NSA HADLEY TALKS TO NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000109

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: NATO PGOV PREL WEU RU
SUBJECT: NSA HADLEY TALKS TO NATO


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY/COMMENT: National Security Advisor Stephen
Hadley discussed a wide range of strategic issues with NATO
Allies on February 21, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, new
U.S. efforts to revive the Middle East peace process, and
relations with Russia. Mr. Hadley's visit comes as Europe is
increasingly seized with uncertainty over U.S. intentions
with Iran, doubts over U.S. efforts to revive the peace
process, and concerns over perceived rising U.S.-Russia
tensions. Mr. Hadley's tour de table with NATO Permanent
Representatives gave Allies a chance to peak behind the
curtain of U.S. intentions and motivations on almost every
major foreign policy issue. END SUMMARY/COMMENT.

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AFGHANISTAN: NOT JUST A HUMANITARIAN CAUSE
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2. (C) Mr. Hadley praised NATO's commitment to the
Afghanistan mission, describing it as important and
"path-breaking" for the Alliance. We are there, he noted,
because we have learned lessons from the last time the world
stood back and watched as terrorist training camps were
developed and plans were made to attack both the United
States and Europe. We cannot walk away this time; we must
work to support a stable Afghan government that delivers
security and economic development to its people. Afghanistan
is not just a humanitarian cause, he stressed, but also a
mission to preserve U.S. and European long-term security.
For political and economic progress to take hold, however,
there needs to be minimum level of security. Security must
not be "in lieu of" but rather a "prerequisite for" a
political-military strategy. Mr. Hadley reiterated the
results of President's review of our Afghanistan strategy and
noted U.S. motivations are three-fold: to ensure there are
adequate capabilities and resources to achieve the mission;
to make clear we are not stepping away from Afghanistan and
dumping it on NATO; and to make clear to Allies that now is
not the time to step back from their responsibilities just
because the U.S. is now doing more.

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AFGHANISTAN CONT.: "STEP INTO THE FIGHT, NOT AWAY"
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3. (C) Mr. Hadley asserted that NATO as an Alliance is
going to learn a lot from the Afghanistan mission. NATO is
developing new capabilities in Afghanistan that we will need
in the future. Most importantly, these lessons serve as a
reminder to us that NATO is a security provider first, and
the most effective one at that. This successful tradition,
he said, requires us to invest further in our capabilities,
articulate our Alliance solidarity, and prepare to "step into
the fight, and not away." According to Mr. Hadley, just as
important as increased NATO capabilities in Afghanistan is
the coordination of our strategic messaging; "we are getting
beaten every day by the Taliban" on messaging and he
suggested the idea of creating a NATO Strategic Communication
Task Force. Mr. Hadley also argued that NATO's strategy in
Afghanistan needs to be country-wide; "we cannot Balkanize
Afghanistan" and the Alliance must take risks and
responsibilities with this in mind.

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PAKISTAN: TALIBAN IS THEIR PROBLEM TOO
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4. (C) In response to Canadian and Romanian questions on
how NATO should cooperate with Pakistan to control the
growing problems along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Mr.
Hadley said that areas in both Pakistan and Afghanistan are
increasingly becoming safehavens for extremists. He
emphasized that the U.S. is prepared to work with President
Musharraf in the tribal areas (including long-term economic
development),but that Pakistani military authorities also
need to do more in the short-term (something the U.S. is
discussing with them). He stressed that there is also a role
for Europe to help promote a long-term solution, and
encouraged Allies to articulate to Musharraf that Al Qaeda
and the Taliban pose a threat to the Government of Pakistan
as well.


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RUSSIA: WE WILL NOT TOLERATE BULLYING
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5. (C) Russia, missile defense, and Putin's performance at
Munich were very much on the mind of Allies; Mr. Hadley
received several questions on how the U.S. sees its
relationship with Russia, how U.S. missile defense efforts
affect that relationship, and how NATO should approach its
relations with Russia. Mr. Hadley noted that we need to
cooperate with Russia in areas of common interest, such as
non-proliferation, Iran and Kosovo. As part of this
dialogue, we should speak candidly when we have
disagreements; Mr. Putin spoke candidly at Munich, but no
European except the NATO Secretary General spoke candidly
back to him. Mr. Hadley emphasized that Europe needs to
decide on its policy towards Russia and then speak clearly on
it; "we can't keep carrying the water" with Russia. The U.S.
will not tolerate bullying on the part of Russia and
encouraged Allies to make clear they will not tolerate it
either.


6. (C) On missile defense, Mr. Hadley attempted to clear up
any Allied confusion over U.S. intentions, noting that the
U.S. is expanding missile defense sites in Europe because the
U.S. and Europe must defend ourselves. We will continue to
be as open and transparent with the Russian government on our
efforts as we have in the past. Mr. Hadley characterized
missile defense as a "hedge" against a nuclear Iran, not a
threat to Russia. He argued that part of why there is an
agreement with North Korea today is because it acknowledged
its nuclear threat capability would be marginalized by U.S.
missile defense capabilities.


7. (C) On Kosovo, Mr. Hadley emphasized that resolution of
the issue is of "pre-eminent importance" for the security of
Europe. To help achieve a successful resolution, we need to
have "quiet bilateral discussions" with Russia. Although
agreeing with a UK suggestion that Russia may be acting out
in part because it wants to be treated with respect, Mr.
Hadley said the U.S. and the Alliance should treat Russia
with respect without accepting its bullying.

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THE MIDDLE EAST: A CRUCIBLE AND A CHOICE
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8. (C) The old Middle East is gone, Mr. Hadley said, and a
new Middle East is emerging, the contours of which are still
unclear. He described the region as a crucible for a major
struggle between forces of moderation and extremism, an
underlying dynamic that is playing out in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon
and in the context of the Middle East peace process. Mr.
Hadley urged Allies to make clear which side they are on,
especially in the context of Iran.

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IRAN: PRESSURE IS NO PRELUDE TO MILITARY ACTION
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9. (C) Mr. Hadley urged Allies to continue to put pressure
on the Government of Iran. He noted Iran will only change
course if pressure continues to be placed on the government,
and there is evidence that collective pressure is working.
Parts of the Iranian government are starting to get the
message that Ahmadinejad is not acting on behalf of the best
interests of the Iranian people. He said we cannot be forced
to accept a nuclear Iran, and U.S.-European solidarity on
this issue is needed to ensure this outcome does not occur.
Mr. Hadley was quick to assuage some European concerns,
however, by noting that U.S. efforts to increase pressure on
Iran are not a "prelude to a military option."

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE: QUARTET STILL APPLIES
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10. (C) Mr. Hadley stressed that as the Palestinian unity
government emerges, it must accept the agreed principles of
the Quartet and the right of Israel to exist. In response to
a Spanish request to not "pre-judge" the results of the Mecca
deal and the new unity government, he urged Allies to not
wait to encourage the Palestinian government to accept the

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Quartet principles. Further, Mr. Hadley said that as the
process progresses, we need to find a way to elaborate where
the roadmap leads so that Mr. Abbas can rally the Palestinian
people behind a positive vision for their future that
includes the benefits of a peaceful Palestinian state.

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IRAQ: NO BAKER-HAMILTON YET
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11. (C) Mr. Hadley offered a frank assessment of the
situation in Iraq, noting that "we are not at Baker-Hamilton
yet" and will not get there unless we can help the Iraqi
government establish security in Baghdad. While the world is
seeing the military operations side of this new plan right
now, Mr. Hadley noted that there is also a diplomatic piece
that is not well understood and will soon be better
articulated. Turkey raised the only questions on Iraq,
specifically over the situation in Kirkuk and the PKK
operations out of northern Iraq. On Kirkuk, Mr. Hadley
expressed his shared concern over what he termed "one of the
hardest issues in Iraq" and said that while he had no
solution, it would likely require "time". He commended
Turkey's patience on the PKK issue, frankly commenting that
the U.S. has not done all it should have done and has hope
that General Ralston's process will provide some relief.

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LEBANON: ONE MAJOR WORRY
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12. (C) The resupply of Hizballah across the Syrian border
is not being addressed by the Lebanese government or UNIFIL
(despite its mandate to do so if Lebanese government gives
permission) and Mr. Hadley described this scenario as a
"ticking time bomb".

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SYRIA: DOESN'T LIKE CARROTS
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13. (C) Turkey noted that the U.S. needs a "more carrots,
less stick" approach to the region, especially in regards to
Syria. Mr. Hadley rejected the assumptions that carrots
change behavior in the case of Syria, noting that despite
continuous effort and a high volume of visits to Damascus by
other governments (many in the room) with carrots in hand, no
one has gotten anything out of the Syrians. Even more
importantly, Mr. Hadley stressed, Syria has faced no
consequences for its actions to destabilize the region.
There has not been a context where Syria faces positive and
negative incentives; any new strategy must aim to change
Syria's behavior.


14. (SBU) This cable has been coordinated with NSC Staff.
OLSON