UPDATE ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT NOVEMBER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001027

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: AF PGOV PREL SU UNC UN KPKO
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT NOVEMBER
15TH

REF: A. USUN 980

B. USUN 999

C. USUN 1001

D. KHARTOUM 1762

Classified By: Ambassador J. Wolcott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Key Points:

--US DPKO Under Secretary General Guehenno met with Sudanese
Major General Maghzoub on November 11th in Addis Ababa in an
effort to find a way forward with UNAMID deployments.
Guehenno briefed the Security Council on November 14 on the
details of his meetings.

--Deployment update: The HSP deployment is underway with the
arrival of equipment for the Chinese engineering unit. Other
HSP units are taking preparatory steps. For UNAMID, the
second High Ranking Officer Technical Assessment Team
(HROTAT) schedule has been released. Also, DPKO provided
information about GOS hindrances to UN deployments.

--TCC update: The USG Guehenno-Maghzoub meeting failed to
obtain GoS concurrence on the UNAMID TCC list.

--Command and Personnel: US Contractor update. Also, AU
Chairperson Konare reportedly remains adamant that UNAMID
troops wear green berets.

END SUMMARY.




2. (C) In the briefing to the SC USG Guehenno related what
was discussed in Addis Ababa with Sudanese General Maghzoub.
Guehenno said he offered some adjustments in the current
UNAMID deployment schedule in order to help President Bashir
save face and accept the list of TCCs, which included
deploying the Egyptian, Ethiopian and Thai units immediately.
Sudan General Maghzoub initially agreed and forwarded a
short paper detailing the discussions to Khartoum for
approval. However, the following day Maghzoub forwarded a
revised copy to DPKO which included only the agreement to
expedite the deployment of African TCC's, thereby walking
back the agreement to accept other non-African TCCs.
Moreover, President Bashir delivered a speech the same day
denouncing the Nordic engineering company as being full of
"American and Israeli spies." Guehenno expressed frustration
with the disconnect between reasonable military officials and
Khartoum policy makers within the GNU.


3. (C) Deployment updates derived from DPKO's force
generation update :

---
HSP
---

--China's engineer unit is currently deploying and will have
its advance party, equipment and personnel in Nyala in mid-
December.

--Egypt's signal, engineer, medical and composite transport
company conclude Pre-Deployment Visits (PDV's) this week with
advance parties due into Darfur by February 2008, and main
body deployments occurring in March.

--Pakistan, providing an engineering unit, a Level III
hospital and aerial reconnaissance, has its PDV's scheduled
from 26-28 November, and its advance parties arriving in
February/March 2008, and main body deployments scheduled for
March/April 2008.

--Nigeria is providing a Level II hospital that has already
undergone a PDV and is planned to deploy in January 2008.

--Bangladesh's logistic unit has a PDV scheduled for 21-23
November and its advance party arriving in December, followed
by the main body in January 2008.

--------------
UNAMID
--------------

The second High Ranking Officer Technical Assessment Team
(HROTAT) visit schedule has been established (COMMENT: To
reiterate, the HROTAT's mission is to identify gaps in TCC
capabilities prior to the potential deployment for UNAMID.
While it remains the TCC's responsibility to satisfy the

USUN NEW Y 00001027 002 OF 002


requirements and close the gaps, the combined presence of the
UN HROTAT, donor nations, and the host nation provides an
opportunity to collectively identify problems and expedite
solutions. END COMMENT):

Bujumbura, Burundi from 18-20 November
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania from 20-23 November
Lilongwe, Malawi from 23-25 November
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 25-27 November

African TCC's have been askedto escort the HROTAT throughout
UN visits to each country and the TCC's MilAds have been
invited to include potential donors/partners (such as the US,
UK and France) in the visits.


4. (C) DPKO provided USUN specific instances of GOS
interference to ongoing deployments. These include land
acquisition, which was granted in El Geneina after a long
negotiation but is inadequate due to its location and lack of
water. Second, communications equipment was impounded in El
Fasher upon arrival for UNAMID. Also, frequent late approval
of flight clearance requests cast doubt on all air missions
and result in an inordinate amount of time wasted.
Additionally, approval for an action may be granted at the
federal level but disapproved at the local level. These
examples, while seemingly minor on an individual basis,
conspire to slow down HSP/UNAMID deployments and muddy up an
already complicated TOA (REF B).


5. (C) TCC update: The UN still has no volunteers for helo's
and transport units.


6. (C) Command and Personnel: AMIS Force Commander General
Agwai supports the retention of the 16 U.S. (retired)
Military Observers in their capacity as advisors/liaison
officers. Berets - Konare is holding firm on the beret issue
(REF C). Reportedly, he told USG Guehenno that he would
accept blue berets, if the UN could convince President
Bashir. In a meeting with USUN MSC and Pol officers
(septel),Force Commander Agwai acknowledged the problem,
noting that he refused to wear the green AU beret, but at the
same time it made no sense for him to stand up in front of
his men in a blue beret if they were all wearing green ones.
He stressed that the issue needed to be resolved in some
fashion, preferring that they be blue.


7. (C) The GOS has indicated that they will not/not permit
the UN to set up additional broadcasting capabilities
targeted at Darfur, however the UN is proceeding anyway and
already has some capabilities in place.Also UNMIS has short
wave capability that reaches anyone in Darfur with the right
equipment. They are already transmitting a "limited amount"
of Darfur related programming via this channel.The UN is also
transmitting periodic programming through local commercial FM
radio stations in Darfur. DPKO would very much like to
expand its broadcasting capability with UNAMID and has
included this requirement in the budget. They view this as an
essential component of the Political process since the rebel
rejectionist groups and the GOS currently have close to a
monopoly on public information. (REF D)





Khalilzad