NRC: RUSSIA DISCOUNTS IRANIAN THREAT AND OFFERS

S E C R E T USNATO 000430

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR RU
SUBJECT: NRC: RUSSIA DISCOUNTS IRANIAN THREAT AND OFFERS
"EITHER/OR" MISSILE DEFENSE PACKAGE

Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (S) Summary: In the July 25 NATO-Russia Council (NRC)
meeting, Russian MFA Director of Disarmament Antonov and LTG
Buzinskiy gave lengthy presentations on Russia's offer to the
United States on missile defense (MD) cooperation in a
transparent attempt to drive wedges within the Alliance. The
Russian delegation stressed that its offer could not be
combined with the US system, and that the US must abandon MD
work in Europe before this collaborative effort could begin.
The Russians offered their radars in Gabala and Armavir to
assess the Iranian threat (i.e., by monitoring missile tests)
with an interested "pool of countries." From data provided
by the radars, the MD pool could assess if a threat exists
and if so, how to counter it. The Russians strongly disputed
the existence of an Iranian threat; Russian Ambassador
Totskiy, however, called on the NRC to restart a ballistic
missile threat assessment that was abandoned in 2004 due to
lack of consensus. Ambassador Nuland noted that Allies and
Russia all agree that Iran bears watching and said the US
program has nothing to freeze since we have not begun work on
it. Growing in confidence on this issue, Allied Permanent
Representatives contested many of the Russian political and
technical assumptions. End Summary.

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Threat, what threat?
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2. (S) MFA Director of Disarmament and International
Security Anatoliy Antonov, LTG Evgeniy Buzinksiy, and a
briefer (Col Illyen) questioned the Iranian threat, and
contended it was not real because Iran does not have a
sufficient industrial, scientific, and technological base to
develop long-range missiles. According to the Russian
experts, even if Iran had the technological base, it would
take 10 to 15 years to deploy long range systems. Antonov
stated that the international sanctions on Iran have been
effective in preventing it from developing long-range
systems; in addition, Iran cannot modify SCUDs into
long-range systems. Antonov questioned why Iran would ever
attack Europe since Iran is looking to integrate with the
world community and not isolate itself. He said Iran's
political and economic interests in Europe make an attack
from Iran unthinkable.


3. (S) Allies pushed back on Russia's assessment of the
Iranian threat. France said, "we have analyzed the threat
and the reality of the threat cannot be questioned at the
basic level." Denmark questioned the divergence of the
perceived Iranian threat between Russia and the Allies and
asked how two very different conclusions could be reached
from the same set of facts. The UK welcomed US plans and
assurances to cover Allies against the Iranian threat.
Ambassador Nuland observed that all NRC members recognize the
Iranian threat, but Allies see it as more advanced than the
Russians.

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CHOICE BETWEEN RUSSIAN OFFER AND US SYSTEM
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4. (S) The Russians briefed Allies on their proposals put
forward by President Putin at the G-8 Summit in Heiligendamm
and at the US/Russia Summit in Kennebunkport (Russian
proposal emailed to EUR). General Buzinskiy said the GOR was
prepared to share data from its radars in Gabala, Azerbaijan
and Armavir in southern Russia. The radars could provide
data on the Iranian and other Middle Eastern threats out to
the year 2020. Using this data, a "pool of states" could
then accurately assess the threat by monitoring any ballistic
missile tests. When the threat warranted, the pool of states
could respond appropriately. The Russians repeatedly
emphasized that the United States must freeze all missile
defense activity in Europe as a precondition to the Russian
offer. Antonov argued that the Russian proposal would
provide equal security for NATO and Russia, reduce costs, and
prevent a new arms race in Europe.


5. (S) Russia proposed expanding the Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC) by making it multilateral and adding another
center in Brussels. (NOTE: JDEC, a bilateral US/Russian
initiative in Moscow, never become operational. End note)
Russia would like to open this project to all European states

-- multilateral crews would acquire and process real-time
data on detected missile launches. Buzinskiy noted Gabala
and Armavir would be the primary radars but others could be
added.


6. (S) Allies questioned many of the Russian political and
technical assumptions. The UK asserted that Allies cannot
leave themselves open to missile attack from rogue states and
therefore must have the capability to intercept a rogue
missile. Spain and Belgium stated forcefully that the
security of the Alliance is indivisible. France said a US
site in Europe in no way threatens Russia's strategic
deterrent. Spain, the UK, and the US questioned the
capabilities of the Russian radars to track an Iranian
missile launch throughout its full trajectory in view of
their location.


7. (S) Ambassador Nuland welcomed the Russian offer of two
radars and noted the progress that has been made in the NRC
on missile defense: we all agree that Iran bears watching and
that forward-based radars can play a useful role. She noted
that Russia agrees on the need for interceptors at some
point. (NOTE: Russian proposal lacked interceptors, but one
slide showed US interceptors (Aegis and PAC-3) based in the
Mediterranean and Turkey, implying that these systems were
sufficient to deal with a minimal Iranian threat. End note)
She also robustly defended the planned US MD system.

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"TO BE CONTINUED"
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8. (S) The Secretary General wrapped up the session with the
words, "to be continued." Spain, Denmark, UK, and Belgium
all called for more dialogue on this issue in the NRC.
Ambassador Nuland called for a reinforced NRC on missile
defense in the Fall.


9. (S) Ambassador Totskiy called on the NRC nonproliferation
working group to restart work on a ballistic missile threat
assessment. He noted that this working group did not reach
consensus on the 2004 assessment because of an issue not
linked to ballistic missiles (biological weapons),and
therefore he is optimistic that consensus could be achieved
on ballistic missile assessment. (NOTE: Russia has already
stated its conclusions on the Iranian threat (i.e., that no
threat exists). Therefore, finding consensus on an NRC
ballistic missile threat assessment would be a long slog.
End Note.)

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COMMENT
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10. (S) The Russian presentation mirrored the US presentation
in the NRC on April 19 in form and substance. This was not
lost on Allies, who commented afterwards that the Russian
presentation was much more polished than previous Russian
interventions in the NRC on MD. Even hapless Ambassador
Totskiy kept to his script.


11. (S) The Russian proposal cannot replace US missile
defense since it deals only with monitoring Iranian ballistic
missile tests. We need to move Russia beyond its "either/or"
proposal by maintaining Allied unity. France gave a
particularly strong intervention, but Germany -- a principal
target of the Russian wedge driving campaign -- stayed
silent. Ultimately, once the GOR realizes MD in Europe is
inevitable, perhaps, it will abandon its campaign and
seriously turn attention to areas of potential cooperation.
End Comment.
OLSON