Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO308
2007-05-16 16:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

COUNSELOR COHEN DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Tags:  NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF PK 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000308 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR COHEN DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
DURING MAY 14-15 TRIP TO NATO


USNATO 00000308 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000308

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR COHEN DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
DURING MAY 14-15 TRIP TO NATO


USNATO 00000308 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. During separate May 14 meetings at NATO HQ
with Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and NATO
Permanent Representatives, Counselor Cohen discussed NATO's
role in Afghanistan, as well as general challenges in
Afghanistan and Pakistan and the need to address them in an
integrated manner. The Counselor shared his observations
from recently completed trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan,
noting the challenges of bringing development and security to
Pakistan's tribal areas and building rule of law and
governance in Afghanistan. He highlighted the key role
security and military operations play in enabling development
and cited U.S. efforts in Nuristan province in Afghanistan as
a positive example. Dr. Cohen told interlocutors the
international community needed to enhance training efforts
for Afghan security forces and address Afghanistan's
narcotics problem more effectively. He also said he had
concerns with command and control (C2) structures in
Afghanistan. SYG de Hoop Scheffer agreed on the need for
NATO to increase its training efforts with Afghan security
forces, and addressed the need to better coordinate strategic
messaging among ISAF, OEF, and the Afghan government. NATO
PermReps probed for the Counselor's views on a variety of
fronts, focusing on how to enhance Pakistani efforts on the
Afghan border, and ISAF-OEF coordination. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer opened with three main points on
Afghanistan. First, President Karzai needed to exercise
restraint in criticizing international forces publicly,
recognizing that NATO is doing all it can to prevent civilian
casualties. Next, NATO must increase its role in training
Afghan security forces, but lack of training should not
become a catch-all excuse for all that is wrong in the
country. Third, NATO has work to do on improving its
strategic messaging in conjunction with OEF and the Afghan

government, while understanding the political reality that
the same message resonates differently for each Ally due to
domestic politics. The SYG urged that existing coordination
and messaging structures be examined, and modified
appropriately to enhance efforts. He also briefed the
Counselor on NATO's efforts implementing a "Comprehensive
Approach" in Afghanistan, in other words, working seamlessly
with other international actors involved in country. NATO
must do its part, the SYG noted, but only had a piece of the
puzzle: the G-8, UN, and EU must also do more to enhance the
overall international effort.


3. (C) The Counselor noted he had found Karzai emotional
during his recent meeting, and intensely concerned with
Pakistan. He stated that both Presidents Karzai and
Musharraf need to be helped and prodded simultaneously by the
international community. He addressed the need to train
Afghan security forces, and for urgent progress particularly
within the Afghan National Police, which according to Major
General Durbin (CSTC-A),needed 2,400 additional trainers and
mentors. The mentors would both advise ANP in the field and
also monitor their performance and keep them on good
behavior. He agreed organizational fixes could be made to
current strategic communications arrangements in theater, but
noted that local commanders would, in many cases, have to
take the lead The Counselor, Ambassador Nuland, and the SYG
discussed the possibility of a three-pronged media
arrangement in theater, whereby ISAF, OEF, and the Afghans
would coordinate messages, share information, and respond
appropriately to questions concerning complex, pan-theater
operations. The SYG expressed interest, and noted that
discipline would be key; once a line was decided, all
entities would need to fall in and support it. ISAF should
not take questions that should be addressed to OEF, and
vice-versa.


4. (C) In a separate meeting with Allied Ambassadors, the

USNATO 00000308 002.2 OF 002


Counselor shared observations from his time in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. He believed the war in Afghanistan was
winnable, a theme he had heard from many interlocutors during
his recent visit, though the challenges were significant. He
urged that nations' policies towards Pakistan and Afghanistan
be pursued in an integrated manner, reflecting the nature of
the problem. Cooperation between the two nations should be
encouraged, but just as the Afghans needed assistance with
training and capabilities, the Pakistani Frontier Corps was
woefully under-equipped. He suggested that nations begin to
look differently at Provincial Reconstruction Teams in
Afghanistan, stating the PRTs should see their job as
strategic development rather than reconstruction. An equal,
and in some ways more important, challenge was governance and
rule of law, and much work remained on those fronts.


5. (C) Dr. Cohen highlighted the crucial link between
military operations and development: they could not be
separated cleanly, and cited U.S. civil and military efforts
in Nuristan province as an excellent example of how to
combine robust military efforts with development in an
effective counterinsurgency strategy. He urged Allies to
address the gap in credibility and capability between the
Afghan National Army and Police and to do more police
training, including mentoring. The Counselor pointed to the
strategic challenge of counternarcotics, noting the links
between the drug trade, corruption, and funding of the
insurgency. The problem would only grow worse if not
addressed more effectively, he stated. Finally, he shared
his concern with PermReps that while understanding the ISAF
and OEF current C2 structure resulted from multilateral
compromises, its unwieldy nature could be improved.


6. (C) During discussion with PermReps, Greece, Poland, and
Italy focused on how to make more progress on
Pakistan-Afghanistan border issues. The Spanish ambassador,
supported by Norway, stressed his belief that ISAF and OEF
needed to coordinate operations and messaging better, noting
the sensitivities of many Allied publics and parliaments to
casualties - particularly civilian - in Afghanistan.
Addressing the issue of ISAF C2 and civilian casualties, the
UK ambassador stated that ISAF and OEF needed a joint toolkit
to respond publicly to incidents when they occur, however
regrettable they are. In reply to the Spanish ambassador, he
stressed that nobody should call into question the guarantee
of in extremis ISAF support to Coalition forces in need, and
vice-versa.


7. (C) On Pakistan, the Counselor responded that addressing
border challenges would be a long-term effort, requiring
economic and military aid to both Pakistan and Afghanistan,
as well as more political and military coordination between
both nations. The international community should support
Pakistan in its efforts to bring its North West Frontier
Province -- in particular the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas -- into "Pakistan proper." In response to the points
by the Spanish and Norwegian ambassadors, the Counselor
acknowledged coordination and synergy should be improved, but
pushed back, noting that in war, in extremis situations arise
despite the best of planning and coordination, and that
European governments must begin to acknowledge that NATO must
fight in Afghanistan, as part and parcel of fulfilling ISAF's
mandate to bring security and stability to the country. More
importantly, they must explain these realities to their
publics.


8. (U) Counselor Cohen has cleared this message.
NULAND