MISSILE DEFENSE: A/S ROOD CONSULTS WITH CZECH,

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000265

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL CZ PL RU
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: A/S ROOD CONSULTS WITH CZECH,
POLISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN COUNTERPARTS

REF: A. USNATO 263

B. USNATO 264

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of the April 19 meetings at
NATO HQ on Missile Defense (reftels),Assistant Secretary
Rood briefed his Czech, Polish, French and German
counterparts on his April 17 meetings in Moscow and the U.S.
offer of Cooperation across the full spectrum of missile
defense activities with Russia. Polish Under Secretary of
State Waszcykowski laid down markers in advance of the start
negotiations on placement of missile defense interceptors,
pressing for additional U.S. security guarantees to accompany
any agreement to build a site in Poland and arguing for
additional defense cooperation or hardware for Poland to
provide security at the site. Czech Deputy FM Pojar praised
the U.S. offer of cooperation to Russia and said Russia was
trying to weaken the transatlantic relationship. German
Political Director Brandenburg noted concerns about Russia,s
reaction and floated the idea of an inspection/verification
regime with Russia. French MFA Director of Strategic Affairs
Carre said France would not oppose a U.S. system, supported
NAC and NRC discussion, agreed on the threat, but might have
concerns about the "NATO-ization" of the U.S. system. End
summary.


2. (C) Assistant Secretary for International Security and
Nonproliferation Rood briefed his Czech, Polish, German, and
French counterparts in separate meetings on April 18 and 19
in Brussels on the U.S. offer of MD cooperation given to
Russian DFM Kiselyak and LTG Buzinskiy in Moscow on April 17.
He said his visit to Moscow was a follow-up to the March 28
phone between Presidents Bush and Putin. A/S Rood told them
that the USG offered the "full spectrum of cooperation" to
the Russians in a two page non-paper (non-paper reported
septel). Rood explained that this was not a detailed
proposal and that further discussion would be necessary to
flesh out projects should Russia show interest in any of the
specific areas proposed by the U.S. A/S Rood said we did
not expect the Russians to immediately accept our offer, and
noted that even if they turned down the offer it would still
be beneficial to mitigating Russian criticism and
demonstrating U.S. sincerity in attempting to build trust and
cooperation. He told the four Allies that we plan to
distribute the non-paper in both the NRC/R and NAC/R on April
19, but do not plan to release it to the press.

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PERSISTENT POLE
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3. (C) Undersecretary of State Witold Waszcykowski praised
our "pragmatic approach" toward the Russians, but cautioned
that MD was not a technical issue for the Russians, it was
political. The location of the two planned sites in Central
Europe was still highly sensitive to them. Ten interceptors
were no threat to Russia. He said Russia could influence
policy in Western European capitals, but Moscow had no sway
with new NATO members. A/S Rood told him that it was
important to reach out to the Russians and this could help
reduce Russian wedge-driving; however, we would never give
Russia a veto over the project.


4. (C) Wascykowski referred to the stationing of U.S.
interceptors in Poland as a "test" of whether it was truly a
full member of NATO. He lamented Poland's "second-class
status" in NATO and expressed a hope for a more solid
security guarantee directly from the U.S. A/S Rood strongly
countered that there should never be any doubt of American
commitment to Article 5, and that we clearly viewed Poland as
a full member of NATO and not a "second-class" member.


5. (C) Wascykowski described the interceptor site as a "naked
base" in need of protection and pressed repeatedly for a
long-term military cooperation agreement to accompany any
agreement to build the base in Poland. Wascykowski said this
must be part of upcoming negotiations on placement of
interceptors in Poland. Rood acknowledged that protection of
the base would be the subject of upcoming negotiations. A/S
Rood said the U.S. and Poland needed to first assess the
threat to the interceptor base before we designed
extraordinary protection for it. He explained that we did
not envision a hardened site and have only standard
protection in our other interceptor bases. A/S Rood told him
agreement on a base would be path breaking and could lead to
political, economic, and military benefits; however, he
declined Wascykowski,s desire for him to commit in principle
that Poland would receive enhanced defense cooperation as a

result of accepting an interceptor base before the
negotiations even begin.

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LAID-BACK CZECH
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6. (C) In sharp contrast to Wascykowski, Czech DFM Thomas
Pojar was much more subdued. He said he did not expect a
positive response from the Russians on the U.S offer of
cooperation, but the offer would be helpful for the internal
European debate on missile defense. Pojar contended that
Russia had three goals: bash the missile defense plans for
domestic political consumption; weaken the transatlantic
relationship; and be treated with respect by the United
States.

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FRENCH AND GERMANS
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7. (C) German Deputy Political Director Ulrich Brandenburg
said that 10 interceptors did not represent a threat to the
Russian strategic force. He praised the U.S. offer of
cooperation as a sound strategy, even if the Russians did not
immediately seize upon it. He asked if the U.S. would be
willing to accept the stationing of Russians officers at the
site or submit to Russian inspections at short notice. A/S
Rood explained that the sites are not located on U.S.
territory and this was a sensitive issue in Poland. In
addition, such a proposal reinforced the outdated concept of
a strategic balance between NATO and Russia that we were
trying to move beyond.


8. (C) French MFA Director of Strategic Affairs Phillipe
Carre told A/S Rood that France had concerns about potential
"NATO-ization" of the U.S. system. France was fine with a
U.S. system, supported discussions in NATO and the NRC, and
agreed that there was a threat, but was probably not ready
for a NATO system. He suggested that a NATO system might
somehow undermine the independent French nuclear deterrent
although he said this was his personal opinion. He tried to
explain that France could not be dependent on NATO MD and
still be truly independent. He asked the U.S. not to seek a
NATO blessing for the U.S. system in Oslo and to encourage
the Czechs and Poles to be quiet on this subject.
NULAND