Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO139
2007-03-02 17:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NATO-QATAR TALKS FAIL, ALLIES PACKING BAGS TO LEAVE

Tags:  MARR PREL MOPS QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3844
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNO #0139 0611758
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021758Z MAR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0569
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0093
RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT FWD IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000139 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS QA
SUBJECT: NATO-QATAR TALKS FAIL, ALLIES PACKING BAGS TO LEAVE

REF: STATE 25984

Classified By: Political Advisor Stuart Seldowitz; reasons 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS QA
SUBJECT: NATO-QATAR TALKS FAIL, ALLIES PACKING BAGS TO LEAVE

REF: STATE 25984

Classified By: Political Advisor Stuart Seldowitz; reasons 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

1.(C)Summary: On March 2 NATO-Qatar talks remained
deadlocked and NATO Deputy Secretary General Robert Simmons
concluded his talks with Qatari BGEN Abdullah. Simmons said
to the five affected Allies (U.S., UK, Netherlands, Canada
and France) that NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer is considering calling the Amir on Sunday to express
his regret that the talks have come to this outcome. Neither
Allies nor Simmons are predicting a change in the outcome
from the SYG,s call, but assess it might mitigate damage to
the personal relationship between the NATO SYG and the Amir
and further could signal to Qatar that NATO retains an
interest in a normal partner relationship and respects the
wishes of a sovereign Qatari government. Allies are preparing
to have all personnel depart the Combined Air Operations Cell
(CAOC) liaison group by March 4 or sooner if
transport/logistics allow. End Summary.

2.(C) Per reftel, Allies pre-coordinated the desired
message to Simmons in advance of his March 2 talks with BGEN
Abdullah. Simmons undertook to pass the reftel message. In
his meeting with affected Allies early on March 2, Simmons
also reported that, at BGEN Abdullah's request, there also
had been an evening meeting on March 1 between NATO Deputy
Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Simmons and

SIPDIS
Abdullah. Simmons reported that it covered no new ground and
had been inconclusive. Simmons also had recounted this state
of play to all Allied Permanent Representatives during the
midday, March 2 North Atlantic Council (NAC).

3.(C) Late on March 2, Simmons reconvened the affected Allies
and said that his talks with BGEN Abdullah had concluded with
no change from the previous day' s outcome. In discussing
departure details with Simmons the Qatari BGEN said that
Qatar would be reasonable about the &few days to pack up,
which can be worked out locally(8 Simmons said that he had
conveyed both U.S. and UK requests that they consider their
military personnel in Qatar to be covered by bilateral
defense cooperation agreements (DCA). The affected Allies
agreed that they would consult with NATO military authorities
to start moving NATO personnel out of Qatar as soon as travel
could be arranged. Arrangements for the remote
communications circuit to constitute new liaison connections
are being made between NATO and CAOC personnel, per NATO
military staff.

4.(C) NATO authorities do not anticipate that Qatar will
publicize this outcome. We would not recommend any public
comment on the matter. On a contingency basis, the UK said
that it plans to use the following "if asked" guidance:

-- The U.S. Combined Air Operations Center based at al Udeid
air base in Qatar provides C3 functions to air operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
-- Following negotiations the NATO ISAF contribution to the
CAOC is being relocated to Kabul.
-- This relocation will not impede the functions of the CAOC.
-- This is a matter for NATO. The UK relationship with Qatar
remains unaffected by these developments.

5.(C) Comment: USNATO recommends a similar public diplomacy
posture to that in para. 4. This is an unfortunate outcome
for NATO's ISAF equities and the immediate NATO-Qatar
political relationship, but we understand that alternate
measures now being put in place should address NATO's minimum
military requirements for liaison from ISAF headquarters in
Afghanistan to the CAOC. We are encouraging the NATO SYG to
reach out to the Amir. We do not recommend consideration of
further U.S. involvement in this NATO matter unless and until
the NATO SYG and the Amir discuss the matter. End Comment.
NULAND