CFE: NOVEMBER 15 MEETING OF THE HLTF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000615

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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL OSCE RS
SUBJECT: CFE: NOVEMBER 15 MEETING OF THE HLTF

REF: (A) STATE 145653 (GUIDANCE)

Classified By: DCM Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. At the NATO High Level Task Force on
November 15, Allies welcomed U.S. updates on current U.S. )
Russian Federation discussions and considered appropriate
next steps in anticipation of Russian suspension of
implementation of the CFE Treaty on December 12.


2. (C) Allies agreed to begin drafting a potential NATO
statement in response to Russian suspension as well as the
CFE language for the NAC communique. Allies also agreed to a
&high road8 response to Russian suspension in the near
term: Allies would continue to adhere to Treaty obligations
(i.e. data exchange, inspections, etc.) in the immediate
aftermath of Russian suspension, as the practical
implications of Russian actions are evaluated. Some Allies
who are members of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties indicated they would likely register their legal
position objecting to Russian suspension with the Depositary
in order to protect their legal rights and options for the
future, but would do so in a low key manner.


3. (C) With support from others, the U.S. and UK strongly
opposed a German proposal for a CFE seminar-like event on the
margins of the OSCE Ministerial in Madrid, citing its
potential to hinder the bilateral negotiations process for
both the U.S. and Russia. END SUMMARY.


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HLTF
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Reporting on Contacts and Bilaterals



4. (C) HLTF Head of Delegation, VCI DAS Karin L. Look,
provided Allies with an update on the substance and outcome
of recent U.S.-Russia bilateral meetings on CFE in Berlin and
Geneva, and distributed the written summary on the most
recent Fried-Antonov discussion in Geneva. Allies were
appreciative of the update, but several requested more timely
reports. Many Allies expressed satisfaction with the
substance of U.S. efforts so far. Several Allies in the
HLTF, most notably the UK, emphasized that Allies should do
nothing to hinder or undermine that bilateral process.
Germany described current negotiations as being three
parallel processes: formal (such as the JCG),informal (such
as the Paris and Bad Saarow seminars),and bilateral
(U.S.-Russia meetings). Germany views these processes as
necessary and complementary. DAS Look described the Geneva
meeting as substantive, as had been the case in Berlin, but
noted that at this recent meeting Russia appeared less
focused on finding solutions, and more on reiterating its
substantive agenda, particularly on key CFE (vice Istanbul)
issues. Most notably, Antonov advanced at the Geneva meeting
a demand for a collective ceiling on NATO forces, which,
along with Russian demands on the flank, appeared to the U.S.
as a deal-breaker. Look made clear that while Russian
interest in a collective ceiling on NATO (set at the levels
established in Articles IV and V of the current CFE Treaty
for a &group of states8) was not new, it had not previously
been an element in the bilateral talks.


5. (C) Germany, seconded only by Italy, pressed hard for an
informal meeting at 30 or 34 on the margins of the OSCE
Ministerial in Madrid to continue further consultations on
CFE. French rep Camille Grand was reserved on this issue,
suggesting that certainly any such meeting should be below
the level of ministers and that it would be best to review
and confirm few days before the ministerial if such a CFE
meeting would be useful. The U.S. Rep indicated that it was
doubtful such a meeting in Madrid would be useful unless
there were an agreed deal that Allies could endorse. Look
observed that a meeting at 30 (or 34) would force Russia, by
its own admission (per Antonov,s comments to Fried),to
express maximalist positions and grandstand, which does not
benefit the process of seeking a way forward. The UK offered
that whether to have a meeting at the Ministerial need not be
decided at this time. We could wait for an assessment from
the U.S. on the progress of discussions and whether such a
meeting would be helpful, such as if there is a deal that
needs the blessing of all others. Otherwise, a meeting

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should not be organized since it might hinder U.S. efforts.
(NOTE. Despite apparent consensus on this approach, Spain
and Germany announced, without warning, at the JCG in Vienna
on November 20 their intention to schedule a CFE meeting in
Madrid and German FM Steinmeier wrote to ministers making the
same proposal. END NOTE.)


6. (C) A large number of other Allies took a different tack
in criticizing the proposal for a meeting at 30. Turkey made
it sharply clear that any further meetings at 30 must be
preceded by NATO discussions to coordinate a message and
positions on issues likely to be addressed. For the Turks in
particular, this was a redline (COMMENT. The Turks believe
that they were burned at the Paris CFE seminar, as German rep
Groening brainstormed in the plenary ) that is, in front of
the Russians ) about approaches to the flank issue. END
COMMENT.) Turkey also expressed concern about a lack of
Allied consultation before tabling initiatives by Allies in
Joint Consultative Group (JCG) (the apparent concern was a
German briefing and discussion of force balances by region
and in the CFE area of application as a whole). Others
supported Turkey,s call for more effective use of the NATO
Caucus and JCG-T in Vienna for coordination.


7. (C) The NATO International Staff reported on the November
13-14 meeting of the NATO and Partner Chiefs of Defense
(CHOD) wherein Russia (CHOD Baluyevskiy) stated its intent to
suspend the CFE Treaty. With no Allied statement of objection
having been made, General Baluyevskiy subsequently held a
press conference on November 16 stating that the NATO CHODs
agreed with his position.


8. (C) Bulgaria reported that in a meeting with the Moldovan
Ambassador the Ambassador had stated that the process for
political settlement in Moldova is on hold. He asked for
details regarding the relationship between ideas on Moldova
in the U.S. package proposal, and President Voronin,s recent
demilitarization initiatives. U.S. team (EUR/PRM Jennifer
Laurendeau) followed up after the meeting. The Moldovan
ambassador also said that if Russia agrees to the parallel
actions plan, the U.S. and EU will have stepped back from
previous positions and Russia will set up bases such as the
U.S. bases in Romania and Bulgaria.


Preparing for Russian Suspension of the CFE Treaty



9. (C) Allies endorsed the concept, advanced by the U.S.
rep, that in the period immediately following a Russian
suspension, NATO should take the high ground by continuing
full implementation of CFE provisions. Most Allies also
agreed that any such position could only be maintained for a
limited time, before taking stock of the situation and
Russian non-compliance. France (Grand) argued that it is not
certain what a suspension will mean in practice, and we
should pursue three phases: First, gather evidence of a
Russian suspension in practice; second, form our estimate of
the Russian implementation of any suspension; and third, call
an Extraordinary Conference if necessary to voice our
position. Several Allies responded that it was already clear
) because Russia had said so publicly ) what a suspension
would entail. It seemed unlikely that Russia would
&suspend8 on paper but &implement8 in practice. Germany
stated that a response should be carefully calibrated based
on a cost-benefit analysis.


10. (C) Turkey, The UK, Canada, Poland, and Romania
specifically stated that they will register their legal
position in a low key fashion, perhaps before December 12,
with the Depositary in order to protect their future rights
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
Other members of the VCLT may choose to do the same.


11. (C) Most Allies want to continue to seek a solution to
the current CFE impasse even after a Russian suspension,
although many expressed that full implementation of the
Treaty would only be sustainable for a very short period
during that time. Some, like the French, are hesitant about
the U.S.-Russian format for seeking a deal, but see it as the
only game in town. The Germans would like a larger direct
role in seeking a solution, but many Allies (TU, East
Europeans, Baltics, UK) do not trust their intentions. On
the other hand, several Allies (CA, BE, IT, UK, TU PO, CZ,
PORT) underscored that &it should not be business as usual8

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after a Russian suspension, without specifying what that
means. U.S. Rep agreed that it should not be business as
usual over the long term if Russia suspends, but also said
that we should not jump to conclusions at this point
regarding what that means.


12. (C) Romanian Rep Micula argued at the high end, that the
current approach )- of compromising to address Russian
concerns -- is not working and that NATO should return to its
previous principles. Romania pledged not to support any
statement lowering the political cost to Russia after
suspension, and suggested Allies should not beg Russia to
return to negotiations. To Romania, the CFE Treaty will lose
value if NATO departs from the principles that the Treaty
reinforces. The Czech Rep added that CFE is important to
Europe but ¬ at any price.8 (COMMENT. It is clear that
Italy, Belgium, Romania, and Canada do not/not all have the
same idea of what the cost to Russia should be of suspension.
But &no business as usual8 was a rallying cry across the
spectrum of NATO opinion, and it is an impulse we will want
to channel to best effect, including by insisting on better
future coordination of NATO proposals and ideas, like
seminars at 30. END COMMENT.)


13. (C) In its only intervention for the day, Canada
(Poupart) stated that Allied commitment cannot be the same
after suspension. Admitting that Canada was first inclined
to not exchange data with Russia on the principle of
reciprocity, it now understands the benefit of first gaining
a feel for the practical effect of suspension as a stronger
basis for a calibrated reaction. Poupart also noted the
parallel action plan calls for some Allies to begin
ratification of the adapted Treaty before all Istanbul
commitments are fulfilled, which departs from previous NATO
positions. Canada asked if this position really has
consensus.

The Way Ahead



14. (C) The HLTF discussed the IS paper on &Elements for
Ministerial Communique and Contingency Statement8 (Annex 1,
LTF-N(2007)0053-REV1). U.S. HOD Look suggested that the
Communique language could be used for a NATO statement at the
OSCE Ministerial which precedes it if a consensus Ministerial
declaration is not possible. A draft text closely modeled on
U.S. thinking was issued following the HLTF for consideration
and refinement by HLTF Deputies.


15. (C) The NATO IS has set up a team of experts to help the
Baltic states review military needs in preparation for
accession to the adapted CFE Treaty. The IS is still missing
a representative from Allied Command Transformation but hope
to begin its effort very soon.


16. (C) The HLTF chair (Simmons) informed the HLTF that the
Permanent Representatives tasked a paper on &Raising NATO,s
Profile in the field of Arms Control and Disarmament.8 DAS
Look echoed U.S. concerns that have been raised in other NATO
contexts regarding the need to take account of Russia,s
approach to CFE in framing any future plans regarding
dialogue on new CSBMs or future approaches on conventional
arms control. France also expressed the need for any papers
or statements regarding CFE should be first blessed by the
HLTF. Simmons responded that this document was an
NATO-internal document to be used for planning purposes only.


17. (U) The HLTF Deputies plan to meet on November 21 and 23
to work on the text for the NAC Communique, and on December
10 to finalize the text of the NATO Statement regarding
Russian suspension (if it occurs). The next meeting of the
HLTF is proposed to take place on December 14th and will
focus on the way forward based on Russian actions.

Meetings on the Margins



18. (C) The pre-HLTF Quad meeting (U.S., UK, France,
Germany),focused initially on a U.S. debrief of U.S.-Russia
consultations, and then on the way ahead, post- December 12.
Following the U.S. debrief, Germany (Biontino) reported that
Antonov had expressed to German authorities a negative view
of recent discussions in Geneva, stating that Georgia had not
been willing to go as far as the U.S. had suggested on a
Gudauta solution. France (Grand) reported the opposite: DFM

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Grushko had, in fact, told the French that Antonov was
pleased with progress. France said that all elements of a
deal were in the U.S. plan and there is no plan &B.8 France
expressed the hope that Putin, who has &full flexibility8
to implement the suspension decision as he chooses, will not
choose actually to halt practical implementation. Grand added
that in previous discussions France had argued for
consideration of negotiation of a new Treaty to replace CFE.
Paris had now reconsidered that view. Any attempt to work
out alternative Treaty structures could keep us busy for the
next five years, and would not yield an equal result to the
current or Adapted CFE Treaties; CFE is the Treaty we need to
keep, and that should be the focus of our efforts.


19. (C) Germany repeated a familiar message that the
U.S.-Russia process should be more inclusive as CFE affects
European security (and the U.S. is not &European8). This
led him to suggest that a meeting at 30 in Madrid would be a
useful follow up to Bad Saarow and Paris. When pressed about
whether the U.S. has been inclusive, Biontino offered no
answer, but he stated that the U.S. holds its meetings and
then reports on what has been discussed which, so far, has
been consistent with Allied positions. France showed a
similar ambivalence, i.e. support for U.S. positions and
efforts but concern about the inclusiveness of the process.


20. (C) France asked if Russia was required to give any
further official notice to the Depositary prior to suspending
or would suspension be automatic based on their previous
notice of intent to suspend? The U.S. delegation responded
that the Russian Notice and accompanying Memorandum appeared
to establish a period of 150 days after which, absent
modification or rescission by Russia, suspension would
automatically take place. No further notice by Russia would
be required.


21. (C) In other bilateral meetings:

- Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia). Lithuania
distributed a paper outlining basic principles to guide their
approach on setting ceilings, including that current levels
couldn't be an automatic template for future ceilings (their
military infrastructure is only now being developed and they
may have to build up),the need to meet NATO and national
requirements, and the desire to have all Treaty mechanisms
available to them including extraordinary temporary
deployments (meaning they don't want to be in the flank).
Estonia reiterated principles it had expressed in Paris,
focusing on the need for flexibility to meet needs as its
defense establishment developed and the requirement to meet
NATO and national obligations. All three were sharply
critical of German and French freelancing at the Paris CFE
seminar, and expressed concern about the idea of a meeting at
30 or 34 in Madrid: it would accomplish little except to
expose differences among Allies. The Lithuanian and Latvian
reps also underscored that it did not seem entirely
reasonable that they should be bound by the flank
restrictions, when in fact the portion of Russia that
bordered their territory ) the Pskov Oblast ) had been
removed from the flank in the 1996 Flank Agreement.

- Romania. After hearing the U.S. debrief of the Geneva
meeting, Romanian rep Micula underscored that it did not look
promising for a resolution on CFE that avoided Russian
suspension. If Russia suspended it was reasonable to suppose
that most ) if not all ) Allies would be unable to ratify
the Adapted Treaty, even if they wanted to. Thus Allies
would need to look again at our strategy: it was time to
recognize that Russian suspension would not be a disaster for
NATO or for Europe, and long as NATO did not respond to it by
giving in to a long list of Russian demands. We might lose
CFE, but we needed to stand by our principles. Micula also
asked for ) and received -- details regarding the Moldova
package now in play.

- Turkey. Turkey (Beyer) stated that its ratification process
could take more than a year for non-controversial agreements.
Beyer expressed support for the U.S. plan to take the &high
road8 and take further action after analyzing what Russia
has or has not done to comply with the Treaty. He felt that
the Allies should call an Extraordinary Conference after
January 1, 2008. For Turkey, the flank is the core of the
Treaty. Turkey is willing to review the flank in the context
of a review of all elements after entry-into-force of the
adapted Treaty but not before. Asked whether the U.S. should

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continue to pursue a CFE agreement on the model of the U.S.
package in the wake of a suspension decision, Beyer,s
support for continued U.S. efforts was emphatic. He made
clear that Turkey did not trust Germany, in particular, to
maintain a firm position on the flank or on issues related to
Istanbul, which Germany considered as important as the flank
) and closely related.

- UK. U.S. Rep Look and Laurendeau met with U.K rep Ford over
dinner prior to the Quad meeting and HLTF. Among the issues
discussed was how to position ourselves regarding the likely
German proposal for another informal (at Madrid) and how
Allies should react if/when Russia suspends. The U.S. and UK
were of like minds on both and, as a result of this
consultation, were able to complement each other on these
issues at both the Quad and the HLTF.

- Canada. U.S. Rep Look met briefly with Canadian Rep Poupart
regarding how we should react to suspension if it occurs on
the 12th. Look sought this meeting because in previous HLTF
meetings Canada had indicated it was seriously considering an
early declaration of &material breach8 if Russia were to
suspend. It was good news when, at the HLTF the following
day, Canada was able to join the U.S. concept of a moderate
&fulfill all obligations8 response in the immediate
aftermath of suspension.
NULAND