MISSILE DEFENSE: ANSWERS PROVIDED TO RUSSIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000136

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/17
TAGS: NATO PREL RU
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: ANSWERS PROVIDED TO RUSSIAN
QUESTIONS ON U.S. PLANS

REF: USNATO 0133


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: This cable provides answers to 11 written
questions on U.S. Missile Defense (MD) plans, drafted by the
Russian Mission to NATO, which were answered by Lt Gen
Obering, Director, Missile Defense Agency, at a NATO-Russia
Council meeting on February 28, 2007. While the Russian
questions cover a wide range of topics, particular emphasis
was made on the following areas: the threat of ballistic
missile attacks on European territory, missile debris, the
desire for increased dialogue and cooperation between NATO,
the U.S. and the Russian Federation on missile defense, and
the scale and capabilities of the proposed U.S. system.
USNATO provided the following written responses (cleared by
Lt Gen Obering) to the Russian Mission on March 2, 2007.
Posts may wish to draw from these questions and answers in
their MD discussions with host capitals. End Summary


2. (SBU) In the U.S. view, what is the current level of
probability of missile attacks on the territory of European
countries?

The uncertainty of when an attack will occur is great, but
the proliferation of long-range missiles is certain.
Security for these missiles is questionable and this lack of
security raises the risk that non-state actors could strike
or threaten Europe.


3. (SBU) Which parts of Europe will be covered by a European
site?

All European countries within range of a long-range missile
attack from Iran, including a portion of north-western
Russia, will be covered. Short-range systems fielded by
individual countries, or as a part of a NATO theatre defense
capability, would protect against intermediate and
short-range attacks. There exists the opportunity to
collaborate on the development of a long-range defense system
that would cover the part of Russia that will not be covered
by a U.S. system.


4. (SBU) Does the U.S. side have any plans to continue such
meetings as the one we are having today, at the level of
missile defense experts from the capitals?

Yes. We propose scheduling such meetings in the April-May
2007 timeframe, to include a simulation-based "war-game" to
deepen the experts' understanding of the U.S. missile defense
system's capabilities, limitations, and operational
considerations, such as command and control.


5. (SBU) Has the U.S. analyzed possible risks for the
European NATO nations emerging as a result of the U.S.
missile defense installation,s deployment in Europe which
may be attractive to terrorists?

Missile defense sites are highly secure. In addition, they
are attended by a relatively small cadre of operational,
maintenance, and security personnel, making them less
attractive targets for terrorists.


6. (SBU) Can the U.S. guarantee that Russian territory and
the Kaliningrad region in particular, will not be exposed to
the falls of debris of the U.S. missile defense system
interceptors and engaged missiles?

Debris associated with the intercept of an Iranian long-range
missile attack on the U.S. would not fall on Russian
territory. Debris from the intercept of an Iranian
long-range missile attack on Europe could fall on Russian
territory, but the probability of that debris causing death
among the civilian population is very low. It should be
noted that boosters from an Iranian long-range missile system
aimed at the U.S. are highly likely to fall on Russian
territory.


7. (SBU) Is there any concept for the U.S. missile defense
elements deployment in other European countries? Can the
U.S. determine at present the maximal quantity of the
interceptors and C2 systems that might be deployed to Europe?

As briefed to the NATO-Russia Council in November 2006 as
well as at this NRC meeting, the U.S. concept for deploying a
European missile defense capability includes 10 interceptors
based in Poland, a mid-course tracking radar based in the
Czech Republic, and transportable cueing radar forward-based
in the Caucasus region. There will be a small amount of C2
equipment collocated with the interceptors and the radar, but
the main C2 elements will remain in the U.S.


USNATO 00000136 002 OF 002



8. (SBU) Are there any plans to invite European countries to
the research and scientific works to create MD elements of
the European site?

The systems to be fielded as part of the European sites are
non-developmental, so there will not be an opportunity for
European commercial participation in research or scientific
activities per se. However, we expect the vast majority of
the site preparation and construction activities to be
accomplished by European companies operating as
subcontractors to Boeing, the prime contractor for the U.S.
long-range system.


9. (SBU) Considering the time limitations of the ballistic
missiles engagement operations, who and where will take
appropriate decisions on the combat use of the U.S. assets in
Europe?

Because of the short timelines associated with missile
defense engagements, the U.S. system is designed to operate
largely autonomously with man-in-the-loop supervision. The
U.S. will collaborate with those nations that both host the
sites and are protected by them, in the development of
pre-established rules of engagement (known as Execution
Plans) that govern the operation of the system.


10. (SBU) What will be the legal status of the U.S. European
missile defense installations?

The installations will remain sovereign territory of the
hosting nation. The missile defense equipment deployed on
the installations will remain the property of the U.S.
Additional legal details will be the subject of negotiations
between the U.S. and the hosting nations.


11. (SBU) Does the U.S. intend to support the NRC TMD
cooperation project?

The U.S. continues to support the concept of a NATO-Russia
theatre missile defensive capability that compliments the
long-range defensive coverage provided by the U.S. system.


12. (SBU) Has the U.S. or NATO studied the consequences of
the European site deployment as a prerequisite for missile
programs in other countries? Creation of shorter and
intermediate range missiles specially designed to overcome MD
elements?

The U.S. long-range ballistic missile defense system is aimed
at the &rogue nation8 threat. We do not believe they will
have the capability to field such sophisticated capabilities
in the near term. We would encourage those countries that do
possess the wherewithal to field more advanced offensive
capabilities to instead focus on fielding defensive
capabilities.

NULAND