RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE VIEWS NATO AS A

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000533

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR KCFE RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE VIEWS NATO AS A
CHALLENGE, NOT A THREAT

REF: PETERSON/SMYTH E-MAILS

Classified By: DCM Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) This is an Action Request: please see paragraph 8.


2. (C) Summary: After delivering a lackluster briefing on
Russian military reforms, Russian Senior Military
Representative Kuznetsov demonstrated previously unseen
frankness in responding to Allies' questions in the September
29 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting. Kuznetsov emphasized
repeatedly that Russia does not consider NATO a strategic
threat, but nonetheless, "the activities of NATO are
considered a challenge to Russian security." He expects a
Russian inter-agency task force to complete the new military
doctrine in 2008, which will identify terrorism and
proliferation as the principal threats to Russian security.
Regarding the Russian recent resumption of long-range bomber
missions, Kuznetsov said Russian flight crews need more
training and the bombers are key to maintaining "strategic
stability." He said Cold War "rules" for the flights are
still in place and called on all concerned nations to
renegotiate them. Charge Olson refuted Kuznetsov's attempt
to equate Russian bomber activity with U.S. activity. (Note:
Allies have not fully grasped the differences between the
U.S. and Russian flights, and therefore, Post would like to
brief Allies at 26 on the differences (see Request for
Guidance in paragraph 8). End note.) The Russian delegation
told us privately that Chief of General Staff Baluyevski
approved the briefing to the NRC in response to U.S. efforts
at increased transparency in the NRC over the past year, but
that the Russian mission pushed the envelope with frank
responses to Allies' questions. End Summary.

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Russian Military Reforms
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3. (C) In his opening statement, Russian Senior Military
Representative to NATO Vice-Admiral Valentine Kuznetsov
delivered a bland presentation on the state of Russian
military reforms (Slides to be e-mailed to EUR/RPM upon
receipt). He claimed that the transformation plan and the
reform of command and control are largely complete and have
reached a "normal level of development." Stressing that the
Russian armed forces will continue to move toward a
professional army, Kuznetsov estimated that professional
soldiers versus conscripts in the Russian armed forces would
increase from 55 to 70 percent by the end of 2008. Russian
military priorities include maintenance of the strategic
deterrent, improved mobility of the armed forces, increased
permanent readiness of its units, armament modernization,
increased training, and military education reform. He said
Russia requires a strategic deterrent to safeguard itself and
its Allies. Kuznetsov said Russia plans to spend between 2.5
to 3 percent of its GDP on its military budget.


4. (C) Germany, Romania and Norway asked about Russian plans
to increase inter-operability with NATO. Kuznetsov said that
the 15th Motorized Brigade's officer corps trains to be
inter-operable with NATO. He asserted that in 2009 or 2010,
Russia would be able to conduct joint exercises with NATO to
include strategic airlift for deployments.

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NEW MIL DOCTRINE: NATO A CHALLENGE BUT NOT A THREAT
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5. (C) In response to questions from the Netherlands, Canada,
the Czech Republic, and Romania, Kuznetsov said work has been
under way on the new military doctrine for two years and he
expects it to be complete in 2008. The Russian National
Security Council is tasked to coordinate the revision and the
relevant departments and agencies are working on it in an
inter-agency ad-hoc team. Due to the changes in the global
situation, he said, the 2000 military doctrine is out-of-date
and the new doctrine will reflect the move from confrontation
to a cooperative approach; terrorism and proliferation will
be described as the top threats to Russian national security.
In response to questions from the Netherlands, Czech
Republic and Lithuania, Kuznetsov said Russia will not
identify NATO as a threat to Russian security; however, "some

activities of NATO represent a challenge to its security."
He said the doctrine would have a clear link between
identified threats and any development of missile defense.
Deploying guidance, Charge Olson asked Kuznetsov about the
role of its collective security arrangements in the new
military doctrine, which was one of the few questions
Kuznetsov left unanswered.

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RESUMPTION OF LONG-RANGE BOMBER FLIGHTS
--------------


6. (C) Norway, Canada, Iceland, and the UK all asked
Kuznetsov about the resumption of Russian long-range bomber
flights. Iceland noted problems caused by the flights
because the Russian bombers are entering into areas of high
civilian air traffic. The Icelandic Perm Rep asked if it
would be possible for Russia to provide pre-notification and
plans on the frequency of the flights. (Note: Iceland told
us privately that the Russians have stonewalled their
bilateral attempts to discuss this issue. End note.)
Kuznetsov claimed Russia decided to resume the strategic
patrolling for technical and political reasons. The
technical reason is that all of the flights serve to train
the strategic bomber crews. Politically, Russia wants to
maintain strategic stability, and the bombers are a pillar of
their Strategic Triad. He asserted that in the absence of
new rules, the Cold War rules still apply, and as such,
Russia is abiding by them. (Note: In a subsequent private
conversation with the Russian delegation, it appears the
Russians are referring to START Treaty notifications. End
Note). Both sides, Kuznetsov said, could put an end to the
flights, and he called for concerned nations to get together
to renegotiate the rules. Charge Olson pushed back on the
Russian claim that the rules of the Cold War are still in
place and explained that the United States does not fly
nuclear capable bombers in the vicinity of Russian territory.
Olson suggested that instead we look for cooperative efforts
in which we share the same strategic objectives.


7. (C) There is considerable confusion among NATO Allies
concerning the differences between U.S. and Russian
long-range flights as a justification for the resumption of
their flights. Italy, France, Norway, and the Czech Republic
have asked us for clarification. Therefore, Post would like
to brief Allies on the key differences in an informal format
at 26 (see action request paragraph 8).

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REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
--------------


8. (C) Post requests talking points by OOB (Brussels) on
October 2 to use with Allies at 26 in an informal setting to
refute Russian claims that the Russian resumption of
long-range bomber flights is comparable to U.S. missions.
Further, guidance is requested to respond to the Russian
assertion that Cold War treaties and rules (i.e.,
notifications under the START Treaty) make their renewed air
activity routine. Post also requests instructions on whether
to raise the strategic bomber flight issue in one of the
NRC's technical committees.

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Naval Strategy
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9. (C) In response to a U.S. question, Kuznetsov said the
Russian Navy would like to increase its participation in
Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean and Operation
Black Sea Harmony (non-NATO operation with Turkey). Russia
would like to pursue similar cooperative efforts focused on
counter-terrorism in the Pacific and North Sea.

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SA-400 Missile Defense System
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10. (C) In response to a Czech question on the deployment of
the SA-400 missile defense system, Kuznetsov noted it is not
linked to the missile defense system around Moscow, which is
designed to counter ICBMs. He said the SA-400 is a mobile

system to counter medium and short-range threats, and the
SA-400 has a targeting system superior to the older SA-300.
He noted both systems (long-range Moscw and SA-400) are in
compliance with Russian oblgations to "our American
colleagues."

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COMMENT
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11. (C) The briefing was a dramatic departure from Russian
less-than-forthright modus operandi in the NRC. Most Allies
were surprised when the Russians accepted the U.S. proposal
to discuss their military reforms and even more so with the
positive tone and frankness in Vice-Admiral Kuznetsov's
responses to Allied questions. While nearly all of the Perm
Reps asked tough, but reasonable questions, the tone around
the table did not split along east/west lines as is often the
case. The Russian delegation privately told us that CHOD
Baluyevski agreed to the U.S. suggestion for the briefing
because of the increased transparency and willingness to
discuss tough issues that the U.S. has shown in the NRC over
the past year. It is unclear whether the Russians view this
briefing as a one-off or if it will open a broader avenue for
NRC dialogue. The briefing was a good general overview, but
Post would like to bore down into the specifics of some of
the issues. To this end, it may be worthwhile to examine the
strategic bomber issue in one of the NRC's technical
committees. This initiative would be welcomed by the
concerned Allies, particularly Iceland, which has gotten
nowhere with Russia in bilateral discussions. End Comment.
NULAND