBASSADOR WOLFF STRATEGIZE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000122

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: SE AHTISAARI AND AMBASSADOR WOLFF STRATEGIZE ON
KOSOVO


Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a February 8 meeting Special Envoy
Ahtisaari and Acting Permrep Wolff discussed the way ahead on
the Kosovo status process including taking Ahtisaari's
package to the Security Council and work that will follow.
Wolff explained that the Russians were continuing to play for
time in New York. The African Security Council members were
still divided and Ambassador Wolff and Wisner would hold a
lunch with all three of them soon to allay their concerns.
Ahtisaari stated that he did not think China would be a
problem. Ambassador Wolff also said P-3 permreps had met
recently with U/SYG for Legal Affairs Michel and U/SYG for
Political Affairs Gambari and made it clear that Ahtisaari's
package should not be fiddled with. Michel was problematic
and would require more attention but Gambari seemed to
understand the message. Ambassador Wolff stated that we
should aim to wrap up Kosovo work by April; otherwise it
could be delayed until the G-8. End Summary.

AMBASSADOR WOLFF BRIEFS AHTISAARI ON USUN WORK ON KOSOVO
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In a February 8 meeting Special Envoy Ahtisaari and
Acting Permrep Wolff discussed the way ahead on the Kosovo
status process including taking Ahtisaari's package to the
Security Council and work that will follow. As the meeting
opened, Ambassador Wolff relayed to Ahtisaari recent
developments in New York stating that at a Security Council
lunch the previous week, Russian FM Lavrov had come out
swinging on Kosovo saying there could only be an agreed
approach with no deadlines and no tolerance for Kosovar
blackmail, but he had ended on a softer note likening Kosovo
independence to NATO expansion that Russia had not liked but
had lived with. Ahtisaari said Lavrov had called U/SYG
Nambiar and asked that the Secretariat not distribute drafts
to the Security Council despite Ahtisaari having wanted it
released. He noted he had already distributed it to the EU,
the Contact Group and NATO and Pristina intended to release
it to the press.


3. (C) Wolff warned that we should watch out for the
Africans: Ghana as the AU chair was robust and had strong
concerns about territorial integrity; Congo seemed persuaded
that self-determination was more important; South Africa
seemed to be in the middle. He said that he and Ambassador
Wisner planned to have lunch with all three African permreps
soon to impress on them that Kosovo bore no similarity to the
African experience and that concerns about territorial
intergity in Africa were groundless because the more
important issue was larger EU integration.


4. (C) Wolff also explained that the P-3 had seen U/SYG for
Legal Affairs Michel and U/SYG for Political Affairs Gambari
and made it clear that Ahtisaari's package should not be
fiddled with. Wolff said that if SYG Ban attaches a cover
letter to Ahtisaari's package it should contain an
unequivocal endorsement. He explained that DPA seemed to
understand the message and the P-3 would see Guehenno soon.
Ahtisaari noted that he thought U/SYG Guehenno would be fully
on board. Wolff stated that Michel had concerns both with
being consulted and more long-term issues regarding the UN's
relationship with an independent Kosovo.

CHINA
--------------


5. (C) Ahtisaari noted that he had met Chinese Permrep Wang
the day before and also seen the Chinese Ambassador in Vienna
and had asked them both to at least abstain in a Security
Council vote. He noted that he had good relations with China
cultivated because while he was President of Finland he had
maintained a strict one-China policy and expected there would
be no problems with the Chinese. Ahtisaari said Wang had
told him however that the Europeans needed to get their house
in order as some had complained to him and offered differing
views. Ahtisaari said he expected to come to the Security
Council by the end of March.

RUSSIANS IN NEW YORK URGE SIGNIFICANT DELAY
--------------


6. (C) Wolff explained that Russian DPR Shcherbak had pulled
him aside at a dinner several days before and argued that
beginning work in the Security Council in March was too soon
and three or four months would be needed to give the


Europeans, who were the key, time to sell the outcome to
Belgrade. Shcherbak had also alleged that the model should
be Montenegro's split from Serbia and that Belgrade was
prepared to negotiate longer and then bless independence at
the end. Wolff noted that when pressed on whether he had
actually heard this information from the Serbians, Shcherbak
had merely stated "we know." Ambassador Wolff noted that he
would meet with Serbian Permrep Jevremovic soon. Wolff also
noted that the Russian game was dangerous because it set the
Europeans up for blame. Wolff continued that we needed unity
and an unequivocal endorsement from the Europeans. Ahtisaari
Chief of Staff Kai Sauer stated that the Germans had
volunteered to help in outreach with other Europeans.

ENDGAME IN COUNCIL
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Wolff stated that we should aim to wrap up
Kosovo work in April. If we lapse into May, then it would
likely be delayed until the G-8 Summit in June. Ahtisaari
asked Wolff whether we were comfortable with South Africa
handling it during its presidency. Wolff responded that
there was limited damage that a Security Council president
could do and, indeed, one that was biased would typically
have to work harder to seem neutral. In response to question
from Deputy Political Counselor on whether Ahtisaari was
sharing his final recommendations with UN officials to
review, Ahtisaari responded that he had not made up his mind
yet and was consulting with Ambassador Wisner and even
considering making his recommendations directly to the
Security Council so that they would be completely
tamper-proof.
WOLFF