NRC/CFE: RUSSIA WANTS COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000433

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: NATO PARM PREL MARR KCFE RU
SUBJECT: NRC/CFE: RUSSIA WANTS COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF
FLANK REGIME

Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

(C) Summary: In the July 25 NATO-Russia Council (NRC)
meeting, Russia outlined how it would like to modify the
Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (A/CFE) Treaty,
including entirely eliminating the flank regime. Allied
response was limited in the NRC meeting. However, Allies
reacted sharply in the June 26 HLTF in which we saw
increasing Allied solidarity, rallying to retain existing
flank regimes (reported septel). In the NRC, Russia refused
to recognize any link between the Istanbul Commitments and
A/CFE ratification, but suggested Russia would be open to a
separate dialogue to resolve Russian troops and munitions in
Moldova and Georgia. The Russians presented a detailed legal
justification for their suspension of the CFE Treaty in the
NRC (NOTE: The CFE has no provision for suspension, only
withdrawal. End note.) The Netherlands and Spain argued
that they do not consider suspension to be withdrawal. The
UK presented the Allied arguments from the July 16 NATO
statement on the Russian suspension, while Spain seemed to be
advocating the need to think about beginning negotiations a
post-A/CFE Treaty. End Summary.

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Suspension Is Not Withdrawal
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2. (C) In the July 25 NRC meeting, the Netherlands as the
depository of the CFE Treaty recapped the Russian suspension
of the treaty and explained that Russian had notified the
Netherlands of suspension of the Treaty, not withdrawal. He
noted that the 150-day period of notification in view of the
Netherlands did not equate to the 150-day period for
withdrawal. Russia and Spain echoed that suspension is not
withdrawal. Russian MFA Director for Security and
Disarmament Anatoliy Antonov gave an elaborate explanation
justifying why suspension is allowed under general principles
of international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, arguing that if the Treaty provides for a large
action (i.e., withdrawal) it implies that a lesser action
(i.e., suspension) is also allowable.

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At The End of The Russian Tether
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3. (C) In a long Russian intervention, Antonov recapped the
reasons why Russia was going to suspend the CFE. Quoting
President Putin, Antonov explained Russia just cannot live
with the current Treaty any longer, and that Russia is at the
end of its tether. Antonov stressed that Russia was not
terminating dialogue and specifically welcomed the German
proposal for an informal CFE seminar in the fall. He
lamented that there had been no serious discussion of
Russia's substantive concerns at the CFE Extraordinary
Conference, only polite speeches. He said that Russia was
open to dialogue toward resolving the issue of Russian bases
and munitions in Moldova and Georgia as well as CFE. Apart
from these positive noises on the Istanbul Commitments, he
decried the linkage NATO makes between remaining commitments
and ratification of A/CFE. Then he outlined what Russia
would like to change in the CFE Treaty, which tracks very
closely with the "elements" that Russia brought to the
Extraordinary Conference:

-- NATO equipment ceilings need to be lowered to take account
of NATO enlargement (i.e., back to collective ceilings);

-- The Baltic countries must come back to the CFE negotiating
table;

-- The flank regime should be abolished. He was very clear:
do not change it, abolish it;

-- We need a common understanding of "substantial combat
forces;"

-- A/CFE is provisionally applied by a date certain (1 July
2008);

-- Conditions must be created for new participants to join
and modernize the A/CFE further.


4. (C) Only a few Allies responded to the Russian diatribe.
The UK cited key portions of the July 16 NATO statement on

the Russian suspension of the Treaty, responding to Russian
comments on the flank regime (available at
www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-085e.html). Germans welcomed
Russia's interest in their informal seminar on CFE, scheduled
for 1-2 October. Spain, which had insisted on today's CFE
discussion, seemed ready to give up on A/CFE and opined about
the possibility of a new treaty. The Spanish Permanent
Representative asked Russia if it wanted adapted CFE or
something more, but emphasized that "we have to have an arms
control system." Russia responded by railing against the
flank limitations. Antonov said, since the danger of the
Soviet Union is gone, there is no danger of a Russian
confrontation with the Alliance; therefore, the flank
limitations are a relic of the Cold War and we should work
together to solve security issues. He explained that A/CFE
would not be suitable unless we do away with the flank
limitations.

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COMMENT
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5. (C) Although Allies did not immediately respond in the
NRC, the sharpening of the Russian rhetoric reverberated in
the July 26 HLTF meeting (reported septel). Most Allies had
not wanted CFE on the NRC agenda the day before a scheduled
HLTF. As with other issues, Russian carping led to increased
Allied solidarity to retain the A/CFE, including the flank
limitations, even among Allies that favor a more conciliatory
approach towards Russia.
OLSON