IF KOSOVO DECLARES INDEPENDENCE UNILATERALLY, WHAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000382

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE; USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2017
TAGS: OSCE PREL PGOV UNMIK KV UNSC SR YI RU
SUBJECT: IF KOSOVO DECLARES INDEPENDENCE UNILATERALLY, WHAT
HAPPENS TO THE OSCE FIELD MISSION?

USOSCE 00000382 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kyle Scott, Reasons 1.4 (B AND D)

Summary:
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1. (C) The likelihood that the OSCE will have to close its
mission to Kosovo is increasing. In the event of a
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI),Russia and
Serbia have threatened to force closure of the OSCE Mission
in Kosovo (OMiK),and they could easily do so. Under such
circumstances, the OSCE would either have to close OMiK's
doors without any replacement, or transfer the mission or key
programs to some other international entity -- UNMiK, the
European Union or a coalition of the willing. Because of
political sensitivities, the OSCE Secretariat can plan only
on a limited contingency basis, and has not fully explored
any of these possibilities. With the Kosovo status
negotiations deadline falling ten days after the November
29-30 Ministerial, USOSCE believes a concerted attempt should
be made in Madrid to pressure Russia and Serbia to keep the
mission open even in the event of UDI. Failing that, it
might be prudent now to plan for a possible transfer of the
OSCE's programs and functions in Kosovo to another
international body. End Summary.

What OMiK does and why it matters . . .
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2. (U) With nearly a thousand international and local
employees, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo remains the largest of
the organization's 18 field missions. With a current budget
of 45 million dollars, it is also by far the organization's
most expensive field mission, consuming nearly 20 percent of
the OSCE's total budget. UNSCR 1244 has charged OMiK since
its establishment in 1999 with taking "the lead role in
matters relating to institution- and democracy-building and
human rights and the rule of law." In addition to building
good governance and a civil society, the mission oversees
elections, monitors and promotes human rights, and provides
early warning of ethnic tension, violence and instability.


3. (U) Over the past two years, in anticipation of a status
settlement, the mission has established a presence in each of
Kosovo's municipalities in order to promote decentralization
efforts and to serve as the international community's eyes
and ears in the field. The Ahtisaari status proposal, in
fact, envisions utilizing the OSCE's extensive field presence
to assist in the monitoring necessary for successful
implementation of a settlement.

. . . and why a UDI threatens OMiK's future
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4. (C) Russia and Serbia have both stated clearly that they
would block renewal of OMiK's mandate in the event of a
unilateral declaration of independence. They could do this
as soon as the end of the calendar year, when OMiK's mandate
is currently scheduled to expire. If Serbia or Russia move
to block a consensus decision for extension, the mission
would be forced to close. While Serbia has previously
acknowledged the work that the mission does to monitor the
welfare of the Serbian minority communities in Kosovo,
Belgrade would view agreement to extend OMiK's mandate in the
face of a UDI tantamount to acceptance of loss of sovereignty
over the province. The Russians have told us privately that
even if UDI does not occur before the end of the year, they
will not allow a one-year extension of the mandate, but will
rather agree only to a shorter (likely month-to-month)
renewal until the results of the troika negotiations become
clear. (Note: Spanish Ambassador Sanchez de Boado
reportedly told a recent FCO
delegation that the CiO believes it can get Serbia and
Russia to agree to a three-to-six month extension prior to
the Madrid ministerial. We should support the CiO's efforts
in this direction, but have seen no signs that this plan
would be accepted by Serbia or Russia.)

Options on Replacing OMiK
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5. (C) There are a number of options for dealing with the
loss of a mandate for OMiK. The easiest, but least
satisfactory, would be simply to disband the mission and let
go its nearly one-thousand staff members. The obvious
downside of this option is that no other international
organization is poised to assume the mission's
capacity-building and monitoring responsibilities. Even now,
the international community is dependent on OMiK to oversee

USOSCE 00000382 002.4 OF 002


the election process in Kosovo.


6. (C) The second option would be for UNMiK to absorb OMiK's
mandate and staff directly, which is what OSCE Secretary
General de Brichambaut has advocated here in Vienna and in a
recent visit to UN headquarters. Re-flagging the mission
under UNMiK and giving it a new name would presumably be
facilitated by the fact that OMiK has operated since its
inception under the UN's ultimate authority as Pillar III of
UNMiK. For this option to work, however, the UN would also
have to be persuaded to absorb OMiK's 45 million dollar
annual budget and take over its personnel, facilities and
equipment. We believe that this would take considerable
planning and organization and is a process that would take
some time. The concrete details of such a proposal should be
worked out in advance, because there could be as little as a
few weeks to engineer such a handover. Our colleagues at
USUN are better positioned to know the feasibility of such a
proposal, although Secretariat officials here tell us there
has been no follow-up from New York to de Brichambaut's
earlier suggestions to this effect.


7. (C) If this option proves unsatisfactory, a third option
could be to integrate OMiK's staff and duties into the EU's
ESDP rule of law mission, or some other EU structure. We
again defer to our USEU colleagues as to the likelihood of
getting an EU mission up and running in a timely fashion.
Without prior planning, it may be very difficult to effect a
handover quickly enough to ensure continuity in OMiK's
programs and personnel. Planning for this option would also
need to be started very soon for there to be a reasonable
chance for a successful outcome.


8. (C) If neither UNMiK or an ESDP mission is able to take
over OMiK's functions, a fourth option could be to transfer
OMiK's staff and duties to an ad hoc coalition of the
willing. This option could probably be done the most quickly
and effectively. Some type of legal entity would have to be
set up to take over the functions, and the HQ operation in
Pristina would have to take on all administrative and
financial details currently managed by the OSCE centrally in
Vienna. This option would also require planning and
preparation very soon.


9. (C) If there is no plan in place for turning over OMiK to
another body at the time of UDI, the mission's foreign
personnel could be forced to depart quickly. 241 of OMiK's
current staff, about a quarter of the mission's total, are
international employees. Some of them are contracted to the
OSCE, but the vast majority is seconded by the EU, EU
aspirants, the U.S. and Canada. Most of these internationals
would likely move on to new jobs outside of Kosovo quickly -
taking with them valuable capacity-building experience and
knowledge of Kosovo's unique circumstances and culture -
unless they could be assured that the transition to a new
international entity would be managed smoothly. Within a
short time, there would be little left to hand over.

Comment:
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10. (C) The OSCE Secretariat is hamstrung by the fact that
any contingency planning for UDI is very sensitive
politically. Beyond suggesting option two (re-flagging OMiK
under UNMiK),the OSCE Secretariat has not actually started
to look at the feasibility of this proposal, nor has it
started to develop a possible plan of action. The only
planning to date has been in the realm of emergency
evacuations in the event of violence in Kosovo. The Madrid
Ministerial provides an opportune occasion for high-level
discussion on the work of the Mission and the importance of
continuing its work. Russia and Serbia need to be pressed to
keep the mission open no matter what the outcome of the
troika consultations on status. We doubt they will be
prepared to make such a commitment before the results of the
process are known, however, so it is vital that we begin
prudent planning for a transfer of the OSCE's programs and
functions in Kosovo to another international body. Mission
would appreciate any possible guidance Department could offer
in this regard. End Comment.


SCOTT