A/S FRIED BRIEFS NATO PERMREPS ON SECRETARY'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000324

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR XB
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED BRIEFS NATO PERMREPS ON SECRETARY'S
CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW

Classified By: EUR A/S Fried for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On May 16 Assistant Secretary Fried told
NATO PermReps that US-Russian relations, Kosovo, and the
internal Russian political climate were the principal
subjects of the Secretary's discussions with President Putin,
FM Lavrov, and others in Moscow. The Russians took on board
the message that they needed to cool their rhetoric against
the U.S. The Secretary found little common ground on Kosovo
and much concern about precedent despite her concerted
push-back that Kosovo is sui generis. She argued Kosovo had
to be resolved on its own merits. A strong message of EU
unity from Chancellor Merkel in Samara will be a key next
step. Fried said the challenge of dealing with a more
assertive Russia was to pursue partnership where possible and
to push back when necessary. In response to questions from
Permreps Fried reported the Russians said little about CFE
and U.S. missile defense. End Summary.

RUSSIA AGREES TO COOL THE RHETORIC
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2. (C) EUR/AS Fried briefed Allied PermReps on the
Secretary's meetings with President Putin, FM Lavrov, former

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PM Primakov, and civil society representatives in Moscow that
had concluded the day before. Fried's briefing and the
following lively Q and A, focused on Kosovo, frozen
conflicts, CFE, Iran, and Russian domestic politics. Fried
said the Secretary had made clear that the U.S. could manage
relations with Russia that included areas of disagreement as
well as cooperation, but would not tolerate constant
rhetorical attacks that had risen to an offensive pitch. As
evidence the message got through, FM Lavrov publicly admitted
that the tone needed lowering.

MANAGING KOSOVO DIFFERENCES
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3. (C) Fried told NATO PermReps the Secretary had long, hard
discussions on Kosovo with both Putin and Lavrov. They
firmly opposed both the draft UNSC resolution and the core
concept of supervised independence for Kosovo. They
expressed continued concern about the precedent that an
independent Kosovo would pose for other separatist regions,
arguing that either territorial integrity or
self-determination needed to be applied consistently across
the board. They asked rhetorically how they could explain to
Abkhaz separatists why they could not have independence if
Kosovars did. The Secretary pointed out that the world was
full of separatist movements, and there was no single formula
for resolving them all. Kosovo, she insisted, had to be
settled on its own merits and was sui generis.


4. (C) Fried told NATO PermReps that none of the Secretary's
interlocutors showed their cards regarding a UNSC veto.
However, Lavrov said again that Russia would not be "more
Serbian than the Serbs." Putin and Lavrov seemed to
acknowledge that if Serbia was willing to give up Kosovo as
the price of joining the West, they would not stand in its
way. Fried judged that Serbian President Tadic might accept
such an outcome, but Prime Minister Kostunica never would.
More broadly, it was clear that the Russians have not yet
decided what they will do in the UNSC endgame.

EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY ESSENTIAL
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5. (C) Fried urged the Europeans, particularly Germany as EU
President, to hold firm on Kosovo at the upcoming EU-Russia
Summit. He credited EU unity, along with U.S.-EU solidarity,
for steadily building support in the Security Council for the
draft resolution. By U.S. count, he said, UNSC votes in
favor had risen from 5-6 to 11-12 in recent weeks, adding
that Russia's Balkans director D/FM Titov did not dispute
that assessment.

OTHER SEPARATIST CONFLICTS
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6. (C) Fried cited some easing of hard-line positions in
Moscow, noting that Russia had criticized South Ossetian
separatist leader Kokoity after his forces had humiliated
Russian peacekeepers, forcing them to the ground in a recent
encounter. Fried said the Russians did not want a crisis in
either of the separatist regions of Georgia. Russia had
allowed the rollover of the UNOMIG mandate and was showing a
more positive attitude toward Georgia overall. One of the
Russians acknowledged that their confrontation with Georgia
last fall had revealed "a lack of elegance."

LETTING UKRAINE CHART ITS OWN COURSE
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7. (C) Responding to questions from NATO PermReps about
Russian attitudes toward Ukraine, Fried said Moscow had not
recently complained about U.S. interference. Genuine

blue-orange differences had emerged in Ukraine, and Fried
said the U.S. would not try to manipulate those (as Russia
had done during the Orange Revolution). He commented that PM
Yanukovych was "growing into his own person" since his
initial role as Russia's stooge in Kyiv.

MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ON IRAN, MD, CFE
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8. (C) NATO PermReps asked principally about current Russian
thinking on the CFE moratorium, Iran, and U.S. missile
defense. Fried said Russia also seemed prepared to deal more
firmly with Iran. Lavrov told the Secretary that they would
support Solana in his upcoming talks with the Iranians in
advance of a possible third UNSCR on Iran's nuclear
obligations. Despite recent high-volume protests on U.S.
missile defense plans and Putin's call for a "moratorium" on
observing CFE treaty provisions, Fried said neither issue
featured high on the Russians' agenda with the Secretary.
Fried noted that Secretary Rice had repeated Secretary of
Defense Gates' offer of MD cooperation and to listen to
Russia's concerns on CFE. Fried commented that Russia could
meet its Istanbul CFE obligations by pulling out of their one
remaining base in Georgia (Gudauta),and might be enticed to
accept a face-saving settlement on Transnistria, such as
replacing their forces there with an international
peacekeeping operation.

RUSSIA'S "MANAGED DEMOCRACY"
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9. (C) Fried said that Putin appeared genuinely concerned
about public opinion in the run-up to Duma elections and the
Presidential succession. While the West focused on
government control of the media, the Russian leadership
seemed fixated on managing what they did not fully control.
They appeared concerned about the public's tendencies toward
excessive nationalism and about anti-reformist forces. One
of the civil society reps told the Secretary that Russia's
growing middle class was the best hope for moving from the
current "managed democracy" toward the real thing. The
Secretary, Fried said, had assured Putin and Lavrov that the

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U.S. supported a strong, democratic Russia. Fried concluded
that the best approach for handling a new, more assertive
Russia was to simultaneously pursue partnership where
possible and to push back against Russian excesses when
necessary.
NULAND