Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO577
2007-10-24 15:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NRC: RUSSIANS ILL-PREPARED TO RESPOND TO US 2+2

Tags:  NATO PREL MARR RU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000577 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR RU
SUBJECT: NRC: RUSSIANS ILL-PREPARED TO RESPOND TO US 2+2
MISSILE DEFENSE OFFER

REF: A. USNATO 263

B. USNATO 430

C. USNATO 544

Classified By: Charge Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000577

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR RU
SUBJECT: NRC: RUSSIANS ILL-PREPARED TO RESPOND TO US 2+2
MISSILE DEFENSE OFFER

REF: A. USNATO 263

B. USNATO 430

C. USNATO 544

Classified By: Charge Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C/NF) Summary: In the October 17 NATO-Russia Council
(NRC) reinforced meeting on missile defense, Under Secretary
of Defense Edelman, EUR Assistant Secretary of State Fried,
and Missile Defense Agency Director LTG Obering offered our
vision for a joint U.S./NATO/Russia regional missile defense
architecture and a threat based approach to activation of the
U.S. missile defense (MD) sites in Poland and Czech Republic
-- ideas originally presented to the Russians by Secretaries
Rice and Gates in the October 12-13 "2 plus 2" talks.
Germany, the UK, and France praised the fresh U.S. offers of
cooperation with Russia, particularly the notion of linking
activation of the U.S. third site to the threat. However,
even when pressed by Allies, Russian MFA Director Antonov
failed to provide an initial Russian response to U.S. offers,
but did characterize the 2 plus 2 talks as "very important,"
asserting that they could lead the way-forward on missile
defense, CFE, and post-START. Antonov became increasingly
animated/agitated as he responded to critical statements and
questions from Allies. Allies strongly refuted Antonov's
claim that Iran represents no threat to Europe or the United
States. End summary.

--------------
U.S. OFFERS FRESH PROPOSALS IN 2 PLUS 2
--------------


2. (C) On October 17, Defense Under Secretary for Policy Eric
Edelman briefed the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on the outcome
of the U.S./Russia bilateral 2 plus 2 talks in Moscow (Note:
Secretaries Rice and Gates met with their Russian

SIPDIS
counterparts October 12-13 to discuss, inter alia, missile
defense. End note). While noting that the U.S missile
defense (MD) system was threat based so that the time
sequence of operationalizing the system can be tied to the
development of an Iranian ballistic missile system, Edelman
emphasized that the U.S. will not suspend MD negotiations
with Poland and the Czech Republic. Edelman informed Allies

that the United States and Russia agreed to another 2 plus 2
meeting in the spring of 2008, as well as the continuation of
bilateral expert level missile defense talks. He stressed
that there was a constructive exchange of intelligence on the
threat -- arguably the most detailed intelligence exchange to
date between the U.S and Russia on any subject.


3. (C) U/S Edelman called upon Allies and Russia to work for
a constructive, cooperative approach to deal with the Iranian
threat. "Unity is the only solution to Iran," he said.
Edelman told the NRC that collaboration among the United
States, NATO Allies, and Russia would give a real boost to
our efforts.


4. (C) Missile Defense Agency Director LTG Henry "Trey"
Obering presented the U.S. views on a potential joint
regional architecture to protect NATO Allies as well as
Russia. He reiterated Edelman's point that even after the
U.S. completed construction of the site, its activation could
be tied to the emergence of the Iranian threat. In this plan,
NATO and Russian systems would not be fully integrated but
could share data in a conceptually similar way as the NRC
Theater Missile Defense project (i.e., through the use of
computer systems to share the radar pictures). A further
step could be to link certain command and control elements.


5. (C) LTG Obering also reported on the U.S. visit to the
Russian Qabala radar station in Azerbaijan and Russian visits
to U.S. sites. He pointed out that the Qabala radar is more
capable than previously thought and that the U.S. had
requested data on previous Iranian missile tests, although it
could not replace the X-band radar in the Czech Republic.

-------------- --------------
2 PLUS 2 TALKS: RUSSIANS A STEP BEHIND AND A DOLLAR SHORT
-------------- --------------


6. (C/NF) MFA Director of Disarmament and International

USNATO 00000577 002 OF 003


Security Anatoliy Antonov had little to say about Moscow's
initial reaction to the U.S. offers in the 2 plus 2 talks.
Antonov said Russia would examine the U.S. proposal for a
joint regional architecture, but added that Russia continued
to see the "old logic" in the U.S. characterization of Iran
as an enemy. Russia "opposes a Holy Alliance against Iran,"
which could lead to another arms race. He contended that the
U.S. system would upset peace and stability, and therefore,
the U.S. should freeze its development. Antonov boldly
asserted that "global MD" and prompt global strike capacity
would give the U.S. a dangerously dominant position. Russian
Ambassador Totskiy said Russia did not agree with the
negative media coverage of the 2 plus 2 talks. France
praised the U.S. offer of a phased approach to the activation
of the sites in Poland and Czech Republic and pointedly asked
Russia's views on this proposal. Antonov did not respond and
simply said Russia was studying the U.S. offer. (Note: The
Russian DCM told us later that the French question so
agitated Antonov that he avoided the French MFA Director of
Strategic Affairs Philippe Carre after the meeting broke.
End note)

--------------
IRAN IS NOT AN ENEMY
--------------


7. (C) Antonov said Russia did not accept the U.S threat
assessment of Iran on either a technical or political level.
Iran does not have the technical, production, or test
capability for future long-range missile work, he said.
Antonov said Russia does not accept the U.S. assertion that
the U.S. MD sites in Poland and Czech Republic are not
directed against Russia. While acknowledging that 10
interceptors posed little threat to the Russian strategic
deterrent, he asserted that the U.S system could be easily
upgraded. Antonov told the NRC that Russia was ready to
jointly assess the threat with NATO and would consider future
work once the threat has been agreed.

--------------
ALLIES MAKE ANTONOV HOT UNDER THE COLLAR
--------------


8. (C/NF) The Czech Republic strongly criticized Russia for
playing politics with MD and noted that the U.S. had made
generous MD proposals. Poland said MD was purely defensive
and expressed concern that Russia's analysis of MD was based
on geopolitics rather than an objective analysis of Russia's
security. Germany appreciated the new ideas for MD
cooperation put forward in the 2 plus 2 talks. In addition,
Germany was optimistic that "we" can move forward, but
supported working closely with Russia on MD. While noting
that MD was a bilateral issue and there was no NATO ballistic
MD program, France said NATO and Russia need a cooperative
approach on MD. The UK, Canada, Hungary, and the Netherlands
were highly critical of the Russian dismissal of the Iranian
threat. France and the UK praised the U.S. offer to link
activation of the European sites with the Iranian threat.


9. (C/NF) In his second intervention, Antonov praised the 2
plus 2 talks as "very important." Although no decisions were
reached, he said, there was an open and frank discussion on
MD, post-START, and CFE. Flustered by Allied interventions
on the Iranian threat, he emphatically stated that there was
no incentive for Iran to attack Europe or the United States,
because, "it would be national suicide." He mentioned
President Putin's proposal that the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) should be a global treaty which
would be a real confidence building measure for the Missile
Technology Control Regime. Antonov claimed Pakistan would
be a greater threat than Iran if its nuclear arsenal fell
into the hands of the Taliban. Increasingly flustered,
Antonov responded to Czech and Polish criticism, saying
Russia was willing and prepared to cooperate on MD. He
stated that Russian opposition to MD was not a political
question and said he could not understand the West's focus on
an Iranian threat. This contradicted an earlier statement in
this meeting by Russian Ambassador to NATO Totskiy who said
it was a political dispute on missile defense and suggested
the technical gap was not so wide, because "on the level of
physics, our assessments are identical."

USNATO 00000577 003 OF 003



--------------
RUSSIAN CANCELLATION OF TMD EXERCISE
--------------


10. (C) Canada, the UK, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, and the
United States expressed regret for the Russian cancellation
of the Computer Assisted Theater Missile Defense Exercise
(CAX 2007) to be held in Germany in November (see REF C).
Ambassador Totskiy said Russia pulled out because it had
never received a satisfactory answer to the relationship
between NRC TMD project and the NATO project (ALTBMD).
(Note: The Russian delegation often raises this criticism --
they want to be more involved in ALTBMD and are tired of
"waiting in the corridor." End note)

--------------
POST-START
--------------


11. (C) EUR A/S Dan Fried noted that in the 2 plus 2 talks,
the U.S. and Russia were looking for ways to move forward on
a post-START regime, but that no conclusions had been
reached. Ambassador Antonov appreciated the U.S. offer that
the agreement would be legally binding, but said the real
issue was what would be included in the arrangement. Germany
expressed support for post-START and other arms control
regimes and hoped to see them developed further.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


12. (C/NF) Allies are increasingly challenging Russian claims
in the NRC and were supportive of the U.S. offers for a joint
regional architecture and a phased approach to activation.
It appeared today that the Russian bureaucracy did not know
how to respond to the 2 plus 2 offers and was waiting on
Putin to set the tone. Even if Russia ultimately rejects our
offers of cooperation, these efforts may pay results with
Allies. Several Allies (e.g., Germany) take into account
Russia's concerns in their internal deliberations on whether
or not to support NATO MD at the Bucharest Summit. Offering
cooperation to the Russians in the NATO-Russia Council helps
us to manage these Allies and to build support for a
Bucharest commitment to missile defense. End comment.


13. (U) This message has been cleared by U/S Edelman and A/S
Fried.


OLSON