Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USNATO113
2007-02-23 12:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON NATO-QATAR TALKS ON STATUS OF ISAF

Tags:  MARR NATO REL PTER QA XF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5930
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DE RUEHNO #0113/01 0541207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0521
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0078
RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT FWD PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000113 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: MARR NATO REL PTER QA XF
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON NATO-QATAR TALKS ON STATUS OF ISAF
PERSONNEL AND ENGAGEMENT

REF: 2006 NATO 731

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000113

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: MARR NATO REL PTER QA XF
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON NATO-QATAR TALKS ON STATUS OF ISAF
PERSONNEL AND ENGAGEMENT

REF: 2006 NATO 731

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: High level discussions between Qatar's
military and NATO on the future of ISAF's support to the
Coalition Air Operations Center (CAOC) at al-Udeid Airbase in
Qatar are back on track after a number of miscommunications.
However, the overall prospect for this dialogue is still
fragile. Most strikingly, Qatar had hoped for a NATO
security guarantee, which is not an option for a nation that
is not a member of the Alliance. Qatar seeks to place
NATO/ISAF personnel under the jurisdiction of the State of
Qatar. MFA officials have told NATO and U.S. officials that
the ISAF Air Operations pose a risk to Qatar, and complain
that NATO has been unresponsive to Qatar's proposals for a
broad framework of cooperation. See possible way forward,
para 9. See SACEUR Letter para 13. End Summary.

CURRENT NATO-QATAR ISSUES
--------------


2. (C) NATO D/ASG Simmons went to Doha February 1-5 on an
urgent basis after NATO's military interlocutor in Doha,
Brigadier General Abdullah Jumad al-Hamad, threatened to
expel ISAF personnel by February 25, should NATO not
recognize Qatar's jurisdiction over ISAF personnel. Al-Hamad
wanted a list of names of the ISAF personnel, their
nationalities and a description of their ISAF
responsibilities.


3. (C) While in Doha, Simmons also met with Deputy Foreign
Minister for Follow-up Affairs al-Rumeihi. Al-Rumeihi said
Qatar is looking to have good relations with NATO, including
a broad framework agreement that goes beyond personnel at the
CAOC and, preferably, from Qatar's point of view, would
include some form of NATO security guarantee for Qatar.
(Comment: Allies internally have made clear that no security
guarantee is on the table, but have offered that Allied
expression of "interest" in Qatari sovereignty, per policy
with other Partners as a possible basis for further
discussion. Simmons laid this out to Qataris early in
February. End Comment). Al-Rumeihi nevertheless added his

view that: 1) NATO had not engaged Qatar adequately in the
past; 2) Qatar had never formally been notified of the ISAF
activities conducted from al-Udeid Airbase and 3) NATO had
never formally responded to written Qatari draft proposals
for broad cooperation submitted by al-Hamad during earlier
legal discussions on a transit/status arrangement. (Comment:
This last point appears true. The proposal languished for
nearly one year within the Office of the NATO Legal Advisor
and did not surface until Simmons was assigned to take over
the Qatar dossier in January 2007. Allied delegations have
not officially seen this Qatari proposal. End comment.)
Qatar's proposed framework agreement reportedly would have
included military to military cooperation, training and
exercises, ship visits, sharing of classified information,
the option for NATO to build facilities at al-Udeid Airbase
and military sports. Al-Rumeihi and al-Hamad also orally
proposed to Simmons that NATO should guarantee Qatar's
security.


4. (C) Al-Rumeihi also told Simmons on February 5 that
ISAF's presence in Qatar increased the country's risk of Al
Qaeda attack. He said Qatar may be willing to support other
Allied operations but Qatar would be vulnerable to
retaliation if any of the NATO powers were to attack Iran's
facilities. Al-Rumeihi said Qatar needed incentives for
allowing NATO to continue operating at the CAOC.

WAY FORWARD
--------------

5. (C) Simmons reports that he proposed a way forward that
was acceptable to the GOQ on February 5: 1) SACEUR would
submit a letter explaining the presence of the ISAF personnel
at the CAOC; 2) notification by concerned countries to Qatar
on an interim basis of national military personnel currently
carrying out ISAF functions at al-Udeid Airbase; and 3) NATO
International Staff response to Qatar's proposals for a
comprehensive cooperation program.


6. (C) The GOQ is now reviewing NATO proposals for a Lines
of Communication (LOC) agreement that will address NATO's
interest in regional security, territorial integrity and the
sovereignty of the State of Qatar and propose practical

USNATO 00000113 002 OF 004


cooperation based on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
(ICI) Menu of Practical Activities. The LOC, however, would
be narrower in scope than the broad framework agreement
proposed by Qatar. In particular, it does not contain the
security guarantee that Qatar had sought. (Note: a security
guarantee is a complete non-starter.) NATO has proposed to
resume the discussions in Brussels on March 5.


7. (C) Simmons reports that Armed Forces Chief of Staff
Major General Hamad bin Ali al-Atiyeh and al-Hamad have
indicated to him that they are now satisfied with the way
forward and the process of consultation and negotiation since
his visit to Qatar. They were also pleased to receive a
letter from SACEUR informing Qatar that the CAOC would be
used to support ISAF and that Allies represented at the CAOC
sought to work with the GOQ to resolve the jurisdiction issue
under the respective bilateral agreements. (see para 13).


8. (C) In spite of a general NATO-Qatar agreement on the way
forward, U.S. Embassy Doha reports that al-Rumeihi was
personally antagonized by SACEUR's letter (para 13).
Al-Rumeihi did not like SACEUR's assertion that jurisdiction
of ISAF personnel was a matter of Allies' bilateral
agreements with Qatar. Moreover, al-Rumeihi inferred that
even if he should accept that ISAF personnel were to be under
the jurisdiction of Allies' bilateral defense agreements with
Qatar, he wanted to know their names. He did not understand
why the U.S. would not furnish the names of its personnel
attached to the ISAF mission at the CAOC (U.K., FR, NL, CA
all have or will provide the GOQ with names of their ISAF
personnel in Qatar). Embassy Doha also reported that Qatar
is most upset with the French presence. Qatar understands
that France is outside of NATO's unified military command and
therefore it is unclear how the French relate to the ISAF
mission. The GOQ also wants to know what the French are
doing within a separate building at the CAOC.

QATAR WANTS REGIONAL CENTER
--------------


9. (C) Qatar's embassy in Brussels confirmed that al-Rumeihi
also is responsible for heading Qatar's effort to win support
for its hosting of the NATO Security Cooperation Center.
Qatar delivered a Note Verbale to NATO on 22 December 2006
reaffirming an offer 12 months previous to host and support a
NATO MD and ICI SCC. The note verbale also offered to kick
off the NATO Training and Cooperation Initiative by hosting
two NATO courses at Qatar's national military training
facility in 2007. On February 5, 2007 Qatar's Ambassador in
Brussels repeated the offer to fund a future NATO SCC if it
were to be established in Qatar. The offer was made during
an informal luncheon of MD and ICI and PermReps from the
U.S., Spain, Norway as well as the Italian Charge d'
Affaires. Any response to Qatar (or U.S. preferred candidate
Jordan) is pending a future decision by Allies that will be
based in part on an ongoing Training Needs Assessment. The
SCC is to be a part of the NATO Training Cooperation
Initiative, which was decided upon by Allies at the November
2006 Riga NATO Summit.


10. (C) A meeting previously agreed for February 15 in the
context of regularly scheduled NATO - ICI country
consultations between Qatar's Ambassador al-Dosari and NATO
Allies is being rescheduled at the request of the Qatari
Ambassador. The postponement may have been related to
Qatar's difficult relations with NATO on the status of
NATO/ISAF personnel at the CAOC and more broadly on
negotiations about Qatar's cooperation with NATO. (Comment:
Another possible reason for the postponement is that Qatar is
awaiting Belgium's accreditation of its first defense
attache, who would will be responsible for the NATO dossier.
Al-Dosari wanted the DATT to participate in the 26 plus 1
meeting. End Comment.)

NEXT STEPS
--------------


11. (C) Simmons will meet with al-Hamad in Brussels on March
5-6 to discuss the cooperation proposal. He is confident
that the GOQ understands that NATO security guarantees are
only possible for signatories of the Washington Treaty.
Simmons said Doha may be mollified with a mutually acceptable
outcome on jurisdiction and the LOC agreement.

COMMENT

USNATO 00000113 003 OF 004


--------------

12. (C) NATO's discussions with Qatar to date have been
plagued both by the NATO Legal Advisor's incompetence and
International Staff stovepiping as well as by mixed signals
from differing Qatari interlocutors. Only in January 2007
did NATO put the talks on a solid staff footing.
Al-Rumeihi's argument about risk and incentives seems to be
posturing. We defer to Embassy Doha on Qatari motivations,
but wonder how ISAF's presence at the CAOC would expose Qatar
to more risk than what already may exist from the much larger
U.S. and Coalition presence at al-Udeid. While the GOQ would
like to have the symbolism of a NATO security guarantee, they
consider the U.S. on a bilateral basis, the principal
security provider. It is clear that al-Rumeihi and others
remain irritated at NATO's perceived lack of response to
Qatar's proposals and NATO's establishment of an ISAF
presence in Qatar without its formal agreement. It seems
likely that the GOQ seeks the symbolism of a broad
cooperation agreement with NATO. Qatar is also clearly
signaling its interest in hosting a NATO-supported Security
Cooperation Center.

SACEUR LETTER
--------------

13. (SBU) Attachment:

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
SHAPE BELGIUM

9 February 2007
Major General Hamad bin All AL-ATIYEH Chief of Staff of the
Qatar Armed Forces Doha

Dear General AI-Atiyeh

Thank you once again for the warm hospitality during my
recent visit, and also for the support and cooperation that
the State of Qatar has provided to facilitate the efforts of
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan. I would like to follow up on our earlier
discussions, and those of the NATO team led by Ambassador
Simmons that just visited.

As you know, a number of personnel provided by NATO member
states have been acting as the liaison element for ISAF HQ in
Kabul and are conducting ISAF air command and control
functions within the United States Central Command Combined
Air Operations Centre (CAOC) at al-Udeid Airbase. This
element is called the ISAF Detachment to CENTAF CAOC (IDCC).

I would like to provide you with some additional information
about the activities of these personnel. In accordance with
UN Security Council Resolution 1659(2006),the last months
have seen the expansion of the NATO-led ISAF mission
throughout Afghanistan. This expansion of the ISAF mission
has been accompanied by changes to the command and control
structures to achieve the long-standing military principle of
unity of effort. Within this process, there has been a
requirement to streamline the command and control
requirements for air operations to ensure that ISAF and
coalition forces are well supported. For this reason a
limited number of positions have been identified within the
CAOC to be filled by military personnel from individual NATO
countries that have existing bilateral agreements with the
Government of Qatar.

I understand that negotiations regarding an agreement between
the State of Qatar and NATO have been re-energized within the
last few days, and that there now appears to be a clear work
plan which will allow us to take this issue forward. In the
meantime, I hope that you will agree that it would not be in
the best interests of the wider effort of the International
Community to disrupt the operations that are being conducted
by NATO in Afghanistan. I would therefore like to formally
request that the ISAF functions currently being undertaken
within the Combined Air Operations Center at al-Udeid Airbase
by the IDCC are allowed to continue for a further six months
pending the conclusion of the agreement. In addition, I will
recommend the Secretary General invite those NATO countries
represented in the IDCC to work with you under their
respective bilateral agreements and arrangements to meet your
concerns. Thank you again for your support in this important
matter, and I look forward to the next time that we are able
to meet together.
Yours sincerely

USNATO 00000113 004 OF 004


Bantz J. Craddock
General U.S. Army
OLSON