DUTCH BRIEF US, UK, AUSTRALIA ON URUZGAN FORCE GEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000562

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF NL AS UK NO FR LO
SUBJECT: DUTCH BRIEF US, UK, AUSTRALIA ON URUZGAN FORCE GEN
EFFORTS

REF: A. THE HAGUE 1856 AND PREVIOUS B. SOFIA 1218

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. We found Netherlands Ambassador Herman
Schaper unfocused and gloomy on October 16 in briefing key
RC-S allies on Uruzgan backfill requests. Dutch engagement
with its top three target nations has yielded some results,
but not nearly enough. Slovakia is expected shortly to
confirm the government's intent to send approximately 50
soldiers. According to Schaper, Norway's Defense Minister
and CHOD would like to send a quick reaction force (QRF)
company to help the main Dutch battle group, but Norwegian
coalition politics will make a government decision tough to
reach (frankly we find this prospect wildly unrealistic;
Norwegian F-16s or OMLTs would strike us as a better "ask").
The Danes reportedly rejected the request to send F-16s,
noting they are already heavily engaged in Afghanistan and
others should do more. France continues to discuss options
with the Netherlands, but has shown little interest in
sending trainers or other assets to the south. Meanwhile,
bilateral efforts have left the
Australians "cautiously optimistic" that Singapore will
provide a field hospital, one of the seven "modules" that the
Dutch are pulling out of Uruzgan and want Allies to fill
(reftel A). Ambassador Nuland pushed back on the Dutch to
consider keeping their OMLTs in Uruzgan if Allies came
through with other forms of assistance, and asked the
Australians to think hard about OMLTs, too. The Dutch
Council of Ministers will likely open discussion on the
Uruzgan mandate renewal on November 9, immediately following
the NATO force generation conference November 6-8. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Naming many NATO Allies, as well as Japan, South
Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden, Ambassador Schaper briefed
Ambassador Nuland, Australian Ambassador Thomas, and a United
Kingdom Defense Advisor on largely unsuccessful Dutch efforts
to obtain backfill from Allies in Uruzgan province prior to
the Dutch Parliament's debate on the renewal of the Dutch
ISAF mandate past its August 2008 expiration. The mood was
not positive in The Hague, he stated. He noted a 50-soldier
Slovak contribution for force protection could be in Uruzgan
relatively shortly following an Slovak government decision
that was expected imminently. Dutch-Norwegian mil-mil
contacts on the possibility of a QRF company (the preferred
Dutch option),an OMLT, or force protection elements had been
positive, Schaper said, but Norwegian coalition politics
would greatly complicate the decision, which was expected in
early November. FM Store was the key, Schaper and Ambassador
Nuland agreed. The Dutch were still working on France at the
highest political levels, Schaper noted, but had been
frustrated thus far at French unwillingness to consider
training or other deployments to the south. As a bare
minimum, The Netherlands is trying to convince France to send
two of its three previously announced OMLTs to the south, but
France has insisted they will be deployed to Kabul.


3. (C) Ambassador Schaper also mentioned limited, continuing
contacts with the Hungarians and Czechs, but was not
optimistic. He said the Dutch perceived a political block on
support in the Bulgarian decision-making process, but that PM
Balkenende would speak with his Bulgarian counterpart.
Denmark had responded negatively to Dutch requests for F-16s,
noting their current commitment in Helmand, but Ambassadors
Nuland and Schaper agreed Norway could also be a good target
for F-16s.


4. (C) Australian Ambassador to NATO Alan Thomas told the
group that Singapore is interested in providing a Role 2
medical facility, one of the modules that the Netherlands is
seeking from Allies and partners, and could make a decision
by the end of the month. The Australians were cautiously
optimistic, he said, but noted that Singapore has a history
of backing out of decisions at the last minute on issues of
force deployments to hostile areas. Detailing other

Australian bilateral efforts, Thomas said that the Malaysians
had told Australia they were only interested in financial
contributions, while the Indonesians rejected military
assistance, stating they would only consider participating in
a "UN force."


5. (C) Ambassador Nuland asked the Dutch DCM (who took over
the meeting in progress when Ambassador Schaper had to leave)
to speculate on where the Dutch parliament would come down
based on a best-case scenario of the options that had been
discussed: Slovaks come to Uruzgan, Singapore sends a
medical facility, and Norway commits "something." The DCM
stressed his personal view was that gestures were more
important to the Parliament than a line-by-line review of the
seven modules the Dutch were currently seeking. Political
optics were the key, he stated, and MOD van Middelkoop's case
would be helped if he were able to tell Parliament he had
found 200 ground troops to help Dutch forces in Uruzgan.
Ambassador Nuland pushed back on the Dutch to consider
keeping their OMLTs in Uruzgan if Allies came through with
other forms of assistance, and asked the Australians to think
hard about OMLTs, too.


6. (C) COMMENT. The two key near-term events at NATO will
be the October 24-25 Noordwijk ministerial, and the November
6-8 force generation conference. It will be important to
avoid a public foodfight at Noordwijk, where the spotlight
will shine even more brightly on the Netherlands as hosts.
The Dutch at NATO have been appreciative thus far of U.S.
support efforts, but seem to be having difficulty closing
deals with Allies we've teed up. It will be important to
press the Dutch in the wake of OSD DASD Cagan's trip through
Europe, and to focus our efforts on winning solid pledges
from Allies prior to the November force generation
conference. The conference will be the make or break event
prior to the formal discussion process within the Dutch
government that will begin with the November 9 Council of
Ministers meeting in The Hague.
Minimize Considered.
NULAND