Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO302
2007-05-14 10:01:00
SECRET
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

SPAIN RAISES OEF-ISAF COORDINATION WITH ANTO

Tags:  PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF 
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DE RUEHNO #0302/01 1341001
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S E C R E T USNATO 000302 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF
SUBJECT: SPAIN RAISES OEF-ISAF COORDINATION WITH ANTO
PERMREPS

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T USNATO 000302

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF
SUBJECT: SPAIN RAISES OEF-ISAF COORDINATION WITH ANTO
PERMREPS

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Spanish PermRep Benavides, on instructions, raised
with PermReps coordination between Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in
connection with recent military operations in western
Afghanistan. Emphasizing the impact that collateral damage
has on public opinion, he urged that OEF be mindful that its
operations have a political impact, including consequences
for ISAF, and to abide by the principles of necessity,
proportionality and discrimination. In response, U.S. and UK
PermReps agreed that public handling and coordination could
always be improved, but underscored firmly the importance of
both OEF and ISAF operations, and this mutual support to each
other. While civilian casualties and damages are always
regrettable, we have to remind our publics that it is the
Taliban who consciously put civilians at risk. Nuland
further noted that ISAF air support had been essential in
Shindand to assist U.S. forces who had been involved in a
14-hour firefight. She reminded colleagues of the hundreds
of close air support (CAS) missions OEF has flown in support
of ISAF. Privately, Benavides (protect) made clear that his
demarche was impelled by PM Zapatero's personal concern about
civilian casualties after seeing negative press reporting.
It was a reminder of the fragility of public opinion in some
key Allied capitals and the need to strengthen our
quick-reaction messaging.


2. (S) At a PermReps' lunch on May 9, Spanish PermRep
Benavides read out the text at para 3 on instructions --
unusual at lunch, but the venue was chosen to soft pedal the
content and avoid press leaks. By prior agreement, the U.S.
and UK responded as noted above.


3. (S) Begin Spanish text:

-- The clashes in the Zerkoh Valley of the province of Herat,
and the ensuing collateral damages, already impact our main
asset: the support of our public opinions, of our
Parliaments, and the understanding of the Afghan people of
our mission and our actions.


-- Concerning the incidents themselves, without prejudice to
the ongoing investigations - which should be fast, candid and
detailed - Some facts deserve a closer look, in order to draw
lessons which should be already learnt.

-- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) must be conscious of the
political impact of its operational and tactical decisions,
which have always, direct consequences on ISAF. Synergy
should work both ways. ISAF can support OEF, but OEF must
also support ISAF's political objectives. Political support
and control not only binds ISAF. The principle of "Necessity"
of the Law of War should always be applied on the ground. All
possible efforts to maintain the principles of
"Proportionality" in the use of force (causing the minimum
harm to attain military objectives); and of "Discrimination",
(between civilians and OMF) are an inevitable requirement.

-- ISAF has decided to associate "Necessity" to the
operational term "in extremis support to OEF" (OPLAN). Is
there a decision on articulating the scope of this term? Is
there a clear picture of the "synergy" so many times
discussed? How is coordination on the field? It has been
decided to support synergy by respecting the different
mandates and tasks and by talking fluently to each other,
taking full advantage of the "double hat".

-- Proportionality must reign not only in the response, but
also in the conception and conduction of the initial stages
of operations. Special Operation Forces have basic combat
power, and rely on very detailed planning and intelligence.
Is this being done? Are "in extremis" situations being
forced, because intelligence is not shared?

-- There is consensus on the idea that "a military alone
solution is no solution" and that we need a "comprehensive
approach".

-- Public Diplomacy: again, it must be pro-active and
coordinated. It is to be welcomed that after debate in the

NAC, people on the ground are making an effort to explain
what happened. OEF must also bear the burden of "Public
Diplomacy" and speak, especially when it has required our "in
extremis" support.

-- Ownership? Karzai has shown his disgust at "foreign
forces", in general, and has avoided the main issue: his
responsibility for the slow pace of a real "Afghanization" of
Afghanistan. This is the main issue, the "cross cutting"
theme: an effective "ownership" in security (six years since
2001),which fails to come.

-- We cannot step into the trap of the different forces in
this scenario. ISAF's or OEF's rhythm of operations must be
self imposed, not set by the insurgents. For the sake of
relatively minor tactical victories, the advantage of
initiative cannot be endangered, by losing the freedom of
action, national public opinion support and that of the
Afghans, grant.

End Spanish text.

NULAND
NULAND