Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO170
2007-03-15 15:54:00
SECRET
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN/MISSILE DEFENSE: USD/P EDELMAN,

Tags:  NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF IZ 
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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0619
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0181
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0298
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0558
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5661
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0206
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0509
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0372
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000170 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN/MISSILE DEFENSE: USD/P EDELMAN,
A/S BOUCHER, AND D/NSA O'SULLIVAN BRIEF ALLIED PERMREPS


Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000170

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN/MISSILE DEFENSE: USD/P EDELMAN,
A/S BOUCHER, AND D/NSA O'SULLIVAN BRIEF ALLIED PERMREPS


Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Eric Edelman, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher,
and Deputy National Security Advisor Meghan O'Sullivan
briefed Allied PermReps on the latest U.S. thinking on Iraq,
Afghanistan, and missile defense in a coffee session at
USNATO on March 12. On Iraq, they elaborated for Allies that
the surge of U.S. forces into Baghdad was the essential
enabling element of a political, economic, and diplomatic
strategy designed to help the Iraqi government make the tough
choices needed to chart a forward course. On Afghanistan,
they outlined U.S. assistance and priorities, and U.S.
engagement with Pakistan. USD/P Edelman reminded Allies that
U.S. missile defense plans for Europe were to counter the
Iranian threat, and that the U.S. will continue the
established pattern of consultation on cooperation with
Russia and offers by Allies. Questions focused on handling
Pakistan, missile defense, and U.S. contacts with Iran. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
Iraq
--------------


2. (C) USD/P Edelman made clear that the surge of U.S.
forces into Baghdad is not intended to resolve the situation
militarily. Rather, military operations are intended to
create the political space for the Iraqi government to take
the necessary steps to solve problems and chart an Iraqi way
ahead. Though the strategy was only a few weeks old, he
cautioned, a decrease in sectarian killings in Baghdad, the
reopening of markets, and other indicators provide grounds
for cautious optimism. He noted, however, that spectacular
VBIED attacks would continue and drew attention to the recent
spate of terror attacks on Shiite pilgrims.


3. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor O'Sullivan
reinforced USD/P Edelman's remarks and outlined the main
tenets of the new Iraq strategy. She stressed that Iraq was
in the early stages of the new plan and we are only in a

position to note the inputs to the strategy, not evaluate the
outcome. She noted that the Iraqi surge battalions had
arrived in Baghdad. Both she and USD/P Edelman pointed to
the positive anticipated effects from Parliament's expected
passage of a hydrocarbons law, which will ensure that Iraq's
oil resources are a national patrimony, not to be used to
benefit any one segment of the population over another. On
the economic and political fronts, O'Sullivan outlined the
plan to increase numbers of USG civilians embedded with
military units outside of the Green Zone doing on-the-scene
economic development work, and anticipated greater Sunni
participation in upcoming provincial elections. She told
PermReps that the March 10 Iraq neighbors conference was
constructive, and in response to a question from Spain,
stated that no official bilats had been held between the U.S.
and Iran, but that delegates had spoken informally. USD/P
Edelman underscored the need to keep strong international
pressure on Iran to live up to its non-proliferation
obligations.

--------------
Afghanistan
--------------


4. (C) USD/P Edelman said that he personally did not use the
term "Taliban spring offensive," to characterize resurgent
Taliban activity, because it lent an air of legitimacy to
Taliban actions. Noting that the Taliban had adjusted
tactics following the successes of the international
community in 2004-2005, he reminded PermReps of the U.S.
commitment to a comprehensive approach, encompassing military
operations, reconstruction, development, and civil society

USNATO 00000170 002 OF 002


activity. He pushed back strongly against the conventional
wisdom in Europe that the U.S. only focuses on military
operations, noting that U.S military counterinsurgency
doctrine emphasized that 80% of an effort was political and
economic.


5. (C) A/S Boucher outlined the comprehensive approach and
noted U.S. priorities in training and equipping Afghan
national security forces, building roads, constructing
electricity infrastructure, reforming the justice sector, and
fighting narcotics. The Administration had asked for $11.8
billion from Congress for this, he said, and he sensed a
supportive mood on the Hill. He told Ambassadors that the
Afghan government was making much greater progress on poppy
eradication this year as compared to last, and was on track
to add six to eight more provinces to the "poppy free" list.
Helmand remained a serious challenge, but a nearer-term goal
was to declare northern, western, and central Afghanistan
poppy-free. Turning to strategic communications, and
effective cooperation between the Afghan government, ISAF,
and nations, he highlighted the key role of the Afghans' new
National Communications Coordination Center (NC3). The Dutch
PermRep noted that the U.S. policy on Iraq sounded very much
like the policy onAfghanistan -- a development he welcomed.

--------------
Pakistan
--------------


6. (S) A/S Boucher said that Secretary Rice would be
traveling to Pakistan in the coming month or so. He pointed
to U.S. economic support for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
in Pakistan's border region as a key part of our
relationship. In response to comments by the UK, Canadian,
and Romanian Ambassadors on how best to deal with President
Musharraf, A/S Boucher said that the Pakistanis want
recognition of their accomplishments in the war on terrorism,
and the difficulties they face. We are frank and clear in
our bilateral discussions with them, he assured, but we talk
as partners in a common cause. He stated that Pakistan is
looking to build a relationship with NATO, and urged a visit
to Islamabad by SYG de Hoop Scheffer. USD/P Edelman reminded
Allies that the region comprising the Pakistani-Afghan border
had never been under the control of any government or
authority; President Musharraf needed help from partners to
realize his commitments in the war on terrorism there. He
counseled Allies to push the Pakistani government privately
to do more, without further complicating Musharraf's
challenging domestic political situation.

--------------
Missile Defense
--------------


7. (C) In response to a question from the Czech ambassador,
USD/P Edelman told Allies we continue to talk with the Czech
Republic, Poland, Denmark, and the UK on our European missile
defense plans. He reiterated the goal was to stay ahead of
the Iranian missile threat, and that we continue to offer
possibilities for cooperation to the Russians. He pointed to
the upcoming Reinforced NAC on April 19 with LTG Obering as
an opportunity for further consultation, and while noting
that missile defense under a NATO rubric would certainly need
NAC approval, hoped that movement at NATO could occur in
parallel with U.S. initiatives.


8. (U) The delegation has cleared this cable.
NULAND