DPKO U/SYG GUEHENNO CONCERNED ABOUT UNAMID WEAKNESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001211

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU MOPS KV AF
SUBJECT: DPKO U/SYG GUEHENNO CONCERNED ABOUT UNAMID WEAKNESS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 2017

B. USUN 1132

C. USUN 1153

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 B/D.


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: At a December 17 working lunch at UN
Headquarters, Deputy Secretary Negroponte and U/SYG for
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Jean Marie Guehenno reviewed
problems with the deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur
(UNAMID). Guehenno said that he continued to be concerned
about TCC shortfalls and delays and with GOS obstacles in the
run-up to the December 31 AMIS to UNAMID transfer of
authority. Guehenno said DPKO continued to hold Egyptian
troop contributions to one battalion to offset "perceptions"
that Egypt was "too close" to the GOS and suggested that the
U.S. might also raise this with Egypt. The Deputy Secretary
inquired about the appointment of a UN-AU chief mediator to
handle day-to-day interactions with the rebel groups and the
GOS and lamented the lack of progress on the political track.
On Afghanistan, the Deputy Secretary told Guehenno that the
U.S. is committed to Paddy Ashdown's candidacy as an SRSG for
Afghanistan. Guehenno said the U.S. could be helpful on
Kosovo by weighing in with the Secretary General in support
of the U.S.-EU led scenario for supervised independence for
Kosovo. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) U.S. Participants: Deputy Secretary John Negroponte,
AMB Zalmay Khalilzad, D Staff Gustavo Delgado, USUN MSC LTC
Glenn Sadowski, USUN Poloff Jesse Levinson (notetaker). UN
Participants: U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno, A/SYG Edmond Mulet,
Darfur Planning Director Mike Gaoutte, and Milatary Advisor
Major General Per Arne Five.


DPKO: UNAMID Lacks Key Capabilities



3. (C/NF) The Deputy Secretary told UN DPKO U/SYG Guehenno at
a December 17 working lunch that the U.S. wanted to be as
helpful as possible in facilitating the deployment of a
robust peacekeeping force to Darfur. Guehenno responded that
he was "very worried" about the peacekeeping force's lack of
capacity. He noted the December 14 attack by unidentified
gunmen on an AMIS convoy in North Darfur (ref A) as a
disturbing sign regarding the security conditions the
peacekeepers would encounter upon arrival.


4. (C/NF) With regard to the deployment, Guehenno was
skeptical about any significant increase in UNAMID's
capabilities vis a vis AMIS until late February or early
March (ref B). The initial deployment of Egyptian and
Ethiopian infantry battalions would move relatively quickly
in early 2008, but beyond these close to 3,000 troops UNAMID
will not have any additional military capabilities in place
for quite some time. The main body of Chinese engineers and
their equipment should arrive mid-January, but could arrive
even later. Guehenno expressed pessimism that the forces on
the ground at the December 31 Transfer of Authority (TOA)
would be able to effect any immediate security improvement on
the ground in Darfur.


5. (C/NF) Guehenno asked the U.S. to continue assisting DPKO
with efforts to identify TCCs to provide the missing
helicopters and transport assets. At the close of the
meeting, Guehenno provided the Deputy Secretary with a
current list of the countries that DPKO has contacted
requesting helicopters.


GOS Not Following Through
on Lisbon Commitments



6. (C/NF) With regard to the December 13 UN-GOS agreements on
the margins of the EU-Africa Summit, A/SYG Mulet said that
GOS had subsequently reopened all the accoutrement (blue
berets, arm bands, etc.) issues they had agreed to in Lisbon.
The UN planned to proceed with the January 1 rehatting of
AMIS to UN forces as if the agreement still stood. Mulet
reported Sudanese backpedaling on commitments to resolve
outstanding issues with land for bases, night flights, and a
formal response to the UN-AU TCC list (ref C). A/SYG Mulet
conceded that the GOS had released some communications
equipment from al-Fasher Airport and that Status of Forces
Agreement discussions were ongoing, but his view was that the

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Sudanese have still not "made the strategic commitment" to
allow a peacekeeping force.


Egypt Playing Unhelpful
Role in Fifth Committee



7. (C/NF) Guehenno noted that Egypt continued to insist on
fielding the full two battalions it had offered up for
UNAMID. They were now blocking the UN budget in the fifth
committee, ostensibly in an effort to force the issue.
(NOTE:Per USUN contacts, Egypt's motivations are primarily
financial. END NOTE.) Guehenno said that he continued to
push back on additional Egyptian troops because of his
concern that the Darfur rebel groups perceive the Government
of Egypt as far too close an ally of President Bashir.
Increasing the Egyptian components of the force, he believes,
would decrease UNAMID's legitimacy with the local population
and potentially endanger the safety of the entire operation.
Guehenno observed that the U.S. might be able to help with
the Egyptians on this point. The Deputy Secretary was
non-committal.


DPKO: Darfur Peace Process
Needs Full-Time Attention



8. (C/NF) The Deputy Secretary asked about the pending
appointment of a UN-AU chief mediator to handle day-to-day
interactions with the rebel groups and the GOS. Guehenno
agreed that the Darfur peace process needed more of a "full
time" commitment than the UN and AU Special Envoys, Jan
Eliasson and Salim Ahmad Salim, could provide. He added that
the politics of the situation required an African, preferably
an Arabic speaker. Guehenno reported that UNDP Development
Policy Director Carlos Lopez had declined the job, but
referred to two former Algerian Permanent Representatives to
the UN, Abdullah Baali and Muhammad Sahnoun, as potential
candidates.


9. (C/NF) Guehenno expressed doubt, however, that the GOS was
sincerely interested in moving forward with a viable peace
process. He thinks that elements of the Sudanese Government,
mainly Military Intelligence and key members of President
Bashir's inner circle, still view "divide and rule" as their
best strategy for dealing with the Darfur crisis. Guehenno
quipped that the Sudanese were still relying on their long
established strategy for dealing with Darfur rebel groups,
what he called "the three B's - bomb, bribe and bargain."


Afghanistan



9. (C/NF) The Deputy Secretary told Guehenno that the U.S. is
committed to Paddy Ashdown's candidacy as a an SRSG for
Afghanistan. Guehenno did not voice an opinion directly, but
said that the terms of reference and the number of hats, i.e.
a joint NATO and UN appointment, would have to be resolved.


Kosovo



10. (C/NF) On Kosovo, Guehenno said it would be useful for
the U.S. to speak with SYG Ban to encourage him to be
supportive of the U.S.-EU led scenario for supervised
independence for Kosovo. Guehenno opined that the SYG had
already heard from several other delegations on the issue who
were "pushing him very hard."


11. (U) D has cleared this message.
Khalilzad