RFG FOR NATO REVIEW OF THE LONGER-TERM ANALYSIS OF

S E C R E T USNATO 000490

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017
TAGS: MNUC NATO PARM PINR PREL
SUBJECT: RFG FOR NATO REVIEW OF THE LONGER-TERM ANALYSIS OF
BALLISTIC MISSILE RISKS AND THREATS

Classified By: Classified by Charge Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b an
d d)


1. (U) This is a request for guidance by COB Tuesday,
September 11.


2. (S) Summary: NATO's Senior Political-Military Group on
Proliferation (SGP) failed to come to agreement on the text
for NATO's Review of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic
Missile Risks and Threats at the September 5 Plenary meeting.
Following the meeting, the Czech Ambassador conveyed to
Charge concerns that the current version of the text
downplays the Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) threat and could make it difficult to justify U.S. and
NATO missile defense plans for Europe. USNATO is also
concerned that the text in question does not highlight nor
adequately reflect the U.S. inter-agency's position of the
threat from Iran. End Summary.


3. (S) Background: As requested by the North Atlantic
Council on October 25, 2006, NATO's Senior Political-Military
Group on Proliferation (SGP) is nearing completion of an
in-depth review of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic
Missile Risks and Threats which, once completed, will provide
the Alliance,s agreed and authoritative reference document
on ballistic missile risks and threats. The report will thus
serve as the threat justification for any NATO missile
defense plans. On September 6, Czech Permanent
Representative Fule told Charge Olson that the current text
under discussion in the SGP downplayed the ICBM threat from
Iran, and would make it more difficult for the Czech
government to win public and parliamentary support for the
U.S. missile defense site in the Czech Republic. Fule
specifically referred to the last sentence of paragraph 13 in
Section 2 of the document (below) which states that Iran
would face major technical obstacles to producing a
deployable ICBM even with foreign assistance.


4. (U) Begin Text of paragraph 13 in Section 2 of the Review
of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile Risks and
Threats.

(S) Iran has a programme to develop space launch vehicles
(SLVs) which would be capable of very small payloads. In
order to be successful in such a programme Iran must
establish mastery of adapted guidance rules and optimized
architecture, something it has yet to achieve. The SLV
development effort could allow the covert development of
longer-range BMs and may also help to establish part of the
technical base from which Iran could develop experimental
long range ballistic missiles and potentially later
IRBMs/ICBMs capable of delivering warheads to NATO countries.
Based on past precedent (e.g. North Korea and TAEPO DONG)
Iran may initially test such a missile as an SLV and not as a
BM in order to demonstrate an inherent IRBM/ICBM capability
without risking the potential political and economic costs of
a long-range missile test. In the absence of supply of a
complete ICBM, and its failure to master multiple stage
technology, Iran, even with foreign assistance, would still
face major technical obstacles, before it could achieve a
deployable ICBM. End Text.


5. (S) The U.S. has briefed NATO Allies that Iran could have
with continued foreign assistance, an ICBM capability by

2015. Accepting the above language would not be consistent
with previous statements the U.S. has made regarding the
Iranian missile threat and could throw Allied support for
U.S. and NATO missile defense into doubt.


6. (S) The NATO International Staff has called for a meeting
of the SGP at the point-of-contact (POC) level for Wednesday,
September 12 in order to review the entire document. USNATO
requests guidance on paragraph 13 to ensure it accurately
reflects U.S. assessments of the potential for development of
an Iranian ICBM capable of striking NATO countries.
OLSON