NSA HADLEY'S 21 FEBRUARY DISCUSSION WITH NATO SYG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000110

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL RU NATO
SUBJECT: NSA HADLEY'S 21 FEBRUARY DISCUSSION WITH NATO SYG
DE HOOP SCHEFFER

Classified By: Charge Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: De Hoop Scheffer described European
weakness as playing out in Allies, approaches to Afghanistan
(lack of unity of purpose),Russia (desire not to rock the
boat),and missile defense (ditto). Mr. Hadley pressed the
SYG to have ISAF do more on counternarcotics, and an
augmented civilian presence in Afghanistan. On Russia, Mr.
Hadley emphasized that the USG would cooperate where it
could, and stand up for its interests where it could not.
SYG argued for a NATO debate on policy toward Russia. On
Kosovo, Mr. Hadley expressed concerns about a gap between
UNMIK drawdown and the stand-up of the ESDP mission. End
Summary.


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AFGHANISTAN: NO EUROPEAN ALIBIS
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2 (C) SYG De Hoop Scheffer opened the conversation by saying
that the Alliance faced a &messaging and marketing problem8
brought about by a &perception gap8 between the US and
Europe: the US regarded Afghanistan as the front line in the
war on terror, while Europe lacked the necessary cultural
identity to see Afghanistan in a unified way. Some allies
favored a robust military policy, others focused on the
comprehensive approach but sometimes as an alibi for not
providing additional troops. In that regard, the robust US
presentations on 26 January and at Seville were most welcome,
but the US could not expect that Europeans would respond in
two weeks to what had taken Americans six months to develop.
Mr. Hadley responded that the US intention had not been to
impose a tasking on the SYG or European allies, but rather to
provide resources in response to NATO,s request and allow
the SYG to skillfully use American contributions to build
European support. The SYG acknowledged that it was his job
to ensure that the comprehensive approach did not become an
alibi for Europeans.


3. (C) Mr. Hadley said the USG thought ISAF could do more on
counternarcotics, in particular interdicting the
narco-traffickers. The SYG replied that the NATO OpPlan
allowed for limited ISAF support, but a coherent
counternarcotics (CN) strategy seemed to be missing. Mr.
Hadley said the USG believes it has an effective plan,
especially over the long-term, but we might not get to the
long-term without a good short-term strategy. In the
short-term, interdictions were important. Ambassador Nuland
added that it would be useful to brief Allies on the overall
CN strategy.


4. (C) Mr. Hadley said that a more robust civilian presence
was needed; the EU, UN and NATO were all underpowered on the
civilian side. Consideration was being given to dual or
triple-hatting arrangements. The SYG replied that the weak
link was the UN, especially SRSG Koenigs, and that the
problem with triple-hatting was that the international
community did not have the extraordinary powers it has in the
Balkans, and so any new arrangements would have to be sold to
Karzai.

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EUROPEAN WEAKNESS PLAYS OUT IN RUSSIA, MD
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5. (C) Continuing on the theme of European weakness, the SYG
pointed out FM Steinmeier,s recent criticism of US Missile
Defense policy, suggesting it amounted to a plea to ¬
rock the European boat,8 and expressed the view that NATO
needed to take a more vigorous position with regard to
Russia. Mr. Hadley said that the USG had hoped that Putin,s
legacy would be the creation of democratic institutions that
could serve to constrain the power of the president.
Unfortunately, Putin had in the end not shared this vision,
and the strategic partnership based on shared values had not
been achieved. Nonetheless, there were areas in which the US
and Russia could work together on the basis of mutual self
interest (especially Iran and non-proliferation generally),
and we would contain the areas in which we could not work
together. What was needed was the Europeans to have a frank
conversation about Russia and arrive at a European policy on

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Russia, then come to NATO for a transatlantic discussion.


6. (C) The SYG again observed that there was no strong
European leadership. He had personally been disappointed
that Merkel had raised expectations at last year,s
Wehrkunde, but then had been completely overshadowed by Putin
this year. (The SYG noted that he had been the only European
to challenge Putin at Munich.) That said, NATO needed to
take strong positions with Russia on three issues: Kosovo,
enlargement, and missile defense. On Kosovo, Russia
appeared to be objecting for tactical reasons, to get the
best deal possible at the UNSC. NATO needed to signal that
this was not the Congo; it was a priority one issue for
European security. On enlargement, and particularly in the
lead up to the 08 summit, NATO needed to make clear that it
would not be subject to Russian bullying on enlargement
decisions. On missile defense, the Alliance needed to have
an internal debate, which might be divisive, but which in the
end would signal to Russia that missile defense was not only
a US issue.


7. (C) Mr. Hadley agreed that the Alliance should reiterate,
as we have said for 15 years, that enlargement is not subject
to Russian blackmail. On missile defense, Mr. Hadley
emphasized that the systems were defensive in nature and had
been briefed extensively to Russia and NATO. Bringing NATO
into the discussion was broadly consistent with US policy
over the past fifteen years. More broadly, we needed to
cooperate where we could, stand up for our interests where
they diverged, and contain areas where we could not
cooperate.


8. (C) Finishing his riff on European weakness, the SYG
shared his firm conviction that a strong Europe was in the US
national interest. In that regard, the constitutional crisis
within the EU was sucking all the energy out of the system.

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2008 NATO SUMMIT
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9. (C) Turning to the 08 Summit, which he described as
POTUS,s legacy summit, the SYG said he wanted deliverables
to be: real progress in Afghanistan; resulting in more
people on the planet living under the rule of law and
democracy; a Europe free and democratic, including in the
Balkans which meant finishing Kosovo; and enhancement of the
Global Partnership program. All of these areas needed major
&investment8 between now and next spring.


10. (C) Mr. Hadley said he would add &capabilities8 to the
SYG,s list. As a military alliance, NATO needed to reverse
declining capabilities and enhance its sense of solidarity
(removing caveats, augmenting forces in Afghanistan, sharing
the duty to go in harm,s way). The SYG readily agreed,
adding that in this regard as in others, Germany was
critical. Ambassador Nuland suggested that the key was
building support for these ideas amongst the big continental
countries: Germany, Spain, Italy, and France. Nuland added
that defense spending also needed to be addressed. The SYG
said that if he called for defense spending at two-percent of
GDP, some would say there was no agreed Alliance benchmark
and it was a question of quality not quantity. Ambassador
Nuland said we should emphasize the commitment on defense
spending agreed at Riga.

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KOSOVO: US CONCERNS ABOUT THE EU/UN GAP
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11. (C) Mr. Hadley said the USG was concerned that there
would be a security gap between UNMIK drawdown and ESDP
mission stand-up at the critical moment of transition.
Ideally there would be an overlap between the forces, not a
shortfall. The USG had not reached a formal decision on
whether to support the ESDP mission, but did want the mission
to succeed. We would have to address NATO-related issues.
The SYG replied that Solana realizes that the risk of a
security gap exists, especially after the recent incidents
involving the deaths of protesters.


12. (C) Participation:

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US:
Mr. Hadley
Ambassador Nuland
NSC Senior Director Ansley
DCM Olson (notetaker)

NATO:
Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer

SIPDIS
Director of Private Office Shuwer
Deputy Director of Private Office Manso
SYG,s Personal Secretary Rutgers


13. (U) This cable has been coordinated with NSC Staff.
OLSON