U.S., UK BRIEF ISAF CONTRIBUTORS ON AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000229

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS: MOPS NATO PGOV PREL SNAR AF
SUBJECT: U.S., UK BRIEF ISAF CONTRIBUTORS ON AFGHANISTAN
COUNTER-NARCOTICS

REF: USNATO 209

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Ian C. Kelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a joint briefing to the North Atlantic
Council and ISAF troop contributors, INL/PDAS and Coordinator
for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan,
Ambassador Thomas Schweich, and Head of the FCO's Afghan
Drugs Interdepartmental Unit Peter Holland described the
narcotics problems facing Afghanistan, outlined the Afghan
counter-narcotics strategy, and suggested ways the Allies
could help. The briefers outlined efforts to develop
alternative livelihoods for farmers, pursue eradication,
build Afghan police and prosecutorial capabilities, and
conduct a public information campaign. While the narcotics
problem was difficult, it was not insoluble and although the
southern half of the country was experiencing increased poppy
production the northern and central regions were seeing
decreases and could be poppy free in two years. The Afghan
strategy followed a multi-faceted model that had been
successful elsewhere, but would require 10-15 years to
succeed. In response to questions, Ambassador Schweich said
the U.S. had studied proposals to create a legal opiate
medicine market in Afghanistan and found the proposal
lacking. END SUMMARY

AFGHANS HAVE A VIABLE STRATEGY


2. (C) The FCO,s Peter Holland began by noting that
President Karzai had called narcotics the greatest threat,
along with terrorism, to the stability of Afghanistan.
Narcotics production dominated the economy, generating about
one third of economic production by value, totaling an export
value of $3.1 billion. He said there was growing nexus
between the narcotics trade and the Taliban. While the
narcotics problem was tough, though, it was not insoluble and
progress was being made. There were real differences within
Afghanistan with the situation in the south remaining
difficult but real progress in the north.


3. (C) Ambassador Schweich outlined the Afghan national
drug control strategy that was adopted last year and included
as its main pillars legal livelihoods, institution building,
information campaign, law enforcement, criminal justice,
eradication, demand reduction, and regional cooperation. The
public information campaign stressed that drugs were against
Afghans' religion, affected relations with Afghanistan's
neighbors, and exposed farmers to eradication which would
leave them with no crops to harvest. Eradication played an
important part in convincing farmers to shift to legal crops
that could provide a more reliable, if lower, income. Law
enforcement remained a key element and it was necessary to
show that all involved in the drug trade, including
high-level traffickers, would be arrested and tried. An
Afghan criminal justice task force has been effective in
bringing prosecutions, although still only on a small scale.
Schweich said he believed that over time the multi-pronged
Afghan strategy could work.

PROGRESS IN THE NORTH, CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH


4. (C) Schweich said narcotics production was dropping in
the northern half of Afghanistan, dramatically in some
places, and it was a realistic goal to make the north
poppy-free within two years. A Good Performers Fund was
providing assistance to poppy-free provinces. These gains in
the north were offset, however, by production increases in
the southern half. Forty percent of Afghanistan's poppy
output came from Helmand Province, which if it were its own
country would be the world's second largest opium producer --
just behind the rest of Afghanistan, he said. A recent
seizure on the Afghan-Pakistan border had not only netted a
record 80 tons of opium, but also a large cache of weapons
and IEDs, highlighting the confluence between narcotics and
anti-government forces.


5. (C) Holland added that negative headlines can often crowd
out success stories. There is a strategy in place that was
being implemented by the Afghans, which meant it could only
move at the pace of Afghan capabilities. A year ago there
had been no convictions of traffickers, but now about 350 had
been convicted. The number of higher-level convictions
should increase as Afghan institutional capabilities grow, he

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asserted. Security remained critical since without it poppy
becomes a low-risk crop and alternative crops are not
attractive.

PRIORITIES FOR THE COMING YEAR


6. (C) According to Holland, priorities over the next few
years would include consolidating achievements in the north
and the center, which could serve as examples for the rest of
the country. Tackling corruption, including at high levels,
was essential as was developing a cross-cutting
counter-narcotics strategy that involved all Afghan law
enforcement resources. In addition, better provincial
planning and targeting was needed to tailor strategies to
local conditions and PRTs could be instrumental in this
effort. International support for the strategy was crucial
since it would take 10-15 years to succeed.


7. (C) Holland said the ISAF OPLAN provided a good
framework for Allies to help counter narcotics efforts. In
Konduz, a PRT offered important assistance in building a
counter narcotics police post. In Farah and Zabul, Allies
provided logistics and air support for counter-narcotics
activities, although this support was not always forthcoming
from ISAF commanders and Holland said he would like to see it
increase.

ALLIES FOCUS ON ALTERNATIVES, ASK ABOUT LEGALIZATION


8. (C) During the following discussion, Ambassador Nuland
stressed the importance of a comprehensive approach to the
problem and asked for a deeper explanation of the short and
long-term strategy and the measures of success. Romania
suggested a subsidy program or a "Buy Afghanistan" campaign
to expand the market for legal crops and give the
international community a sense of solidarity with the
Afghans, rather than only focusing on the military side.
Norway supported the emphasis on Afghan ownership and asked
what could be done to address the problem of getting
alternative crops to market, many of which were perishable.
Spain suggested there should be greater use of UNSCR 1735 for
listing Taliban and narcotics traffickers, and asked for
views on the Senlis Council's suggestion that a legal market
for opium for the production of medicine be created in
Afghanistan. Dutch Perm Rep Schaper emphasized the need for
Afghan ownership, and relayed Dutch difficulties getting the
governor of Oruzgan to focus on the narcotics problem.


9. (C) Ambassador Schweich replied that the U.S. had done
an in-depth study of the Senlis Council proposal and found it
would likely lead to increased opium production, would
require deep subsidies to make the legal sale of opium
competitive with the illegal market, and would increase
supply in an already oversupplied legal opiates market. He
agreed with Norway on the need to help farmers transport
perishable, legal goods to market and said it was an
important area for international assistance. Peter Holland
said microcredit programs were essential to enabling
alternative livelihoods, and had recently been shifted to
focus on poppy-producing areas.


10. (C) Comment: This U.S./UK joint briefing and Q&A session
were very effective in raising PermReps, awareness on
counternarcotics strategy and activities in Afghanistan, and
inspired further discussion on the topic in the follow-on
North Atlantic Council meeting (reported reftel). End
comment.
KELLY