Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO227
2007-04-04 09:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION, MARCH

Tags:  PREL PARM NATO OSCE KCFE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNO #0227/01 0940958
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 040958Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0708
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000227 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM NATO OSCE KCFE
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION, MARCH
29, 2007

Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM NATO OSCE KCFE
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION, MARCH
29, 2007

Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: In the NATO-Russia Council arms control
discussion on March 29, 2007, Russian Ambassador Totskiy
claimed that Russia "did not know what it needs to do" to get
NATO to ratify the Adapted CFE (A/CFE),and asked for a list
of outstanding Russian "debts" related to ratification.
Allies urged Russia to fulfill its Istanbul commitments as
the only path to ratify the A/CFE. Ambassador Totskiy
suggested that if a Russian force is not acceptable in
Transnistria, it should be replaced by an OSCE force, if
Tiraspol would agree. End Summary.


2. (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer opened the discussion by noting
that it was timely for NRC Ambassadors to follow up the
discussions held by NRC arms control experts (NRC/ACE) on
March 22. He highlighted the importance of the CFE Treaty to
all present and noted that Russia still needs to meet its
Istanbul Commitments before we can move forward with the
A/CFE. He suggested that nothing was "off the table" and
opened the floor for what he hoped would be a constructive
discussion.


3. (C) German PermRep Duckwitz was first to speak, clearly
recognizing the importance of arms control to European
security and suggesting that the topic needed more visibility
(in the NRC). Noting the strategic value of the interlocking
framework provided by the combination of CFE, the Vienna
Document 1999, and the Open Skies Treaty, he pointed to the
need to bring arms control regimes in line with the current
security situation ) and the A/CFE is the way to do that.
Czech PermRep Fule and Canadian PermRep Juneau were quick to
reinforce these points, stating that their countries were
ready to ratify A/CFE once Russia met its Istanbul
commitments. They added that any new CSBMs to be considered
in the OSCE must be based upon the 1993 Madrid mandate:
verifiable, politically binding, and balanced (i.e.,
reciprocal). Juneau also noted that it would not consider
any measure that sought to apply the benefits of A/CFE before

the treaty entered into force.


4. (C) Spanish PermRep Benevides, citing Spain's role as
OSCE CiO, wanted to promote progress in the pol-mil dimension
and to address the frozen conflicts. He said Spain sees
ratification of A/CFE as a significant step in achieving
this. With regard to new CSBMs for the OSCE, he suggested
that there were a number of tools already in place that were
not being used and might be tapped, rather than creating new
ones. Representatives from Belgium, France, Romania, Italy,
Slovenia, and the Netherlands were all equally clear in
calling for Russia to meet its Istanbul commitments and
expressing their willingness to engage in discussions on new
CSBMs (for the OSCE) that met the Madrid mandate.


5. (C) Russian Ambassador Totskiy welcomed the discussion on
arms control, but felt the NRC should address the topic in a
broader manner, not just focus on CFE, Open Skies and the
Vienna Document. After complaining about the "difficulties"
Russia faced with the current CFE Treaty, he commented that
he felt A/CFE would most probably not be allowed to be
ratified. Noting this had also been done in Vienna, he asked
for a list of outstanding Russian "debts" related to
ratification, adding that Russia "did not know what it needs
to do" to get NATO to ratify A/CFE. Once such a list is
provided, Russia is willing to discuss it. Raising another
familiar question, he asked for a definition of "substantial"
military forces as indicated in the Founding Act. With
regard to Gudauta, he noted that Russia had left the base
five years ago, but that they are still expected to guarantee
the security of an OSCE mission in order for an inspection to
ensure that all actions had been completed. Totskiy did not
know how this could be accomplished. With regard to Moldova,
he suggested that if a Russian peacekeeping force for
Transnistria was not acceptable, then we should look at an
OSCE force ) but only after Tiraspol gave a green light.


6. (C) Drawing from guidance, U.S. Deputy PermRep Olson
highlighted the value of CFE as a political tool for building
cooperative security, and reiterated that the A/CFE could not
be ratified until all remaining Istanbul commitments had been
fulfilled. Olson also noted that this was not a position of
convenience since it would be more convenient to NATO if
A/CFE were already in force. He also cited NATO's deliberate
decision in 1997 not to define substantial military forces,
and said that we would not support reopening that discussion.
Noting that Presidents Bush and Putin had spoken on March 28
about missile defense, amongst other subjects, Olson stressed
that NATO would like to work with Russia in a positive

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manner, including fulfillment of Istanbul commitments, making
the NRC's 10th Anniversary a NATO-Russia success story.


7. (C) UK Deputy PermRep Kidd rounded out the discussion,
reinforcing many of the points already made. He specifically
responded to Russia's request for a list for ratification,
noting that the required steps have been clear for years and
have not changed. With regard to the Russian CSBMs proposals
in Vienna, he welcomed the effort to address the new security
situation, noting that proposals should not only meet the
Madrid mandate, but must also take us forward in some way.
He suggested that the proposal on information exchange for
rapid reaction forces appeared to do this and merited careful
study.
NULAND