Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK1155
2007-12-11 22:19:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
USUN New York
Cable title:  

CDG MINUS RUSSIA DISCUSSES RUSSIAN PRST ELEMENTS

Tags:  PREL UNSC UNMIK KV YI 
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VZCZCXRO9331
PP RUEHBZ RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #1155 3452219
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 112219Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3312
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0214
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1119
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 1055
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001155 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNSC UNMIK KV YI
SUBJECT: CDG MINUS RUSSIA DISCUSSES RUSSIAN PRST ELEMENTS
AND DECEMBER 19 MEETING


UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001155

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNSC UNMIK KV YI
SUBJECT: CDG MINUS RUSSIA DISCUSSES RUSSIAN PRST ELEMENTS
AND DECEMBER 19 MEETING



1. (SBU) On December 10, Ambassador Khalilzad convoked
Permreps of the CDG minus Russia to discuss the Russian
distributed elements for a PRST and format issues for the
December 19 UNSC meeting on the Troika report. Ambassador
Khalilzad framed the options for dealing with Russia's PRST
elements and for pushing for direct Kosovar participation in
the Security Council meeting. UK Permrep Sawers argued all
should keep in mind Russia's goals of preventing closure of
the Kosovo issue in the UNSC and dividing Europeans, and
therefore, oppose a PRST. Belgian Permrep Verbeke believed
there could be a tactical advantage in some kind of
compromise PRST containing anodyne language because Russia
then could not reasonably ask for more later. German Permrep
Matussek noted that Verbeke's argument assumes, probably
incorrectly, that Russia is ready to agree to any text, which
was unlikely so proposing "killer amendments" would be a
better approach. France's PolCoordinator also spoke in favor
of "killer amendments," such as adding that the Ahtisaari
plan should go into effect in 120 days. France did not think
a benign PRST was necessary or that Russia would agree to
one. Sawers stated that even a neutral PRST would draw us
into Russia's game and undesirably show the UNSC to be
engaged.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad raised the issue of how to show
the Council is deadlocked and asked whether we could use
affirmation of the Ahtisaari plan for that purpose. Sawyers
argued that attempting to use a resolution to show blockage
in the Council has the disadvantage that if it does not work
it could call into question our plans for going forward.
Sawers argued for a "political approach" of telling Permrep
Churkin directly that we do not accept his PRST and do not
want to engage on it. Ambassador Khalilzad proposed giving
to experts the question of how to kill Russia's PRST.


3. (SBU) In a follow-on meeting on December 11, CDG minus
experts met and tentatively agreed on a proposal to raise
Russia's elements on the margins of consultations on December
14 and have one member deliver coordinated points in a press
statement after the meeting that could also be distributed to
Security Council members. Those present also agreed, subject
to agreement from capitals, to request that President Sejdiu
be allowed to speak for the Kosovars on December 19 in a
public meeting and to be prepared to accept a private meeting
as a fallback. The group agreed to divide up meeting elected
Security Council members to sound out their views in advance
of December 19.
Khalilzad