EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE 62ND UNGA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001217

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA AA AM BK BU CY EN GG GR HR
IC, LG, LH, MD, MK, MW, RO, RS, SI, TU, UP
SUBJECT: EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE 62ND UNGA

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B&D)

Summary and Introduction


1. (U) This cable was prepared by Ambassador James Gadsden,
who served as Senior Area Adviser for Eastern European
Affairs to the 62nd United Nations General Assembly.


2. (C) Summary: Most Eastern European states generally
supported US priority objectives for the Fall session of the
62nd UNGA: adoption of the resolution condemning rape as an
instrument to achieve military and political objectives;
adoption of resolutions on the human rights situation in
Iran, Burma, Belarus and the DPRK; resisting Palestinian
resolutions widely supported by UN member governments; the
appointment of US candidate David Walker to the Independent
Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC),and focusing UN member
states attention on excessive increases in the 2008/2009
proposed UN budget. This message assesses the impact of 1)
the tendancy of Eastern European states to align with EU
member states on UN positions, 2) the interplay of regional
sensitivities on UNGA voting decisions, and 3) the limits of
Eastern European alignment with EU member states on UNGA
issues on support for US positions. To maximize Eastern
European support for US positions, we should 1) intensify
efforts to find common ground with the EU, with which Eastern
European states tend to align; 2) cultivate relationships
with Eastern European officials throughout the year in New
York, Washington, and capitals, thereby demonstrating US
interest in their assessment of their strategic environment,
and 3) explore, long before the next UNGA, ways in which
Eastern European states could support our positions without
jeopardizing their strategic interests. End Summary.

The Tendency to Align with EU Member States


3. (SBU) Three inter-related dynamics drive Eastern European
states' UNGA voting. The dominant dynamic is the tendency to
align with EU member states, except where their national
interests lead them to choose another course. Perm Reps of
new EU Eastern European states, such as Estonia, Latvia,
Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania, together with aspirant
Croatia, often state boldly that their top foreign policy
priorities are NATO membership, EU membership, and
participation in global affairs through the UN. For them,
being a good new EU member means working to achieve consensus
among EU member states on UN issues. These countries treat
the EU and the UN as vehicles through which they can leverage
influence in global affairs with leadership positions in
either organization. The Croatian Perm Rep lobbied hard for
Croatia's 2009 Security Council seat and was confident
Croatia would win on the first round. Slovenia's Perm Rep,
poised confidently to coordinate in New York EU member state
positions on UN issues when Slovenia becomes EU Council
President on January 1, 2008, is already laying the
groundwork for Slovenia's bid for a Security Council seat in
2012 and a UNICEF Executive Board seat in 2008. Bulgaria soon
will campaign to succeed Slovenia with a Security Council
seat in 2010-2011. Substantive UNGA priorities for these
states will remain human security, human rights, human social
development, women's rights, HIV-AIDS, Millennium Development
Goals, and climate change. Croatia is eager to contribute to
UN reconciliation, peacekeeping, peace building, and police
training efforts, areas in which it believes it can offer
others the benefits of its experience. Bosnia and Herzegovina
wants to emphasize humanitarian assistance in natural and
man-made disasters.


4. (SBU) The tendancy to align with EU member state
positions is clear in the voting patterns of Iceland, which
is not an EU aspirant, and states to the East that wish to
join the EU. The Icelandic Perm Rep indicated privately that
unlike in the past, Iceland no longer will follow the US
consistently on foreign policy issues. It will instead align
more closely with the EU. Eastern European countries such as
Macedonia, Montenegro, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Turkey, Albania, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Romania,
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Georgia also cite EU membership as
their long term foreign policy high priority and the UN as
their vehicle for engaging in global affairs. On most issues,
they too tend to align with EU member states on UN voting.
The most helpful and approachable non-EU Eastern European
states were Ukraine, Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, and Montenegro. They
were least comfortable when the US and the EU could not find
common ground, for example on the Palestinian resolutions.


5. (SBU) The Central European states, the Baltic States,
Ukraine, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova,
especially grateful for the US role in their transition to
democracy and market economy, are most comfortable when the
US and the EU positions on UN issues mesh. Except for
Turkey and Iceland, both of whom committed to other
candidates before the US candidate was announced, most
Eastern European states voted for David Walker for the
Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC). Once US
negotiators developed a consensus rape resolution text, which
EU states joined, most non-EU Eastern European states quickly
did so as well. Most Eastern European states joined EU member
states in voting for the DPRK and Burma human rights
resolutions. Differences between EU and some Eastern European
states over the Belarus and Iran human rights resolution
complicated those states aligning with the EU.

Regional Sensitivities


6. (SBU) Regional Sensitivities form the second dynamic
driving Eastern European states' UNGA voting. First among
those are security and commercial relations. Armenia, for
example, is a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty
Organization, together with Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In addition, Armenia enjoys
beneficial trade relations with Belarus. For these reasons,
Armenia voted "no" in committee and plenary on the Belarus
Human Rights Resolution, while EU states and Turkey voted
"yes." During the Belarus no-action vote, Armenia's Perm Rep
went for coffee. Armenia objected strongly to current "GUAM"
coordinator Azerbaijan's recent tabling of a draft resolution
on protracted conflicts. The Azeri Perm Rep hinted that if
the GUAM pushes this resolution forward, Armenia may
re-examine its participation in the OSCE-sponsored talks on
Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the Azeris tabled the draft this
year, they expect it will be discussed in 2008. Ukraine is
considering tabling during the 63rd UNGA a draft resolution
on the 1932 famine, and the Perm Rep has requested the
assistance of State Department legal advisors on language to
avoid reference, even by implication, to "genocide." For
completely different reasons, the Armenians and the Russians
are both very sensitive about Ukraine's famine initiative.
While Russia joined the consensus on the rape resolution and
was an early supporter of the Walker nomination, Russia was
not helpful on the country specific human rights resolutions.
The Russians will pay close attention to UNGA reform
discussions to ensure that UNGA reforms do not change what
they see as the iron-clad, charter-based balanced
relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA.


7. (SBU) A second regional sensitivity is relations with the
Moslem world. For East European countries with Moslem
domestic communities, such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Albania,
Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the concern is the
prospect of negative domestic repercussions of positions
their governments might take on the Palestinian resolutions
or on Iran. While EU member states tend to vote "yes" on some
Palestinian resolutions and abstain on most, Turkey and
Azerbaijan, also concerned about their image in the OIC, tend
more consistently to vote "yes." Turkey chose not to
participate in any voting on Iran. A third key sensitivity,
especially for Armenia, is the diaspora throughout the Moslem
world, but especially in Iran. Yerevan worries about the
welfare of ethnic Armenians who for centuries enjoyed
relatively privileged lives in Iran and elsewhere in the
Middle East, including freedom to practice their religion. A
fourth consideration is dependence, especially for energy
supplies and investment resources. Iran supplies natural gas
to Armenia, a concern as winter approaches, and is building
an oil refinery in Armenia which could generate considerable
employment. Given these factors Armenia, in plenary, voted
"no" on the Iran Resolution and "yes" on the no-action
motion. Armenia abstained or was absent for the vote on the
amendment proposed in plenary. Regional sensitivities such as
these do challenge the EU's push for Europe to speak with one
voice on global affairs.

The Limits on Aligning EU and Eastern European States
Positions on UNGA Issues


8. (SBU) In an ideal world, the EU Council President would
relish more opportunities to declare on most issues the
preamble to his December 18, 2007 plenary statement opposing
no-action motions on the Iran, Burma, and Belarus human
rights resolutions: " I have the honor to speak on behalf of
the European Union. The candidate countries Croatia and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the
Stabilization and Association Process, the potential
candidates Albania and Montenegro, the EFTA countries Iceland
and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as
Moldova align themselves with this statement(" In New York,
the EU presidency coordinates positions among EU member
states through weekly meetings of the EU Perm Reps, the head
of the New York Council Secretariat Office, and the head of
the European Commission's New York office. These meetings
are supplemented by daily meetings of experts from member
states missions and often from capitals as well. EU mission
officials complain that they spend far more time in EU
coordination meetings than they do at the UN.


9. (SBU) A Troika of the presidency, the council secretariat,
and the Commission meets twice yearly with EFTA members
states and less frequently with candidate states, states in
association arrangements, and other non-EU European states.
More frequently, common EU positions and draft statements are
simultaneously communicated electronically to EU and non-EU
European Perm Reps together with an invitation to align with
the EU. Informal channels, such as readouts from Nordic EU
member states to the Icelandic and Norwegian Perm Reps
augment the periodic Troika meetings and electronic
communications with non-EU European states. The current
head of the EU Council Secretariat's New York Office
indicated that with the number and pace of EU coordination
meetings and UN meetings, Council Secretariat officials in
New York are simply not able to conduct extensive outreach to
non-EU European missions. Now planning the future EU External
Action Agency's New York office, he is already incorporating
into those plans additional staff members dedicated
specifically to outreach and improved coordination with
non-EU European missions as well as with other UN regional
groupings.

Recommendations

10.(C) The most helpful and approachable non-EU Eastern
European states were Ukraine, Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova,
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, and
Montenegro. They tended to co-sponsor the rape resolution,
support Walker's election, and vote with us on the four
country specific human rights resolutions. Cultivating
relationships with them throughout the year in New York, in
Washington, and in capitals and demonstrating US interest in
their assessment of their strategic environment would enhance
the likelihood of their support for our positions during the
next UNGA. With Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, we should
explore ways in which those states could support our
positions without jeopardizing their strategic interests in
energy supplies, investments, trade, image in the OIC,
repercussions in domestic Moslem communities, and the welfare
of the diaspora in the Moslem world. In this context, urging
"going for coffee" during important committee or plenary
voting on Iran or on Palestinian issues, on which regional
sensitivities are in play, might be a more effective initial
US approach than pressing for a "yes" or a "no" vote or even
for an abstention, which these countries have demonstrated
they are politically not prepared to deliver.

Khalilzad