UNGA 62: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001218

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2107
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA US XG XH XT ZB
SUBJECT: UNGA 62: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS FOR REASON
1.4 (B&D)

Summary and Introduction:


1. (U) Robert Smolik served as the Senior Area Adviser for
Western Europe during the main session of the 62nd UN General
Assembly. The following is his summary of the UNGA as it
pertained to the region.


2. (C) Throughout this 62d UN General Assembly our EU
partners have not always proven effective, collective allies
on critical issues. They coordinate closely with us on human
rights resolutions (while continuing to press us to
participate in the Human Rights Council). They mute their
differences with us over such issues as the death penalty and
climate change. A somewhat overwhelmed Portuguese EU
presidency gave us scope to differentiate national positions.
Distinct perspectives also came from Switzerland and others
like Liechtenstein, whose experienced and active UN
ambassadors give them influence disproportionate to their
populations.


3. (C) On the downside, the wealthy EU nations did not stand
with us on UN budget discipline (septel),nor have they
modified traditional positions on UN declarations about Cuba
and Palestine. As "new Europeans" like Hungary, Poland,
Czech Republic, and Slovakia integrate more closely with the
EU, our margin of tactical maneuver with them narrows. The
bottom line is that the EU provides our core support within
WEOG, as we face often overwhelming opposition from other UN
regional groupings. End Summary.


4. (C) U.S. relations with Western European nations during
the 62d UNGA centered on human rights, with many
ramifications. We worked together efficiently and
effectively on the practical business of passing resolutions
condemning abuses by Belarus, Burma, DPRK, and Iran. EU
partners (collectively and nationally) and the smaller voting
members (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and
Switzerland) shared responsibility with us in securing votes
from African and GRULAC delegations where they enjoy special
influence. This EU collaboration was critical in the close
vote condemning Iran, as acknowledged by Canada, the
resolution's sponsor. Nevertheless, no meeting between EU
permanent representatives and the Western Europe area advisor
ended without a pitch or plea for the U.S. to engage on human
rights with the UN in Geneva.


5. (C) The Western Europeans were also cooperative, if not at
first actively supportive, on our anti-rape resolution.
Despite early indications that the EU's resolution against
the death penalty would implicitly criticize the U.S., its
final passage instead drew fire from Egypt and Singapore,
among others. Most revealing was the contrast in comments
following passage in third committee of the anti-rape and
death penalty resolutions. Many delegations spoke openly of
European "insensitivity" while South Africa and others
praised our conduct of the anti-rape negotiations. The Holy
See observer worked quietly but effectively behind the scenes
on many of these human rights issues.


6. (C) Much of the U.S.-EU dynamic was conditioned by
Portugal's EU presidency delegation, which at times seemed
understaffed and/or overwhelmed. This may have worked to our
advantage in that several of the "newer Europeans" felt less
constrained in voicing their national positions. This played
out both bilaterally and one hopes on certain issues within
EU caucus. This dynamic also played positively with the
smaller voting Europeans (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San
Marino) and with Switzerland. Several of these permanent
representatives have long tenure at the UN, and consequently
exert disproportionate influence, both during informal EU
discussions and with other groupings. Examples of this: -
one in our favor and the other not, are: (1)San Marino's
principled open criticism of no-action motions and (2)
Liechtenstein's efforts to dilute UN financial sanctions.
Here, too, the Holy See observer was a presence behind the
scenes.


7. (C) EU opposition to U.S. objectives played out again this
year over resolutions regarding Cuba and Palestine. Despite
Israel's sponsoring its first ever technical resolution,
which passed, and U.S. agreement to join consensus on one of
the Palestine resolutions, the pattern of condemning Israel
continued at UNGA 62. However, one of the Palestine
resolutions (L. 14) passed by only a narrow margin and so
prospects for reversal may improve in future years (also see
Paris 4743 in support of this possibility).


8. (C) On many of these issues, the "newer EU" permanent
representatives privately expressed perspectives different

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from the public EU common position. The Czech Republic was
strongest on human rights, criticizing the Human Rights
Council's performance. Its loss to Croatia for a seat on the
Security Council will probably concentrate and channel its
energies into future UNGAs. Hungary was willing to push the
envelope on other human rights issues and worked very
collaboratively with us in trying to persuade other
delegations. Slovakia is clearly seeking a broader role at
the UN, especially in peace-building, and should be more
active in the GA, once its Security Council term is over.
Poland, however, perhaps due to the personality of its
permanent representative, toed the EU line.


9. (C) Nevertheless, the small Western European nations,
which do not seek EU membership, remain another, if modest
hope to influence the EU bloc. They can also carry our
message to other smaller delegations. San Marino and
Switzerland have on occasion differentiated themselves from
the EU on certain UN procedural and institutional issues.
Cultivating them further, along with Liechtenstein, and even
Luxembourg within the EU, could help influence EU common
positions.


10. (C) Budget issues were still in play as of December 21.
So far, neither the large, wealthy nor the smaller Western
European nations have joined with us to oppose an
unreasonably large budget increase. Whether this is
attributable to their policy objectives, or as likely to a
strong euro, their irresponsible attitude in fifth committee
has run counter to our usual partnership.


11. (C) The U.S. and the EU agree on many key UNGA 62 issues.
At future GAs our joint efforts to influence other
delegations, particularly those where EU states have special
influence, will be critical. Therefore working the Western
Europe account long-term and conceptually will continue to be
an excellent investment to leverage our influence.
Khalilzad