Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO172
2007-03-16 15:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NATO WEIGHING NATURE OF POSSIBLE TIES TO QATAR

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL NATO QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNO #0172/01 0751545
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O 161545Z MAR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0628
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RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0087
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0099
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0074
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0077
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000172 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL NATO QA
SUBJECT: NATO WEIGHING NATURE OF POSSIBLE TIES TO QATAR

REF: A. USNATO 146 AND PREVIOUS


B. SHINAGEL/REID MARCH 15 AND EARLIER 2006

C. BROTZEN/REID MARCH 9 2006

Classified By: A/DCM IAN KELLY;REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000172

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL NATO QA
SUBJECT: NATO WEIGHING NATURE OF POSSIBLE TIES TO QATAR

REF: A. USNATO 146 AND PREVIOUS


B. SHINAGEL/REID MARCH 15 AND EARLIER 2006

C. BROTZEN/REID MARCH 9 2006

Classified By: A/DCM IAN KELLY;REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1.(U) This is a request for guidance; see para. 11-13.

2.(C) Summary: NATO is debating whether, and how strong, a
security assurance it is prepared to offer Qatar in the
ongoing negotiation of a possible NATO-Qatar agreement which
would allow NATO liaison personnel to stay at the al Udeid
Combined Air operations Center (CAOC) (ref. A). Drawing on a
letter then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana sent to
(then partner) Bulgaria in 1999 during the Kosovo conflict,
in which NATO offered time-limited security assurances
against Serbian retaliation in exchange for use of Bulgarian
airspace, NATO is proposing Allies Monday discuss a narrow
form of possible security assurance for Qatar linked to any
threat which Qatar might receive because of hosting NATO
personnel (ref. B) Ideally we would have guidance by March
19, but could seek a postponement until March 21. Simmons has
said that NATO was not yet at the endgame of these talks,
but, out of respect, should be timely about starting the
exchange of draft language. NATO Allies debated other
aspects of this agreement on Monday, March 12, deciding to
eliminate discussion of a transit agreement. NATO staff did
not raise jurisdiction issues on March 12, but privately
assured the U.S. that it would use U.S.-provided text in
their proposal to Qatar (ref.C). NATO Deputy Assistant
Secretary General (DASG) Robert Simmons plans to go to Doha

SIPDIS
from March 31 to April 3 to discuss a bracketed text, which
he wants Qatar to have adequate time to review ahead of his
visit. End Summary.

3.(C) NATO is developing a bracketed text for a possible
NATO-Qatar agreement and hopes to send it to Qatar next week.
Previous exchanges with Doha have identified three
substantive areas for further Allied consideration: transit
provisions, jurisdiction and security assurances. On Friday,

March 9, NATO staff agreed with representatives of the five
nations who currently have or had posted personnel to the
liaison group (U.S./UK/NO/CA/FR) that NATO would use
U.S.-proposed text to seek a strong carve-out for bilateral
defense cooperation agreements (DCA) despite several Qatari
rejections of this approach. In Monday, March 12, Political
Committee discussion, Allies decided to drop mention of
transit provisions in the bracketed text since Qatar had not
sought them in its earlier submissions, no Allies had
encountered transit problems, and there was interest in
simplifying a possible agreement.

4.(C) In the absence of sufficient time to receive
authoritative instructions from capital, discussion of
security assurances still yielded Allied hesitation to offer
Doha a general security assurance, or indeed formula, on
cooperation linkages which went much beyond agreed language
in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Some Allies
also reflected that Qatari interest in hosting a possible
future Security Cooperation Center was off the table since
the Alliance had yet to decide whether to pursue such a step.
Simmons, as chairman, said that Qatar considered itself to
be offering a basing contribution through hosting ISAF
personnel on its territory - a step which Doha saw as beyond
the ICI - and wanted "something from NATO" beyond the ICI
format in return. He also drew Allied attention to past
Allied extension of temporary security assurances to Bulgaria
during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999. Text follows:

BULGARIAN ASSURANCE LETTER, APRIL 20, 1999
--------------

5.(SBU) In the context of the North Atlantic Council's
request to grant unrestricted access to the airspace of
Bulgaria for the execution of air operations over the
territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I would like
to reiterate the assurances provided in my letter dated 24
March 1999 which states that it would be unacceptable if the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were to threaten the
territorial integrity, political independence and security of
your country.

USNATO 00000172 002 OF 003



6.(SBU) The Alliance would view with the utmost seriousness
any attacks by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on your
country, in particular stemming from NATO's use of the
airspace of Bulgaria.

7.(SBU) The Alliance has repeatedly made clear that the
security of all NATO Member States is inseparably linked to
that of all Partner countries. Your security is of a direct
and material concern to the Alliance.

8.(SBU) I should like to add my appreciation of the stalwart
support Bulgaria has given to NATO throughout the crisis in
Kosovo. Your country's valuable assistance will strengthen
and deepen the already close cooperation between NATO and
Bulgaria. Your sincerely, (Javier Solana)

END TEXT

9.(C) While observing that the case with Qatar might be more
complex because it possibly would be threatened by a
non-state actor perhaps even using domestic-linked
terrorists, Allies generally indicated an openness to refer
to capitals a more narrowly-worded formulation of the
Bulgarian security assurance. Allies also discussed
inconclusively whether Allies should consider Qatar's
approaches to NATO as fundamentally a partner cooperation
issue or a basing arrangement proposal from an operational
contributor. France said that the question of whether Qatar
should be addressed as a partner or as an operational
contributor was an open one, but that Paris likely would be
more comfortable if Doha's contribution to ISAF exceeded
allowing the ISAF liaison group to operate at al-Udeid.

10.(C) Several Allies and the chairman also reviewed their
impression that Qatar attached considerable importance to the
personal relationship which NATO Secretary General (SYG) Jaap
de Hoop Scheffer was developing with the Amir and Heir
Apparent. We supported this observation, noting there had
emerged a two-track process in which Simmons negotiated a
substantive text and the SYG pursued development of a
personal relationship with the Qatari leadership.

11.(C) Request for guidance: NATO proposed on March 16 that
Allies consider the following text as a starting point on
negotiation of limited security assurance language for Qatar
linked to their hosting of the ISAF liaison group:

TEXT BEGINS

NATO will consult with the State of Qatar if that country
perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity,
political independence or security in the context of the ISAF
functions currently being undertaken within the Combined Air
Operations Center at al Udeid Airbase and NATO's request to
the State of Qatar to allow NATO personnel to function in
support of the ISAF mission. The security of the State of
Qatar is of concern to the Alliance.

END TEXT

12.(C) RFG continued: USNATO recommends that Washington
instruct it to propose an alternate formula as follows:

NATO will consult with the State of Qatar on security
concerns which are mutually perceived as credible threats to
the State of Qatar, and which stem from the State of Qatar's
hosting of the ISAF functions currently being undertaken
within the Combined Air Operations Center at al Udeid Airbase
and NATO's request to the State of Qatar to allow NATO
personnel to function in support of the ISAF mission. In
this context, the security of the State of Qatar is of
concern to the Alliance.

13.(C) RFG Continued: Should Washington consider the above
outlined approach too extensive, it could consider an
alternative approach for NATO to pursue in which it
substitutes pursuing a broad agreement with Qatar with a
package of considering Qatar an ISAF contributor (and thus
adding it to ISAF format meetings - a possible prestigious
opportunity for Doha),signing an annual individual

USNATO 00000172 003 OF 003


cooperation plan for Qatar, offering mobile training teams
from the Middle East Training and Cooperation Initiative
(METCI),and asking the SYG to send the para. 11 security
assurance language in a letter to the Amir or Heir Apparent,
perhaps in conjunction with a personal trip to Doha. This
alternative approach could be a fall back plan as well,
should Allies not reach agreement on a common approach next
week.

14.(C) Comment: Based on Allied internal discussions of how
far they are willing to go in striking a bargain with Doha
and Simmons' past accounts of his exchanges with Qatar, there
would appear to be considerable gaps between NATO and Qatar's
positions on this possible agreement. Depending upon the
extent to which he is willing to engage personally, SYG de
Hoop Scheffer may be able to narrow that gap. Still, it is
unclear if the combination of substantive negotiation and SYG
personal diplomacy will suffice to bridge the differences
between NATO and Qatar. We will know more in early April
after Simmons returns from Doha with reactions to the
bracketed text NATO plans to offer. End Comment.
NULAND