MISSILE DEFENSE: 9/25 EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP-

S E C R E T USNATO 000536

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/PRA FOR ANITA FRIEDT, OSD/MD FOR PAUL IARROBINO, OSD/P
FOR BRIAN GREEN, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR KCFE RU
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: 9/25 EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP-
REINFORCED MEETING READOUT


Classified By: DCM Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (S) Summary: In the September 25 Executive Working Group-
Reinforced (EWG-R) meeting, the NATO International Staff
agreed to prepare a draft report in response to the Riga
missile defense tasking for the October 24-25 NATO Defense
Ministerial. The U.S. informed Allies that it is seeking a
political decision to pursue territorial missile defense at
the Bucharest Summit (April 2-4). Allies did not react to
our proposal in the EWG-R. In a prior bilateral meeting, the
German delegation noted our proposal will be difficult to
achieve. In a separate trilateral meeting, the Czechs and
Poles offered full support. The French have not yet
formulated a position on our proposal. Going forward, we
will need to focus our efforts on breaking down German
resistance through regular contacts both in the NAC and in
Berlin. End summary.

IS FINALLY AGREES TO CARRY OUT RIGA TASKING
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2. (S) During the September 25 Executive Working Group-
Reinforced (EWG-R) meeting, the NATO International Staff (IS)
agreed to prepare a draft report on territorial missile
defense (MD) to be presented at the October 24-25 Defense
Ministerial in Noordwijk. This report is intended to be a
first step in responding to the Riga Summit tasking that the
EWG-R examine the political and military implications of MD
prior to a NATO decision on whether to pursue such a
capability. The IS will also use the report as the basis for
the February 2008 "comprehensive report" to the NAC which was
tasked at NATO's June 2007 Defense Ministerial.


3. (S) During the September 25 EWG-R meeting, the NATO
International Staff (IS) agreed to address the unfulfilled
Riga tasking on territorial missile defense, with the intent
of submitting an interim report at the October 24-25 Defense
Ministerial in Noordwijk. The IS will use this product as
the basis for the February 2008 "comprehensive report" to the
NAC that was tasked at the June 07 Defense Ministerial.

U.S. WANTS POLITICAL DECISION ON MD AT BUCHAREST
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4. (S) The U.S. informed Allies that it wanted Heads of State
and Government to make a political decision to pursue a
territorial missile defense capability at the Bucharest
Summit, regardless of whether the EWG (R) has completed
analyzing all of the details associated with territorial MD.
The U.S. argued that a high level political decision to
pursue missile defense can be made without having determined
all of the details about architecture, operations, and other
issues that can be resolved once a political decision is
made. The U.S. pointed to its own decision to field its own
territorial defense prior to making key decisions about what
the system would look like and how it would operate. (Note:
NATO,s decision to proceed with the Active Layered Theatre
Ballistic Missile Defense Program was also made in this way.
End note.)

BUT KEY ALLIES NEED CONVINCING
--------------


5. (SBU) Although Allied reaction to the U.S. position was
muted at the table, with Germany stressing the need to keep
examining the many different taskings, privately Allies have
been more forthcoming in their views. In a private meeting
preceding the EWG-R, the Germans reacted negatively, pointing
out the difficulties with reaching an agreement on MD by
Bucharest. The Poles and Czechs, however, have told us they
support our position. French representatives have indicated
that they are in a "listening mode" until the conclusion of a
defense "white paper" expected in the spring of 2008.


6. (S) Comment: Per conversations with the Allies and the
International Staff, it is likely that the most significant
"push back" to a Bucharest decision to pursue territorial MD
will come from Germany. At this point, the Germans are
unwilling to support a political decision on NATO MD without

a formal NATO determination regarding the system details and
its possible impact on wider non-proliferation efforts. We
will need to pursue senior-level discussions with the Germans
- both at the NAC and bilaterally - to convince them to drop
their resistance. At the moment the French are presenting a
more neutral stance, as they re-evaluate their position on MD
in light of their recent change of government. Bringing the
French on board is likely to depend on how strong an MD
deliverable the U.S. proposes. They will be more inclined to
support a decision to pursue an MD system that involves a
minimum of programmatic detail. We should engage them on MD
as frequently as possible, particularly in capital.


7. (S) Comment Continued: We assess that there are two
prerequisites needed to enable a political decision on MD at
Bucharest. The first- an updated joint missile threat
assessment- has just been completed and points out that WMD
and missile-related technologies are becoming more readily
available. The second- an updated NATO MD feasibility study
by the conference of National Armament Directors- should be
competed in January. End Comment.
NULAND