Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO266
2007-04-24 07:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

HLTF MEETING MARCH 22, 2007

Tags:  PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS 
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VZCZCXRO4654
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNO #0266/01 1140744
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240744Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0768
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000266 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS
SUBJECT: HLTF MEETING MARCH 22, 2007

REF: STATE 034686

Classified By: Political Advisor Stuart Seldowitz, reasons 1.4 (b and d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000266

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS
SUBJECT: HLTF MEETING MARCH 22, 2007

REF: STATE 034686

Classified By: Political Advisor Stuart Seldowitz, reasons 1.4 (b and d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Despite determined efforts by the U.S. and
many other Allies, Germany derailed agreement at the March 22
High-level Task Force (HLTF) on the text of a NATO paper on
cross-group stationing of forces under the CFE Treaty. Most
allies, in particular Turkey, Greece, Norway, Bulgaria and
Romania, considered it essential for NATO to speak with one
voice on this issue, and discussions continued into the early
evening. While the HLTF ended without an agreed text, the
German representative's (Groening) unwillingness to
acknowledge his minority (of one) position, and his readiness
to allow individual Allies to face Russian questions without
firm Alliance support on the issue, had the effect of
infuriating most Allies and the International Staff. This
set the stage for subsequent discussions at NATO and in
capitals, which resulted in placing the original,
U.S.-friendly text under silence and getting it agreed by COB
March 28.


2. (C) On other issues, the HLTF reached agreement on key
themes to stress with Russia in the NATO Russia Council (NRC)
and NRC Ambassador Arms Control meetings (NRC (ACE)
discussion reported septel); provided the basis for the
International Staff to place under silence an instruction to
Vienna delegations for responding to Russia's three CSBM
proposals; and agreed to continue work on the "positive
agenda" paper. The HLTF decided to set aside (as a reference
document that has not been agreed and cannot be used outside
the Alliance) the German-originated "matrix" on the status of
the Istanbul commitments. In keeping with U.S. suggestions
at the February HLTF regarding the need to develop priorities
for HLTF work, Germany advanced a paper on new ideas for HLTF
work. The German paper received a mixed welcome. The U.S.
also met on the margins with Turkey, Greece, and Norway to
move forward on finalizing the CFE flank entitlement
transfers (which subsequently finalized on April 5). END
SUMMARY.


3. (SBU) The HLTF Chair, NATO Assistant Secretary General

Martin Erdmann, opened the March 22 meeting by summarizing
his recent meeting on February 21 with Russian DFM Alexander
Grushko in Moscow. In that meeting the following issues were
discussed: how new NATO members fit into CFE; how to achieve
more security with less means; the current arms control
regimes; a proposal for a new NRC (ACE) agenda; and the
anniversary activities associated with the NATO-Russia
Founding Act and the NATO-Russian Council.

Status of the Istanbul Commitments
--------------


4. (SBU) Fulfillment of Istanbul Commitments and the
"matrix." The Chair (Erdmann) noted that the Alliance could
not agree to the "Matrix" paper (HLTF-N(2006)0031-REV2 dated
16 January 2007),and asked Allies how we to address the
Russian Federation since the Alliance was not in agreement.
Erdmann noted that Moldova had stated at the Annual
Implementation Assessment Meeting in Vienna that the Russian
Federation had no legal status for its troop presence in
Moldova and that Russian troop presence is in contravention
to the Moldovan constitution. Moldova had also stated its
preference for a multinational peacekeeping force (PKF) to
replace current PKF. U.S.HLTF representative DAS Karin L.
Look commented hat the views of the Moldovan government
should b reflected in the Matrix. Host nation consent was
the core issue. Others noted that they agreed wth the
Moldovan government. German rep Groening noted that NATO
should have its own position on what constituted fulfillment
of the Istanbul commitments; this was not a matter for the
Moldovans to decide for us. Look, noting the continuing
differences amongst Allies, asked that the Matrix be set
aside and added to the agenda only as required. France,
Turkey, Italy, and Germany commented on the utility of Matrix
when discussing the Istanbul Commitments, but none challenged
Look's assessment that it cannot be "agreed." The Chair
decided that we should keep the Matrix as a living document
that is not regularly on the agenda. He also noted the
support for an international PKF to replace the current
Russian force in Moldova. Regarding Georgia, Erdmann
acknowledged the need for Russia to renew progress regarding
Gudauta.

Cross-Group Stationing
--------------


5. (C) In what turned out to be the most divisive issue of
the meeting, Allies struggled to reach agreement on the

USNATO 00000266 002 OF 004


"Consolidated International Staff Paper
(HLTF-N(2006)0023-REV8)," concerning cross-group stationing.
Agreement did not prove attainable, despite more than two
hours of discussion in the morning session, and an additional
two-hour session after the HLTF reconvened at 5:30 pm,
following the NRC (ACE). At Erdmann's request, HLTF Deputies
Chairman, Mike Miggins recounted the Deputies many fruitless
efforts to find a way forward on paragraph 5 of the text,
which a majority of Allies could accept as written; one ally
insisted that a portion of that text be deleted. Thus
agreement was not possible at the Deputies level.


6. (C) Apparently catching Erdmann by surprise, the U.S.,
Turkey, Romania, Norway, Czech Republic, Greece and Bulgaria
all said that this paper was the crucial issue for the March
22 HLTF, that it was essential to have a strong unified
Alliance position when Russia asked questions about this
issue in Vienna and at the upcoming NRC Ambassadorial.
Turkish rep Gun made clear that for those Allies involved in
transfers of CFE entitlements to the U.S., this issue was
urgent. All emphasized that cross-group stationing was
neither prohibited by the Treaty nor was it a security issue
for Russia. Erdmann asked whether Allies could agree to the
current text of:

REV8 of the Consolidate paper:
"5. Notwithstanding the Alliance's 1997 policy statement
concerning additional permanent stationing of substantial
combat forces, the deployment of some forces by Allies on the
territory of other members of the Alliance, within the limits
of national entitlements, is not incompatible with the text
of the Treaty. (There is no provision of the Treaty that
prohibits stationing of forces of one member of a group of
States Parties on the territory of a member of the other
Group of States Parties) as long as the group ceilings are
not violated and there is host State consent to the
stationing. The Adapted CFE Treaty, which reflects the new
security environment in Europe, explicitly allows such
deployments. This is another factor that underscores the
importance of achieving entry into force of the Adapted
Treaty as soon as possible after remaining Istanbul
Commitments have been fulfilled."

-- Germany, supported by France, said they could not accept
that text with the bracketed language included.


7. (C) German rep Groening's arguments were not always easy
to follow and sometimes contradicted themselves. But the
upshot of his line was clear: unlike other Allies, Groening
made the case that it is not permitted under the current CFE
Treaty to station forces from one group on the territory of
another group of States Parties. On the other hand, Groening
also argued that this was a political issue, not a legal one.
Germany's view was that while the CFE Treaty may not
prohibit cross-group stationing, it also doesn't allow it
explicitly. This was, he said, perfectly reasonable given
that at the time the Treaty was signed, there was little
thought about cross-group stationing. Look and other Allies
argued in return that the Treaty was clear on its face,
establishing a system of unitary sub-zones that were not
geographically bifurcated. An equipment entitlement that
pertained to the central zone could be located anywhere
within that zone (whether on the territory of an eastern
group or western group member),provided other Treaty
requirements, including for host state consent, were met.
Look stressed that this was an Alliance issue: if the German
interpretation were accepted, PFP field activities would be
all but impossible. New Allies and old Allies would not be
able to train together using their own equipment.


8. (C) After nearly two hours of discussion, the U.S.
circulated a proposed text which keyed off of language
provided by Groening and HLTF rep Biontiono to the U.S. in
Berlin. This U.S. proposal was similar to one of the options
the U.S. had discussed with concerned Allies two weeks
earlier, but it tracked almost exactly with German ideas.

"5. Notwithstanding the Alliance's 1997 policy statement
concerning additional permanent stationing of substantial
combat forces, the stationing of forces of one member of a
Group of States Parties on the territory of a member of the
other Group of States Parties, within the limits of national
entitlements, is compatible with the Treaty, as long as the
group ceilings are not violated and there is host State
consent to the stationing. The Adapted CFE Treaty, which
reflects the new security environment in Europe, explicitly
allows such deployments. This is another factor that
underscores the importance of achieving entry into force of
the Adapted Treaty as soon as possible after remaining
Istanbul Commitments have been fulfilled."


USNATO 00000266 003 OF 004



9. (C) The UK immediately stated that it had no problems
with the text, France thought it was a good basis. Bulgaria,
Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Czech Republic, Romania, Turkey,
Greece, and Latvia stated they could accept the U.S. tabled
revised text as written at this meeting. The Chair, noting
the emerging consensus, stated that either a silence
procedure or another meeting of the Deputies was needed to
reach an agreement. The German rep asked for a short break
to consider the U.S. text, but then rejected it after the
break. Ultimately, the Chair decided to suspend the meeting
until after the NRC(ACE) meeting which immediately followed
the HLTF meeting.


10. (C) When the HLTF reconvened later that afternoon,
Groening pushed for language that represented this view of
cross-group stationing as one held only by "concerned"
Allies; that is, it would be a position held by some, but not
all, NATO allies. He also sought to limit the application of
the cross-group stationing principle so it would not apply to
the stationing of Western group forces in Georgia.


11. (C) Trying to square the circle, the Canadian rep
offered language that met some German desiderata but not
others. That language was hard to read, but all Allies
recognized it as presenting a position held by all NATO
Allies, not just a few, and could thus have been acceptable.

"5. Notwithstanding the Alliance's 1997 policy statement
concerning additional permanent stationing of substantial
combat forces, the deployment of some forces by Allies on the
territory of other members of the Alliance, including the
stationing of forces of one member of a group of States
Parties on the territory of a member of the other Group of
States Parties, within the limits of national entitlements,
and conforming to the stated position taken by the NATO
member States Parties to the CFE Treaty, is compatible with
the Treaty, as long as the group ceilings are not violated
and there is host State consent to the stationing. The
Adapted CFE Treaty, which reflects the new security
environment in Europe, explicitly allows such deployments.
This is another factor that underscores the importance of
achieving entry into force of the Adapted Treaty as soon as
possible after remaining Istanbul Commitments have been
fulfilled."


12. (C) Groening's rejection of the final attempt at
compromise ended the HLTF but also set the stage for the
reversal that followed, over the next few days. Look pleaded
that this was an important issue concerning which NATO Allies
should speak with one voice. She said her most serious worry
was that on this sensitive political issue, one the Russians
were certain to pursue, some Allies were willing to allow
others to face that questioning alone without the support of
the NATO Alliance. Romanian HLTF rep Vasiu delivered the
same message more pointedly, "this is not why we joined NATO."


13. (C) Following exchanges on the margins among Ambassadors
at NATO and bilaterally in capitals, on Tuesday, March 27,
Germany agreed that the original text of para 5, rev 8, with
the bracketed text included, should be placed under silence
until COB March 28. Silence was not broken and the text was
agreed.

Other issues


14. (SBU) The Positive Agenda paper (HLTF-N(2006)0032-REV7)
will continue to be worked by Deputies as most Allies agreed
to the importance of this paper for future meetings with the
Russian Federation at NATO and OSCE forums.


15. (C) The 2007 Work Program and Strategic Orientation of
the HLTF. At the February 1, 2007, meeting of the HLTF the
U.S. proposed that the HLTF take a serious look at goals and
priorities for the HLTF, so as to be able to be more
proactive in its work. The Chair and most allies vigorously
supported that proposal. Following up on that, at this
meeting, Germany introduced its food-for-thought paper by
stating that conventional arms control continues to have a
vital role play in Europe and that the Alliance needed to pay
more attention to these issues. Germany (Groening) offered
that the I.S. should take his paper and rewrite it as a NATO
paper. Many agreed that this was a good basis to start
discussion, however there are red lines we needed to observe.
Those ideas presented by Turkey, Canada, U.S., UK, Czech
Republic, Italy and Romania were: not opening Vienna Document
1999; the EU should discuss this in the agreed framework;
asymmetrical threats are too broad; and no duplication of
work in other forums. France noted that it has some
reservations. The Chair announced that the issue would
continue to be addressed in the next HLTF.


USNATO 00000266 004 OF 004



16. (SBU) Russian Proposed CSBMs. The Chair in his
introduction stated that the International Military Staff had
written an analysis of the Russian proposal of information on
Multinational Rapid Reaction Forces. Vienna had asked for
additional guidance. Look opined that we should provide
Vienna with more guidance and include the military analysis
that had been conducted both in November and now.

-- U.S. was open to discussion. But we should ensure that
any measures are even handed, not duplicative of work in
other forums nor cherry-pick the Adapted CFE Treaty, and be
militarily significant and verifiable, as appropriate.

-- Canada noted that the security of our troops is paramount,
and that it was totally against adopting a CSBM measure that
was in the adapted CFE Treaty.

-- France stated that it was against naval CSBMs.

-- Netherlands called the first two CSBMs CFE look-alikes,
wanted Russia to explain its security concerns, liked the
SHAPE analysis on RRF which provided more room for
maneuvering during discussions, and like France, it was
against naval CSBMs to include ground units.

-- Germany was vague in its response. It called for a
balanced response to the Russians, wanted discussions to stay
in Vienna rather than in a NATO or EU forum, and emphasized
that we (the HLTF) should not try to micro-manage Vienna.

-- Greece agreed with Canada about CSBMs that are covered in
the adapted CFE Treaty and recalled that a decision was taken
in Madrid at the OSCE Ministerial that applied specific
criteria to new CSBMs (military significance, verifiability,
and reciprocity).

-- Turkey highlighted that the Alliance did not need to talk
about sub-regional issues that would disrupt the Alliance
solidarity.

In summation of the discussion, the Chairman would draft a
response to the Russian CSBM proposals as Vienna requested.
It would basically say that NATO was not interested in
discussing the first two Russian proposals but would welcome
discussion on the Rapid Reaction Force proposal.


17. (SBU) NRC(ACE) Preparation and Meeting. In the short
time available to prepare for the NRC (ACE),Allies agreed to
try to offer a broadly cooperative message to Russia
regarding the expanded agenda of the group. Germany agreed
to speak on the "strategic importance of arms control;" the
U.S. (and others) would comment on the Istanbul Commitments,
and next steps needed in Moldova; France would offer to
provide a briefing on a new weapons system under the agenda
item on new security concerns; and all Allies would try to
send a common message cautioning the Russians that while we
were open to discussion of new CSBMs (Look mentioning that
the U.S. was open to the idea of a CSBM seminar this fall, in
Vienna),CSBMs were not the only way to address security
concerns. Allies were open to negotiate measures, but to be
acceptable those had to be even-handed, not duplicative of
Adapted CFE provisions, and militarily significant and
verifiable, as appropriate.


18. (SBU) Next meetings: The U.S. proposed that in
preparation of the NRC Anniversary activities scheduled for
June, it would be best to have a meeting in mid-May in
preparation and if needed in late June before the summer
vacation season begins. Others who spoke supported this
proposal. However, due to other scheduling constraints since
this meeting, the next HLTF meeting has been set for May 3.
NULAND