Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO579
2007-10-24 16:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

ALLIES SUPPORT U.S. MD OUTREACH TO RUSSIA

Tags:  NATO PREL MARR PARM IR RS 
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DE RUEHNO #0579/01 2971636
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O 241636Z OCT 07
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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000579 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR PARM IR RS
SUBJECT: ALLIES SUPPORT U.S. MD OUTREACH TO RUSSIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard G. Olson. Reasons: 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000579

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR PARM IR RS
SUBJECT: ALLIES SUPPORT U.S. MD OUTREACH TO RUSSIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard G. Olson. Reasons: 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary: NATO Allies warmly endorsed recent U.S.
Missile Defense (MD) proposals offered to Russia at the
Oct. 17 reinforced North Atlantic Council (NAC) briefing
offered by USD(P) Eric Edelman, A/S Daniel Fried and MDA.
Dir. LTGEN Trey Obering. Allies further praised the U.S.
effort to create a positive tone in its strategic dialogue
(MD/CFE/post-START/INF) with Moscow and urged the U.S.
specifically to continue seeking ways to anchor Russia in a
cooperative stance on MD. Six Allies (Netherlands, Norway,
Luxembourg, Romania, France and Germany) singled out the
U.S. proposals of a phased activation of the European
system as particularly constructive. Allies looked forward
to further NATO-Russia Council dialogue with Russia and
hoped NRC transparency would play a role in keeping Moscow
positively engaged in the face of possible domestic
temptations for Russian leaders to grandstand. Portugal
reported that a Russian MFA official yesterday told EU
embassies in Moscow that U.S. proposals had been deemed
constructive and were lending a positive tone to the
U.S.-Russian dialogue. Looking forward to MD's status by
the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, many Allies welcomed
LTGEN Obering's ideas on how the U.S. and NATO systems
could be gradually integrated into one system in a series
of program development stages. Allies in southeastern
Europe most vocally keyed on the indivisibility of Allied
security and the need for Allied solidarity, calling for
further NATO-U.S. system integration endorsement by
Bucharest. Meanwhile, Germany, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium
and France signaled the most cautious approach to the way
ahead for NATO MD. The UK, Denmark and Italy were silent.
End Summary.

--------------
RECAP OF U.S. MD PROPOSALS IN MOSCOW
--------------


2. (C) U/S Edelman opened the briefing by noting that the
U.S. and Russia had held three rounds of expert talks since
the Kennebunkport summit, culminating in the October 11-12

two plus two ministerial meetings. These expert talks
would continue and another two plus two ministerial meeting
was planned in another six months. He laid out the U.S.
approach last week of offering Moscow (septel) far-reaching
options for: 1) joint development of a regional MD
architecture; 2) a way ahead on the post-START framework;
3) a joint appeal for adding parties to the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and 4) flexible ways to adapt
the parallel actions plan for the Adapted CFE Treaty's
implementation to shift a contentious strategic dialogue
from a net negative to a net positive which could help
address additional difficult issues, like Kosovo (note: and
Fried later elaborated to include general energy security
engagement and specific Caspian Basin energy issues. End
Note.),later on this year and early in 2008. On MD, he
outlined a regional architecture which embraced both
Russian-owned and leased radars, the U.S. European system
and a NATO system with linked command and control systems
and significant sensor transparency. He said that offers
to allow Russia transparency to sites in the U.S. would
include liaison officers and data exchange. This also
could possibly include Czech and Polish sites, should
Prague and Warsaw allow. He also said that the U.S. had
underscored that, while it would proceed apace with
negotiating and building the Czech and Polish elements of
the U.S. European system, it would be open to exploring a
time-phased activation of those sites based on a dialogue
with Moscow about the nature and pace of the development of
the Iranian missile program (illustratively mentioned as
possibly being built around Iranian missile flight tests,
space launch vehicle tests and missile stand tests).


3. (C) On other strategic dialogue issues, he added that
the U.S. had offered to consider extension of the Moscow
Treaty deployable warhead limits of 1,700 to 2,200 with a
legally binding set of transparency measures provided
old-style START counting guidelines and other outdated
START frameworks could be foregone. On INF the U.S.
embraced the Russian idea to call on other nations in the
United Nations First Committee to sign onto the INF
limits. Finally, A/S Fried noted that he would later
explain U.S. ideas on how to be further flexible on the
parallel action plan for CFE in another Allied consultation
meeting
later on October 17 (septel).



4. (C) A/S Fried noted that the Russians at the start of
the two-plus-two Ministerial seem to have been planning
to emerge from the talks declaring no progress and
blaming the U.S., perhaps to paint an adversarial image
of the U.S. for Russian domestic consumption. But,
unexpectedly facing forthcoming U.S. ideas, gradually
(and in some cases reluctantly) came to see the constructive
and potentially valuable nature of the U.S proposals. This
led to contrasts between the publicly negative (and almost
aggressive) characterization of the talks' nature and the
constructive technical, intelligence and later political
exchanges in private discussions. There appear to be
differences between Russian officials and institutions.
It is not clear whether Russia will take up the U.S. offers,
he noted, but Moscow did not parallel its outwardly
adversarial
stance in the private exchanges.


5. (C) LTGEN Obering reported that Iranian missile
development was proceeding apace, with liquid-fueled Shahab
3 IRBM's with a 1,300 KM reach in deployment followed by
ongoing development of similar-ranged, solid-fueled BM-25
MRBM systems which would be adaptable to ranges out to
3,800 KM with a 500 KG warhead. He offered Allies an
assessment of the Qabala radar in Azerbaijan based on site
visits and later technical exchanges by MDA's MGEN O'Reilly
which resulted in the view that the Qabala radar was more
powerful and useful than first assessed, but still limited
by its design parameters to use only as an early warning
and cueing radar, albeit one with longer reach and power
than first thought. He said information on the under
construction Russian radar at Armavir was restricted and
would not be provided until "political agreement" to
cooperate is achieved. Still, it, too, was assessed to be
only an early warning site, although its capabilities would
likely vary from the Qabala facility. He noted that, with
several recent successful tests, U.S. MD systems (naming
Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD),Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense and the U.S. Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
mid-course interceptor system,) had enjoyed 30 of
38 successful hit-to-kill intercepts since 2001. He then
elaborated a series of phased development steps NATO and
the U.S. could take to gradually integrate their respective
systems and achieve developmental efficiencies.

--------------
ALLIES APPLAUD U.S. APPROACH, TRANSPARENCY
--------------


6. (C) In Q&A, Allies further praised the U.S. effort to
create a positive tone in its strategic dialogue with
Moscow and urged the U.S. specifically to continue seeking
ways to anchor Russia in a cooperative stance on MD. Six
Allies (Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, France, Romania
and Germany) singled out the U.S. proposal for a phased
activation of the European system as particularly
constructive. Romania added that such an approach forced
Russia to focus on the growing Iranian threat and to engage
seriously on a joint approach.


7. (C) Allies looked forward to further NATO-Russia Council
dialogue with Russia and hoped NRC transparency would play
a role in keeping Moscow positively engaged in the face of
possible domestic temptations for Russian leaders to
grandstand. Germany said it was disappointed that Russia
had not utilized the potential to move beyond political
development to joint cooperation in NRC channels,
specifically lamenting the recent Russian indefinite
postponement of a long-planned NRC Theater Missile Defense
(TMD) exercise to be held in Germany. (U/S Edelman
concurred in reply.) Portugal reported that Russian MFA
North America Office Director Igor Neverov on October 16
told EU embassies in Moscow that U.S. proposals had been
deemed constructive and were lending a positive tone to the
U.S.-Russian dialogue. Neverov reportedly added that
Presidents Bush and Putin saw a chance for developing a
lasting legacy in developing a positive strategic dialogue
which could play an important role in marking the upcoming
two hundredth anniversary of U.S.-Russian diplomatic ties.

--------------
SEVERAL ALLIES ASSOCIATE MD AND ARMS CONTROL
--------------


8. (C) Norway and Luxembourg said that they wanted the U.S.
to stay in engaged in convincing Russia to cooperate on a
joint MD approach to prevent an offensive arms spiral
between the two strategic powers. Belgium wondered whether
joining the NATO and U.S. systems would disturb the
positive momentum of the recent U.S. talks in Moscow.
While stopping short of an explicit linkage, Germany said
that "should MD positively progress," it would be best if
it were to do so based on "positive momentum within arms
control frameworks." Germany also said it would like to
hear more details on transparency measures like the liaison
team arrangements reported in the press. U/S Edelman
replied that these arrangements were still conceptual, but
were on the table for elaboration if Russia takes them up.

--------------
THREAT DISCUSSION CONTINUES
--------------


9. (C) NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted that the Allied
threat assessment was agreed on October 9. Several Allies
raised threat issues later in the NAC. Turkey said threats
other than Iran (meaning at least Syria) need to be taken
into account, with Spain pointing out that non-MD threats
(WMD and otherwise) also need to be taken into account as
Allies develop new capabilities. Canada asked whether the
U.S. had made progress in narrowing the gap with Russia on
threat perceptions, observing Russian threat assessments
had been inconsistent and therefore less credible. In
response, U/S Edelman said the U.S. had concerns about the
potential of a Syrian missile program, but it was not as far
advanced as that of Iran. He also said that the U.S.
considers
a wide-ranging homeland defense strategy necessary to address
non-MD threats. On MD threat assessments, U/S Edelman
noted that, while differences certainly still exist, even
President Putin acknowledged a growing Iranian missile
program whose reach was extending farther into Russia and
Europe.

--------------
ALLIES EXPLORE INTEGRATED U.S., NATO SYSTEMS
--------------


10. (C) The Netherlands said it saw U.S. mention of an
"integrated" U.S.-NATO system as a step forward with
integrated rather than linked command and control as an
important difference. They further asked whether a common
set of rules of engagement was contemplated. LTGEN Obering
stated only that the U.S. would give Allies visibility into
the rules of engagement. Germany asked who would set the
criteria to consider in the joint assessment of the
development of the Iranian missile program and wondered who
would participate in deciding that milestones had been
reached. Bulgaria also asked whether Russia was interested
in participating in addressing the short and medium-range
gaps intended for coverage in the NATO system.

--------------
MIXED VIEWS ON MD AT BUCHAREST
--------------


11. (C) Looking forward to MD's status by the April 2008
NATO Bucharest summit, Allies welcomed LTGEN Obering's
ideas on how the U.S. and NATO systems could be gradually
integrated into one system in a series of program
development stages. The Czech Republic and Poland said that
they supported the U.S. European system's development and
were proceeding with their respective bilateral
negotiations with the U.S. at an expeditious pace. Canada
observed that the U.S. proposals offered NATO a great cost
saving as it tried to develop territorial MD. Allies in
southeastern Europe most vocally keyed on the
indivisibility of Allied security and the need for Allied
solidarity, calling for further NATO-U.S. system
integration endorsement by Bucharest. Turkey and the
Netherlands also supported a U.S.-NATO combined system.
Turkey was alone in raising continuing debris questions.
Meanwhile, Germany, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium and France
signaled the most cautious approach to the way ahead for
NATO MD. The UK, Denmark and Italy were silent.

12. (U) This cable has been cleared by USD Edelman, A/S
Fried, and LTG Obering.
OLSON