Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK114
2007-02-09 19:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION: WIDE DIFFERENCES

Tags:  PREL KUNR UNSC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0038
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0114/01 0401937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091937Z FEB 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1309
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8277
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000114 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2011
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION: WIDE DIFFERENCES
REMAIN; GA AGREES TO CONSULT ON SPECIFIC "ISSUES" RELATED
TO COUNCIL REFORM

REF: STATE 15781

Classified By: William J. Brencick, Minister Counselor for Political Af
fairs, for reasons 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000114

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2011
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION: WIDE DIFFERENCES
REMAIN; GA AGREES TO CONSULT ON SPECIFIC "ISSUES" RELATED
TO COUNCIL REFORM

REF: STATE 15781

Classified By: William J. Brencick, Minister Counselor for Political Af
fairs, for reasons 1.4 b,d.


1. (SBU) Summary: The General Assembly's Open Ended Working
Group on Security Council expansion and reform, meeting for
the first time this year, accepted GA President Khalifa's
suggestion to proceed via five separate consultations on "key
issues" related to Council reform. Facilitators will begin
these consultations during the week of February 19 and will
be expected to provide a consolidated report back to the
working group by the end of March. While delegations
expressed support for Khalifa's proposed way forward, the
overall tone of the meeting was less cooperative than recent
GA debates on Council expansion and presaged a return to the
more acrimonious exchanges that dominated the discussion in

2005. Few delegations left the room optimistic that the
upcoming cycle of meetings will lead to broader agreement on
the substance of expansion among delegations. Most were
already focused about what comes next. End Summary.


2. (U) The Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security
Council expansion and reform met for the first time in the
61st GA Session on Thursday, February 8. GA President
Khalifa proposed that the OEWG, which has been in existence
since 1993, organize itself around five separate pieces of
the Council reform debate. She named five facilitators (one
from each of the regional groups) and asked them to begin
consultations during the week of February 19. The first
meeting on each of the five "key issues" will be an informal
meeting of the whole (with all GA members invited).
Presumably each of the facilitators will then conduct varying
consultations in order to present a consolidated report by
the end of March, as requested by Khalifa.


3. (U) The five facilitators (and their "issues") are:

-- Tunisian PR Hachani: "categories of membership";
-- Cypriot PR Mavroyiannis: "the question of the veto";
-- Croatian PR Mladineo: "the question of regional
representation";
-- Chilean PR Munoz: "the size of an enlarged Security
Council"; and
-- Dutch PR Majoor: "the working methods of the Security

Council and the relationship between the Security Council and
the General Assembly".


4. (C) Delegations that took the floor on Thursday
universally approved Khalifa's suggested way forward. The
debate, however, quickly returned to restatements of
previously held positions on the substance of reform. In
particular, Italy and Pakistan seemed taken aback by the fact
that the G-4 (India, Japan, Brazil and Germany) had prepared
a joint statement, read by Brazil at the beginning of the
meeting. Though the G-4 statement did not call for any
particular expansion model, the fact that the four continue
their political coordination on Council expansion (and so
obviously demonstrated it to the group) generated a heated
response from their opponents in Uniting for Consensus (UFC).


5. (SBU) The exchange between the G-4 and UFC delegations did
not break new ground. G-4 supporters want a process that
moves towards putting proposals to an up-or-down vote by
member states. They emphasize the language in the 2005
Summit Outcome Document that calls for expansion of the
Security Council and believe the OEWG format, with its
emphasis on consensus, is outdated. UFC supporters emphasize
the need for "ownership" of the process by the general
membership and the need for consensus-based outcome. They
oppose deadlines and support the OEWG as a forum to discuss
this issue. Where UFC will want to continue the OEWG process
through the rest of this year, G-4 supporters will seek to
use the March report from the facilitators as a means to
shift discussion to specific proposals. UFC delegations see
the March deadline as unrealistic for the facilitators, while
a number of G-4 countries on Thursday argued that they could
be done with their work "in less than four weeks".


6. (U) Panama offered a specific proposal for an "interim"
solution. Though the idea of an interim mechanism has been
discussed among delegations in New York, the Panamanians laid
out the first detailed proposal, including numbers, regional
breakdown and terms of membership. In addition, the
Panamanians suggested that specific delegations could "earn"
a permanent seat through repeated election to a non-permanent
seat. The Panamanians proposed adding six non-permanent,
re-electable, five-year seats to the Council (for a total
size of twenty-one). These six seats would be allocated per
the G-4 model: one to Latin America; one to Europe; two to
Africa; and two to Asia. Any Member State elected to one of



these seats for four consecutive terms would then occupy that
seat permanently (without a veto).


7. (C) After the meeting, the Japanese privately commented to
USUN that they were surprised by the lack of African
attendance at the session. "Only twenty-four attended, and
only one (South Africa) spoke." Working-level Japanese in
New York believe that the fundamental differences among
Member States will continue and will prevent broad consensus
from being reached. "We will have to go to a vote to decide.
The process will pick up steam only when a concrete proposal
is introduced." In this regard, the Japanese noted that they
still hoped for a response from the U.S. on their "Model D"
proposal.


8. (SBU) Other highlights from delegations' statements on
February 8:

-- Belgium: While status quo is not an option, any solution
will need the agreement of the current P5. The old proposals
are not viable.

-- South Africa: Support for expansion in both categories.
Need to focus on the function and mandate of the OEWG and
implementation of the 2005 Summit outcome document.

-- Germany: Need to move to a decision-making process; cannot
leave the "dominating role of the P5" unchanged. The current
SC is an "old, favorite car" that needs to be retired.

-- Japan: Facilitators process needs to be results oriented;
Member States need a new proposal. We are working on new
ideas and hope to present them in due course.

-- Netherlands: Need to consider a transitional arrangement;
Council needs to be perceived as legitimate, credible and
equitable by all Member States.

-- China: OEWG is an effective platform.

-- Italy: Need to work together to "build a car" that all are
comfortable in. Need a consensus solution; cannot return to
one group against the other.

-- Korea: Need to avoid deadlines and find genuine consensus,
which is more important than the question of timing or simply
changing the status quo.

-- Argentina: Those who want to change the status quo
continue to argue among themselves. Should pursue more
non-permanent members to "move legitimacy" from the current
permanent members. Our ultimate goal should be no permanent
members and no more veto.

-- Pakistan: We tried the "new, flashy car" of the G-4
proposal in 2005 and almost had a crash. The exercise
"destroyed much of the scenery along the highway." We did
not have a choice in the selection of the current P5, it was
imposed on us when we signed the Charter; but we have a
choice now and cannot accept creating new permanent members.
Need broader representation on the Council as means to
address the misuse by the Council of its authorities.

-- Malaysia: We should expand the non-permanent membership
now, while we continue to discuss the possibility of adding
new permanent members. Need to limit the use of the veto and
limit other privileges of the P5, including in the
appointment of senior UN officials.

-- Costa Rica: Disappointed that today's opportunity to
discuss the process has been set aside simply to repeat
previous positions that don't have the necessary support.

-- UK: There has been insufficient progress. Need to
enhance the Council's "effectiveness and authority". Support
Germany, India, Japan and Brazil for permanent membership and
permanent seats for Africa.

-- India: Problem wasn't that the "new, flashy car" crashed
in 2005, it was that it never got going. Currently, Security
Council decisions are legal, but not legitimate. They are
losing their natural authority, if they have not lost it
already. Only by changing the balance of power on the
Council through the addition of new permanent members will we
address the real problems. We also need to address the issue
of "accountability" as part of the consultations in the OEWG.
Need a process of negotiation to get to a solution.

-- Russia: Need to find consensus through a broad approach.
Without reform of the Council, overall reform of the UN will
be incomplete. Support OEWG as a forum. Expansion should



enhance effectiveness and representativeness but not at the
risk of efficiency. Council should remain "compact". Oppose
infringement on the rights of the P5. Also need to
revitalize the Military Staff Committee as called for in the
Outcome Document.

-- France: Expansion of the Council would make it more
effective because implementation requires the participation
of all Member States. Support the G-4 proposal and Germany,
India, Brazil and Japan for permanent seats.
WOLFF