UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 62ND GA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001193

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2022
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR PINS ECON XW XY ZF ZU
SUBJECT: UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 62ND GA

REF: 06 USUN 2260

Classified By: Min.- Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis for reasons 1.4 (B&D
)


1. (SBU) Gerald Scott is again serving as Senior Area Advisor
for Africa at USUN during the regular session of the General
Assembly. These are his personal reflections on African
participation as the regular session of the 62nd GA draws to
a close. (Note that while in the UN context the African
Group includes the states of the North African littoral,
usage of the term in this cable reflects Ambassador Scott's
portfolio which deals only with the delegations of the
African governments falling within the purview of State's
Bureau of African Affairs.)

SUMMARY


2. (SBU) The record of the African delegations at this GA
does not vary much from that of last year. There was some
criticism of the USG in the General Debate, especially on our
Cuban embargo. A protracted negotiation of our resolution
condemning rape "in conflict and related situations" resulted
in a much modified text which was finally adopted by
consensus. Four country-specific human rights resolutions
(Iran, Burma, Belarus and DPRK) were approved in Third
Committee (and have been referred to Plenary),but it was a
near-run thing since no-action motions receiving substantial
African support were proposed on three of them in Committee.
The anti-Israeli texts passed by massive margins, African
performance mitigated by a handful of abstentions. The
annual resolution condemning our Cuban embargo, which also
passed with almost universal approbation, was the occasion
for six African delegations to attack us from the floor. Our
efforts at budget discipline received no real African
support. But in elections of individuals to UN bodies, our
candidates have prevailed with large numbers of African
votes. I recommend further dialogue to emphasize the
importance we attach to the UN and our desire to see it
function more effectively. End Summary

THE GENERAL DEBATE


3. (SBU) The seven days of the General Debate, which begins
the General Assembly, provide the annual opportunity for each
member to express its views on the state of the world. Most
of this is diplomatic boiler-plate, but occasionally
something breaks the monotony. Since any direct criticism of
another government is, in this context, an unfriendly act, I
always listen for mention of the US. Angola, the Gambia,
Namibia, and Sao Tome all objected to our Cuban embargo.
Namibia which has criticized us on this in four of the last
five General Debates, inaccurately called it a "blockade," as
do the Cubans. Eritrea charged that we sided with Ethiopia
in the boundary dispute. But President Mugabe of Zimbabwe
gave one of the most vituperative speeches heard in such
debates, partly directed at the British but mostly at the USG
and President Bush. (Except for a junior note-taker, we
withdrew all our delgation during his performance.)


4. (U) On the other hand, several delgations praised us.
Liberia, Malawi (for help with Malaria),Mauritius (for our
sanctions against Burma),Togo. Niger's printed text had
praise for our Middle East initiative, but this was dropped
from the spoken text. Botswana favorably cited President
Truman. For some reason, Djibouti and Mali did not speak
this year.

THE U.S.ANTI-RAPE RESOLUTION


5. (C) After weeks of negotiation, the Third Committee
adopted the U.S.-sponsored resolution "Eliminating rape and
other forms of sexual violence in all their manifestations,
including in conflict and related situations" by consensus.
Our original title was "Condemning the Use of Rape as an
Instrument of State Policy," and the text was more pointed
towards deliberate suppression of a population (or segment
thereof) by violence including rape. Our draft text, which
we had hoped would garner widespread support, was instead
opposed by a small group of African missions who insisted
that it was in fact aimed at Sudan - and possibly other
African states. While we believe that most African
delegations would have accepted our draft, or something close
to it, the dynamic of African group politics meant that
almost all were silent in the caucus while Egypt, Sudan and
Uganda held forth on the necessity of resisting the US text.

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We were in negotiation with the Africa group headed first by
Benin and then by Angola. Both gave the impression of trying
to be helpful, but the constant referral of every
modification to the Africa Group allowed Sudan, Egypt, Uganda
and South Africa to set the tone. The DRC was an original
co-sponsor, but reportedly spoke little. Tanzania reportedly
made helpful arguments. The final consensus preserved the
essence of our argument, but the lengthy process consumed an
extraordinary amount of time and energy.


COUNTRY-SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS


6. (SBU) Every year we, Canada and the Europeans sponsor
country-specific human rights resolutions in Third Committee.
This year the process was complicated by the existence of
the Human Rights Council, the Geneva-based body replacing the
Human Rights Commission. The Council, of which we are not a
member, has so far compiled a very weak record, finding only
Israel worthy of serious criticism. We and others have
therefore argued that the General Assembly and its Third
Committee should continue to be the fora for consideration of
egregious violators. This year we sponsored a text on
Belarus, the EU sponsored texts on the DPRK and Burma, and
Canada sponsored a text on Iran. In the Third Committee (see
USUN 1082) the DPRK draft passed 97 (US) - 23 - 60. (The
Africans were 10 - 5 - 26 - and 7 not participating.) The
North Koreans did not present a no-action motion to block
consideration of the draft.


7. (SBU) The Burma, Iran and Belarus drafts were all
confronted by no-action motions in Third Committee, all of
which were defeated, but in the case of Iran by one vote.
Africa no-action votes were as follows: on Burma, 17 - 6 - 17
- 8; on Iran, 28 - 4 (Burundi, Liberia, Madagascar and
Rwanda) - 10 - 6; on Belarus, 17 - 6 - 15 - 10. These are
the key votes, because, if successful, they block
consideration of the texts which pass by comfortable margins
- though only after a major lobbying effort. A number of
African delegations were consistent supporters of no-action
motions: Angola, Botswana, Congo, DRC, Gambia, Guinea,
Namibia, S.Africa, Swaziland and Zambia. To these Sudan,
Uganda and Zimbabwe added consistently negative votes on the
texts of the drafts as well. But an interesting point; in
spite of the rhetoric about group unity, most of the 48 AF
delegations did not adhere to this pattern. Some were
consistently absent: CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome,
Seychelles. Some consistently abstained (or mixed
abstentions with absences): Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mozambique, Sierra Leone. And the other 26 were more varied
in their voting. So it is clear that there is no African
consensus on the question of country-specific human rights
texts. So long as no African country is the object of the
exercise, most delegations demonstrate a considerable freedom
from the restraints of what is often put forward as the
Non-Aligned Movement position of opposition.

8.(SBU) On the texts, Burundi and Liberia were constantly
with the US. Tanzania and Ghana were with us on Burma and
the DPRK. Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe were consistently
opposed; Somalia opposed the texts three times, the Gambia
and Guinea twice. A more detailed analysis was supplied by
email on Nov. 26th. What will really count, of course, are
the votes in Plenary which will take place after I leave the
Mission.

ANTI-ISRAELI RESOLUTIONS


9. (C) Every year the GA votes a number of
pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli texts. These are sticks to beat
the Israelis (and ourselves) and every year we suffer massive
defeat. We are required by PL 106-13 to actively seek the
abolition of entities that contribute neither to peace nor to
the goal of UN reform. With that in view, we concentrate on
attempting to reduce the support for three resolutions that
mandate three unhelpful UN bodies: The Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied
Territories, The Division for Palestinian Rights of the
Secretariat, and The Committee on the Exercise of the

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Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.


10. (U) The Plenary votes on the Division of Palestinian
Rights and on the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People have taken
place. The Division was reconfirmed by 110 - 8(US) - 54.

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The Committee was reconfirmed by 109 - 8(US) - 55. (Note that
this Committee is chaired by Senegal, and Guinea, Madagascar,
Mali, Namibia, Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Africa are
members.) In both votes, the Africans voted 37 - 0 - 2
(Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire) and 9 marked absent (Burundi,
Chad, Eq. Guinea, the Gambia, B. Bissau, Madagascar, Rwanda,
Sao Tome and Seychelles).


11. (SBU) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices was reconfirmed in Fourth Committee by a narrower
margin (85 - 8(US) - 70). (This is a three-member committee
of which Senegal is the only African.) The Africans voted 25
- 0 - 8 (Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, E.Guinea,
Ethiopia, Malawi, and Swaziland) and 15 not participating (B.
Faso, CAR, Chad, DRC, the Gambia, G.Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho,
Liberia, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, and Somalia). Since the total of negative votes and
abstentions on this resolution almost equal the positive
votes, we are pushing to reduce the support for this text in
the Plenary vote which at this writing has not taken place.
(In the 4th Committee vote, compared with last year, Eq.
Guinea went from "yes" to "abstain." Cape Verde and Uganda,
the reverse.)

THE CUBA EMBARGO RESOLUTION


12. (SBU) Another event in which we suffer an annual loss is
the resolution calling for an end to the U.S. embargo of
Cuba. This year the vote was 184 - 4(US) - 1. Every member
of the African Group voted in favor of the resolution; no
surprise there. But in addition, six addressed the Assembly
to underscore their opposition to our policy. They were
South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Sudan.
(Uganda was new to this list. On the other hand, Lesotho and
Namibia spoke last year, but not this year.) The standard
language is more in sorrow than in anger, but Sudan called
the embargo a "blockade" and said it was "a crime against
humanity."

INDIVIDUAL ELECTIONS


13. (SBU) Another major aspect of our effort in the General
Assembly is the election of U.S. candidates to various UN
bodies. Here we are almost always successful, and generally
have very good support from African delegations. This year
we saw Ms Felice Gaer, one of twelve candidates, elected to
one of five open seats on the UN Committee Against Torture.
David Walker, the Comptroller General of the U.S., was
elected to the UN Independent Audit Advisory Committee
(thirty African delegations pledged their support). We
expect that Pierre-Richard Prosper will be elected to the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in
January.

THE BUDGET AND UN REFORM


14. (C) Part of the dialogue in New York is our effort to
restrain the UN budget and promote more efficient use of
resources. We battle strong headwinds on this, since the
Africans contribute almost nothing and receive a great deal.
If we and a few others pay more, it is no loss to them. Most
of the negotiations on these matters take place among experts
in the Fifth Committee, but I try to sensitize Permanent
Representatives to the reality that our concerns are not only
driven by (legitimate) Congressional interest, but also by
our desire to see the UN made more effective. Unfortunately,
when most delegations hear "reform," it translates into more
African seats on the Security Council -- and not much else.

COMMENT


15. (C) The African Group has the reputation of being the
most unified of the regional groups. This is a reflection of
the reality that the weak hang together for fear of being
hanged separately. And they are swayed on some issues
important to us by the remnant of the anti-colonial dynamic
and the knowledge (as one Ambassador put it to me) that they
are (some of them, at least) one coup d'etat away from
finding themselves on, e.g., a human rights black list. But
it does not take much contact to realize that African
governments, like most others, send very impressive people to
New York. Unfortunately, unless they are on the Security
Council, or are before the Council because of crises, or are
automatically very major players (e.g., Nigeria),they
necessarily get little attention from us until we staff up
for the GA -- at which point one does one's best.

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16. (C) Cooperation with individual missions is often
striking -- even if it frequently does not in public extend
further than a principled abstention on a dicey vote. I
should like to mention several missions particularly helpful
this year (some more with advice and information than with
votes): Botswana, Burundi, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania. Others,
particularly unhelpful, were Uganda (a real change),South
Africa (thanks to their NAM leadership tradition),and of
course Sudan and Zimbabwe (with neither of whom have I
established real contact).


17. (C) Most of the rest were personally congenial, but
unable or unwilling to step very far away from the standard
posture on controversial issues. Many in the north are
governed by Islamic/Arab considerations. South Africa exerts
too much of a pull on her neighbors. But if engaged and
cultivated individually, much useful work can be done.


18. (C) I recommend that most Embassies seek out the
appropriate level at the Foreign Ministry or the Presidency
and discuss our common and divergent positions during the GA.
Our gratitude for support should be expressed as well as our
disappointment, particularly on human rights issues, since
these matters come up year after year. In the process, they
should be reminded that there is no real African consensus on
these matters.


19. (C) Governments need to hear that we value the UN, take
it seriously, and want it to be more effective in dealing
with the crises and the issues of the international system.
There is a perception that we see the UN, and especially the
GA, as a negative element in our world. This may
occasionally be an accurate view, but it is a distinctly
unhelpful one, especially in Africa where the UN is seen as
the natural friend of the weak. We need to position
ourselves better in this regard, and in doing so will
increase useful cooperation in matters of common concern in
the years ahead.



Khalilzad