P-3 FINDS DPKO CONCERNED ABOUT KOSOVO END-GAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001026

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC KV
SUBJECT: P-3 FINDS DPKO CONCERNED ABOUT KOSOVO END-GAME

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff for Reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY. UN U/SYG for Peacekeeping Guehenno and
Europe Division Chief Harland shared with P-3 Deputy PermReps
on November 9 their concerns about how Kosovo-related events
will play out after the presumed failure of Troika talks.
Guehenno and Harland have identified key issues -- whether
and when the SYG pronounces a fundamental change in Kosovo
circumstances requiring a change in the configuration of the
international civil presence, international community
reactions to a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI),
timing of a UDI, the relative merits of a UDI versus other
events as a potential trigger of a SYG pronouncement of
changed circumstances, the role of a still-blocked Security
Council, what the EU needs from the UN (without Council
guidance) to deploy its rule of law mission, what vestigial
UNMIK presence is appropriate should the EU deploy, how an
uncertain EU and an uncertain UN can find common ground on a
way forward. Although they believe SYG Ban and the
Secretariat continue fundamentally to support the Ahtisaari

SIPDIS
plan for Kosovo, they see these and other issues as
potentially placing the Secretary-General in uncertain legal
and political waters as they unfold. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a frank November 9 session, UN Undersecretary for
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Jean-Marie Guehenno and DPKO
Europe Division Chief David Harland exchanged views with the
Security Council's Perm-3 on the way forward on Kosovo in the
likely event the ongoing U.S.-EU-Russia Troika process fails
to produce a political settlement by its December 10
end-date. Meeting participants included Ambassador Wolff and
DepPolCouns, French Deputy PermRep Jean-Pierre Lacroix, UK
Deputy PermRep Karen Pierce, and DPKO political officers
Marco Bianchini and Dennis Besinic.

DPKO Would Like Clear Trigger for SYG Intervention
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3. (C) Guehenno and Harland recognize that UNSCR 1244 gives
the Secretary-General ongoing legal discretion to reconfigure
the international civil presence in Kosovo, even to entirely
replace UNMIK. Harland believes that exercising that
discretion eight years into UNMIK's mandate, however, would
require a "fundamental change in circumstances that would
leave the SYG bound by necessity to make certain adjustments"
on the ground. His preferred fundamental change would be a
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) coupled with
imminent recognition of Kosovo sovereignty by a critical mass
of states.


4. (C) Harland sees a first major area of uncertainty in EU
and SYG expectations in the wake of such a pronouncement of
changed circumstances by the SYG. He understands that the EU
would like the pronouncement followed up by an SYG invitation
to Brussels to deploy something like the rule of law mission
(ESDP) and the office of international civilian
representative (ICR) envisioned in the Ahtisaari plan. He
said that various Secretariat offices are considering the
extent to which 1244 can be stretched to allow such an
invitation to be made in the absence of coherent Security
Council guidance. He said the UN Office of the Legal Advisor
(OLA) had great concern about stretching 1244 so far as to
allow the EU presences to leave the SRSG with no substantial
role. On the other hand, he said OLA recognizes that the EU
would have difficulty deploying these presences if they were
to be answerable to an SRSG and the SYG. (NOTE. Harland's
answer to these concerns, which he qualifies as personal,
would be to have the SRSG/UNMIK remain primarily responsible
for the international civil presence in the Serb-dominant
north of Kosovo where UNMIK is generally welcome and where he
thinks an EU presence might not be. END NOTE.)


5. (C) Pressed by Ambassador Wolff about whether UNMIK's
strong indication that it has essentially completed its
mandate might amount to a more obvious changed circumstance
that a UDI that Russia and others would surely reject,
Guehenno hedged. He argued that the more dramatic
UDI/recognitions scenario might amount to a "clean break"
that would allow a more clear UN-EU handoff, but allowed that
the UN was unlikely to quickly walk out of Kosovo altogether
in any event. (COMMENT. Guehenno and Harland both said
vaguely that the SYG could react to the changed circumstances
attendant to a UDI in keeping with his obligation to manage
threats to peace and security in Kosovo. In our view, an SYG
pronouncement of changed circumstances based on indications
that violence might follow failure to recognize a UDI would
deeply offend Security Council members and undermine efforts
to demonstrate that Kosovo's development since 1999 warrants
independence. END COMMENT.)

Security Council -- Making Blockage a Virtue
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6. (C) Harland said DPKO is agnostic about the timing of a
UDI but wanted to coordinate with the Quint and EU about it.
He was particularly concerned that the SYG and Secretariat
establish that the Security Council remained blocked before
the SYG made any pronouncement of changed circumstances. He
said OLA had advised DPKO that a blocked Security Council
increased the SYG's room to maneuver by default. (NOTE.
Ambassador Wolff agreed that a blocked Council could work in
favor of pro-Ahtisarri forces in that Russia would be forced
to try to pre-empt SYG action by its own initiative and would
be unable to muster the needed votes. END NOTE.) Harland
wanted particularly to make sure there would be sufficient
time between the Council's consideration of the Troika report
and any UDI to allow the Council to reveal itself as
deadlocked. France's Lacroix said the UDI would probably
come within two months of the Troika report and that "we" are
convinced we will have some influence to fine-tune the UDI
timing. He also pointed out that the certainty of Council
blockage determines that the SYG should avoid referring the
UDI when it comes to Council consideration. (COMMENT.
Although we agree that the SYG has more leeway in adapting
UNMIK to Kosovo realities in the absence of Security Council
guidance, we suggest that coherent EU/Quint advice should be
offered before what Harland calls "neo-Stalinist" elements
within the Secretariat take it upon themselves to guide the
SYG. END COMMENT.)

UN/EU Coexistence in Kosovo
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7. (C) Lacroix admitted that there are "differing
sensitivities within the EU on the question of UN/EU
articulation" in Kosovo with a significant membership
insisting that the EU presences could take shape only in
reaction to clear UN decisions. Harland replied that that
the UN and EU were in danger of falling into circular
reasoning with the EU unable to deploy without UN decisions
that themselves relied upon dramatic developments including
an imminent EU decision to recognize Kosovo's UDI. Lacroix
offered only that Paris is "brainstorming on the relative
UNMIK and EU roles as we go forward and is considering
various double hating options." Harland said he appreciates
the EU openness about its lack of internal clarity on its
future presences in Kosovo, but he is becoming increasingly
concerned about it, particularly about what he sees as lack
of EU vision with respect to the rollout of the ICR presence
and the ESDP role in the north of Kosovo.


8. (C) Guehenno said the calendar may dictate whether the EU
or the SYG acts first in that EU foreign ministers meet on
December 13/14 whereas the Security Council is unlikely to
have considered the December 10 Troika report by then.
(NOTE. Italy, which holds the December Security Council
presidency, later tentatively set the Troika report for
Council consultations on December 19. END NOTE.) Guehenno
said he is "quite sure" the EU will take a position on Kosovo
at the December 13/14 meetings. UK's Pierce said she looked
for the EU to indicate in December a readiness to play a
serious role in Kosovo and that this EU readiness could be
activated immediately upon a UDI in January coupled with
Kosovo's affirmation of its acceptance of the Ahtisari plan.


9. (C) COMMENT. Guehenno and Harland assure us that SYG Ban
and the Secretariat remain supportive overall of the
Ahtisaari plan, but their obvious concern with legal and
political exigencies indicates they will need guidance as
post December 10 events unfold. END COMMENT.
Khalilzad