REFUGEE RETURNS IN EASTERN CONGO: A JOINT US-EU

UNCLAS USEU BRUSSELS 000827

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM PREL EAID EU BE
SUBJECT: REFUGEE RETURNS IN EASTERN CONGO: A JOINT US-EU
ASSESSMENT


1. Summary: A joint USG-European Union assessment team
composed of US representatives from PRM and OFDA traveled
throughout Katanga and South Kivu provinces in January,
finding a basic level of peace and stability, but continued
sporadic human rights abuses perpetrated primarily by
security forces and ex-combatants. Much remains to be done in
terms of early recovery and development, but refugees are
returning from neighboring countries and receiving assistance
from UNHCR, NGOs, and other donors in their reintegration to
Congo. The delegation found seven areas in which
interventions by all actors could improve the return process:
1) integrated response to return, 2) repatriation-return
management, 3) planning and budget operations, 4) UNHCR
coordination, 5) implementation of Project Profile, 6)
implementation of humanitarian reform, and 7) greater
involvement by the government of DRC. All recommendations
were made jointly by the US and EU, and this report
represents the consensus view of the entire delegation. End
summary.

Overview
--------------

2. From Jan. 14-24, 2007, a joint delegation from the United
States Government (State Department and USAID) and the
European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid
(DG ECHO) traveled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
to assess the return and reintegration of refugees and
displaced people and to appraise the implementation of the
various new coordination and funding mechanisms linked to the
UN humanitarian reform process. The delegation of eight core
members was led by William Fitzgerald, US Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration,

SIPDIS
and Cees Wittebrood, head of the Africa unit for DG ECHO.
The mission held meetings with government officials, UN heads
of agency, and representatives of the international community
and non-governmental organizations in Kinshasa. It visited
Lubumbashi, Moba, Pweto, Uvira, Baraka, and Fizi. The
mission also met with UNHCR in Bujumbura, Burundi, and
concluded with a wrap-up debriefing in Goma.


3. In general, the mission observed professionals from the UN
and other international organizations, NGOs, and the
government of DRC working well under extremely challenging
conditions. The mission witnessed a safe and dignified
refugee repatriation by ship from Tanzania to Baraka, DRC,
and noted extensive preparations for upcoming repatriations
from Zambia to eastern Katanga Province. The mission was
able to move freely without escort and at no time felt either
under threat or that it was in a hostile or dangerous
environment. Nonetheless there was clear and widespread
evidence of the destruction caused by the war, and reliable
witnesses spoke of ongoing insecurity in more remote areas.
In Kinshasa and Lubumbashi all interlocutors spoke of a
recent but significant economic up-turn, with the cities
certainly appearing vibrant. However, the basic services in
refugee return areas of Katanga and South Kivu appeared very
limited, though some members of the team who had visited
previously felt that significant progress had been made over
the last year thanks to the humanitarian assistance and the
efforts of the local communities themselves.


4. The return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) begins a process of integration that may take years to
complete. More than a decade of war has left homes, schools,
and health centers in shambles. There are still some 1.2
million IDPs and some 400,000 refugees in neighboring
counries. Despite the vast needs in the DRC, most eturned
refugees the mission spoke to were pleased to be home after
years outside their native country. Congo has a rare
opportunity to consolidate its peace and democracy, which is
still extremely fragile. With the support of the
international community, the Government of DRC can address
many of the ongoing challenges in infrastructure, delivery of
basic services, security, and rule of law. IOs and NGOs are
currently providing many of those services in areas of
return, and the UN MONUC forces are providing a basic level
of security, but at some point those responsibilities must be
taken up by the Government of DRC.


5. The delegation found seven areas in which interventions by
all actors could improve the return process: 1) integrated
response to return, 2) repatriation-return management, 3)
planning and budget
operations, 4) UNHCR coordination, 5) implementation of
Project Profile, 6) implementation of humanitarian reform,
and 7) the role of the government of DRC. This list is not
meant to be exhaustive, or to indicate deficiencies on the
part of local actors. Rather, the delegation offers these

observations to further our joint objectives. The
expeditious return of Congolese to their homes, in security
and with dignity, will strengthen regional stability and save
lives.

Recommendation 1: Integrated Response to IDPs
--------------

6. The mission recommends that all actors work to provide
similar levels of services to returned IDPs and refugees, and
ensure there is a well-defined coordinating mechanism for
assisting all returnees. The delegation observed that
traditional repatriated refugees received more services and
attention than either IDPs or refugees who return home
spontaneously. With minor exceptions, the IDPs in Congo did
not go to camps, and thu are hard to identify andh IDPs becoming more and@ of civil conflict worlo the
new realities oecause IDPs often do
no`nternational humanitarian@ees, UN staff must devells to work closely withledging
that these saacting in ways that
ca@e first place). The delegt the fh`vh`HQ`dership will be key in he
community create a com the complex
emergenQegation recommends:
Qtween services providQs: More efforts must be melop
an integrated holie return of all
displand resources should b%sible at communities a. the welcome switch frual refugee children to sQpporting schools). Refugees
who return spontaeously also should be afforded similar
support to those who return under organized repatriaions.

b. Designation of a lead agency responQible for IDPs: In DRC,
UNICEF has provided IDQ services through its Program of
Expanded Assistance to Returns (PEAR) and Rapid ResponseMechanism (RRM),both of which predate the Cluser Approach.
These programs must be rapidly eQpanded to cover all areas
where there are IDPs. In general, however, there does not
appear to be clarity in the Cluster Approach about
responsibilities for IDPs other than in the area of
protection.

Recommendation 2: Management of Repatriation and Returns
-------------- --------------

7. The delegation recommends that UNHCR and other agencies
develop better information about the decision-making process
of returnees, and expedite processing of complicated cases
from camps. The joint delegation witnessed well-organized
and well-executed refugee repatriations in South Kivu
province. In Katanga province, the mission saw that transit
centers had been constructed for the anticipated arrival of
returnees beginning in February 2007. The mission, however,
was concerned about the long build-up to the start of
repatriation from Katanga and the lack of adequate
cross-border consultations between UNHCR-DRC and UNHCR-Zambia
(see Recommendation 4). What also appears to be lacking is
any coordinated collection and analysis of data about why
refugees choose to return home and what factors influence
that decision. Field workers from UN agencies and NGOs rely
upon hearsay and conventional wisdom, which often leads to
faulty conclusions. It results in ships and trucks operating
far below capacity some weeks, and long waiting lines other
weeks. While the decision about whether and when to return
will always vary by individual and be influenced by a number
of changing factors (weather, security, health, etc.),some
general conclusions could be drawn through a structured study
of past experience. For example, it was unclear what effect
the recent elections in DRC had upon repatriation. Some
humanitarian workers believed it was a key factor holding
back returns prior to December 2006; others believed it made
little difference to the average farmer. How much
information do refugees in camps have about conditions in
their villages back home? Some workers believe the refugees
know very little after being away for 8-12 years; others

believe they are intimately aware of the smallest details
thanks to networks of friends, relatives, and those who
return home spontaneously and report back. Cell phones are
common, and each ship that returns from DRC to Tanzania
carries bags of mail back to those in the camps.
Specifically, the delegation recommends:

a. In-depth interviewing of those who have returned (both
spontaneously and through organized repatriations): Such
information would allow for better estimations of future
returnees, when it is time to move from facilitated to
promoted repatriation, and what are the most urgent early
recovery and development needs in the DRC.

b. Following up with no-shows to convoys and ships: In
general, the number of refugees who actually show up on any
given day of a repatriation is far below the number who
signed up. Those who handle logistics never know why scores
of refugees opted out at the last minute. Follow-up visits
could determine whether there is a pattern to the reasons
given. If the reasons are based on rumor or false
information (e.g. resettlement possibilities to the US or
other third countries),UNHCR, and NGO staff could correct
misperceptions before they become widespread.

c. Targeting job-training in refugee camps more specifically
to realities back home: Many Congolese refugees are receiving
training in camps for trades that are either oversubscribed
or non-relevant in most villages. Subsistence farming is the
reality in eastern Congo for all but a few of the returnees,
and the delegation recommends that camp training focus more
on improved agricultural production. The delegation heard a
sobering NGO report on ecological devastation to Lake
Tanganyika caused in part by poor fishing and farming
practices, an issue that could be addressed and possibly
reversed by appropriate training in the camps. FAO would
seem to be a logical agency to take the lead on this issue.

d. Expediting the resolution of complicated cases to increase
the pace of repatriation: A significant number of camp
residents are consistently rejected for repatriation because
their cases are deemed problematic by UNHCR (incomplete or
inconsistent records; separated children; medical issues;
etc.). The delegation recommends that HCR expedite those
cases, assigning dedicated staff if necessary, so that they
are not all left until the end, thereby slowing and
prolonging the repatriation.

e. Expediting the repatriation of refugees from the Republic
of Congo (Brazzaville): The mission was disappointed at the
slow rhythm of return from ROC but notes with satisfaction
and anticipation UNHCR's assurances that, all things being
equal, the process will be concluded by the end of the year.

Recommendation 3: Planning figures and assumptions
-------------- --------------

8. The mission urged UNHCR to develop more accurate
repatriation planning figures, to separate fixed
and variable costs, and to keep donors apprised of ongoing
revisions. UNHCR has proposed annual planning figures for
repatriation that consistently have far exceeded what was
eventually achieved. For some operations the difference has
been more than threefold. The funding implications for
donors are obvious, as donors link their funding levels to
UNHCR's planning figures and are thus confronted with
increased and unacceptable unit costs. The mission
recognizes that UNHCR reviewed its targets and budgets for
2006, however this was only done in the last quarter of the
year, effectively preventing donors from readjusting their
contributions and thus making the most effective use of their
funds. The result has been an increasing loss of confidence
in the planning figures and budgets proposed by UNHCR and
thus a consequent apprehension in committing funds. The
proposed Congolese repatriation figure for 2007 is set at
98,000. The delegation considers that, though this may be
theoretically feasible on paper, the technical and political
assumptions on which the estimate is based are extremely
optimistic. The delegation understands that the myriad
elements that influence repatriation are extremely difficult
to predict. Despite recent political advances in DRC, the
delegation remains unconvinced, based on past experience,
that the proposed repatriation figures are achievable.
Consequently, funding the entire budget at once may not
appear reasonable from the perspective of some donors.
Specifically the delegation recommends:

a. UNHCR revise its annual repatriation figures based on past
experience: Also, by attention to Recommendation 2 above,

UNHCR should be able to establish more accurate assumptions.

b. UNHCR break down its budget for donors in terms of fixed
and variable costs: The delegation realizes that UNHCR has
certain fixed costs in order to carry out existing
obligations and to be fully prepared for the repatriation
process. Nonetheless the delegation highlights the fact that
UNHCR must expect that some donors will wish to modulate
their contributions to match the actual rhythm of
repatriation. Consequently, the mission recommends that, if
UNHCR is unable to revise its current planning figure for
2007, it should provide donors with a clear distinction
between its fixed and variable costs and demonstrate how
these variable costs change according to the number of
refugees actually repatriated.

c. Keep donors apprised of ongoing budget revisions: UNHCR
should alert donors in a timely fashion to any adjustments in
variable costs resulting from any reduction or increase in
the rhythm of repatriation.


Recommendation 4: UNHCR Coordination and Tripartites
-------------- --------------

9. The delegation recommended that UNHCR increase
cross-border coordination, increase its Katanga field
staffing, improve communication among field offices,
regularize communication with DRC humanitarian actors and
partners, and encourage the early conclusion of remaining
tripartite agreements and the holding of regular tripartite
commission meetings. The delegation recognizes that UNHCR
has established cross-border meetings, as well as more casual
contacts among offices involved in the DRC repatriation.
However, the mission observed in the field that many
communication gaps exist. Specifically, the delegation
recommends:

a. Increased cross-border coordination: There are gaps in
coordination across borders that contribute to delays in
repatriation operations. An early emphasis on cross-border
planning will ease logistics throughout the return operation
from Zambia. Katanga offices should meet regularly with
counterparts in Zambia to iron out specific details of the
return operation including target dates for convoys. The
mission was pleased to learn of a scheduled late January
meeting, and encourages nsultations.
Furtherh to increase the cross-bor`rmation regarding refugee , and areas of origin. ommunication
should b`fices should incorporat@om the South Kivu operatioreturns from Zambia.

b. facilitate coordinatiol ensure that adequate
place to et`s p Incentives to servQst be increased
untiQound.

c. Improved # field offices: The
deeed for UNHCR to increaseexchange of information among its field offices. Because
field offices report directly to Kinshasa, the offices are
not well informed about each other's activities and planning.
In addition, field offices should be sharing and learning
from best practices. In particular, the CPIA (Comite
Provinciale Inter Agence) is not informed, which means that
clusters are not informed, as is the case in Uvira.

d. Improved coordination with partners and other humanitarian
actors: UNHCR should coordinate more closely with partners,
other humanitarian actors and potential partners in regions
of return, including the dissemination of information from
cross-border exercises so that humanitarian actors can target
their interventions appropriately.

e. Expedited completion of Tripartite Agreements: The
Mission recognizes that the conflict in DRC has spread
refugees across more than nine countries and that tripartite

agreements are subject to political will often outside
UNHCR's control. However it is noted that tripartite
agreements remain to be signed between DRC/UNHCR and Rwanda,
Burundi and Uganda. All parties concerned should take
measures to conclude these as soon as possible. Existing
commissions should meet regularly in order to expedite the
ongoing
repatriation process.

Recommendation 5: Project Profiling and ProGres Database
-------------- --------------

10. The mission encouraged UNHCR to allow transfer of data
from UNHCR Tanzania to UNHCR Congo, to give regional IT staff
authority to change software, and to complete the
installation of digital fingerprinting equipment. Taking
full advantage of proGres is one way to address many of the
information gaps mentioned above in Recommendation 4. After
significant investment from donors in the Project Profile
exercise, UNHCR has failed to use this tool to full advantage
in the DRC operation. UNHCR Congo does not have access to
proGres data from UNHCR Tanzania concerning refugees
scheduled for repatriation. The database is configured in a
way that does not allow UNHCR Congo to enter local data
correctly. Local offices cannot change the database to
correct this problem. Specifically, the delegation
recommends:

a. Allowing UNHCR Tanzania to transfer refugee information to
UNHCR Congo: The argument that information protection
precludes exchange of data appears specious. The data is
available to UNHCR DRC in other forms. In fact, the data
exchange is already underway in Tanzania-Burundi operations.
The present policy only prevents the effective use of proGres
data, thereby slowing the pace of information exchange and
preventing effective refugee services.

b. Removing barriers to software adaptation: ProGres
formatting is not sufficiently flexible to meet mission
needs. As the system is developed, programmers should be
guided by input from the field, and local IT people should be
authorized to make minor formatting changes to the database,
which would enable field offices to enter relevant data and
produce reports, such as passenger manifests for use by
cross-border operators. In a region with ongoing
repatriation, a regional proGres administrator would be
helpful.

c. Completing the installation of digital fingerprinting
equipment: UNHCR should complete the installation of the
proGres project by installing the fingerprint function for
the system in all locations. Fingerprint records are
effective in preventing refugee recycling. UNHCR has
overcome technical problems that prevented fingerprinting in
the recent past, and is already using fingerprinting
effectively in some locations.

Recommendation 6: UN Humanitarian Reform
--------------

11. The mission recommends that the Cluster Approach not
become simply a disbursement vehicle for the Pooled Fund, and
that the Early Recovery Cluster become more active. A new
set of coordination and funding mechanisms has been
introduced in the DRC over the past year, including the
Cluster Approach, the Central Emergency Response Fund
(CERF),and the Pooled Fund. Still in the pilot phase, these
new tools are not widely or consistently understood by
partner agencies and NGOs across the national, provincial,
and district levels. On the positive side, the Cluster
Approach appears to have at least revitalized coordination
among stakeholders. The process has expanded to include
Government of DRC agencies such as REGIDESO (water company)
and the National Commission for Refugees (Commission
Nationale pour les Refugies, or CNR),which is very positive.
Many partners said the multi-sectoral assessments that
Clusters support are effective. The delegation also heard,
however, that partners consider the Cluster process to be
inefficient, causing additional work and too many meetings.
Although the Cluster system was not designed as a funding
mechanism, it has become one in DRC because of the
Humanitarian Coordinator's decision to allocate the Pooled
Fund (joint humanitarian financing by several bilateral
donors, most notably the UK) through the Clusters.


12. Another concern heard by the delegation is that a lack of
clarity exists on how programs chosen for funding by the CERF
and Pooled Fund through the Cluster process are to be
monitored and evaluated. NGO partners do not seem to be
clear on whom they ultimately are accountable to between the

Pooled Fund and the Clusters. Many of the Clusters appear to
be functioning efficiently and well in DRC with the exception
of the Early Recovery Cluster, co-chaired by UNDP and UNHCR.
In eastern Congo, there was little sense that the Early
Recovery Cluster was organized and functioning as it should
be. This is a particularly vital time for early recovery in
Congo, and a lack of coordination in the transition from
relief to development could have long-term repercussions for
repatriation. Specifically, the delegation recommends:

a. The Clusters not lose track of their core mission: If the
DRC finds that distributing Pooled Funds through the Clusters
makes sense, the Cluster Leads must ensure that the Clusters
do not only become funding disbursement vehicles. The
Clusters must maintain their central role as coordinating
bodies to address gaps in the delivery of humanitarian
assistance and to insure the quality and coherence of
activities with respect to the Humanitarian Action Plan for
DRC. NGOs and partners in the field must be informed about
the overall goals of the Cluster Approach and its role in
humanitarian reform.

b. The Early Recovery Cluster become more active: If
recovery and development needs in return areas are not
properly identified and tackled, displaced people may cease
returning home and those who have already repatriated will
face gaps in basic services. It is incumbent upon this
Cluster to ensure that other agencies and the government
assume their full responsibilities in order to respond
adequately to relief-to-development challenges.

c. The Cluster system must not dilute UNHCR's clear mandate
for refugees: The cluster system was essentially set up to
highlight and cover gaps in services to IDPs and specific
non-refugee vulnerable populations. It was not intended to
force UNHCR to share its responsibility for refugee
management to a Cluster. UNHCR must retain its recognized
mandate with respect to refugees.

Recommendation 7: Government of DRC Participation
-------------- --------------

13. The mission recommends that the Government of DRC fund
civil servant salaries, repair and maintain key roads, and
reform the justice and security sectors. The Government of
DRC must become more involved in humanitarian assistance and
development. The mission fully appreciates the constraints
presented by lack of funding and capacity, but the government
must increase its participation and responsibility for
ensuring the return and re-integration of its own people.
The Commission Nationale pour les Refugies (CNR) is well
placed to coordinate the government facilitation of the
return process within the DRC since it represents many
important ministries. However, its budget is far too small
to match its mandate.


14. The delegation heard several times from employees of
international organizations and NGOs in the field that the
best thing the Government of DRC could do is stay out of
their way. The mission also heard from Government of DRC
officials that the government will be prepared to step
forward once the international community has completed its
humanitarian work. Both approaches are understandable in
times of crisis, but not in the current environment. Now
that DRC has moved beyond war and has conducted democratic
elections, it is time for the government and the
international humanitarian
community to work more closely. It is the government's
responsibiliQy, security and
welQ Specifically, the delega. The Government of DRC servants:
The fact ten unpaid or underpaide pace of repatriatio. areas of security and ederpaid soldiers
create security cncerns and lack of pay for teachers make itQ
impossible to staff existing schools. The CNRshould receive
much greater funding to work through its member ministries to
ensure that basc health, education, and social services are
rovided in areas of return.

b. The Government takes over the maintenance of key roadways:
Infrastructure needs in Eastern Congo are enormous. The
humanitarian community has been repiring and opening key
roads, but without the articipation of the Government of DRC
in repair and maintenance, most roads will not last beyond
one rainy season, leaving citizens isolated from services and
markets.


c. The Government of DRC must proceed with the reform of its
security and judicial sectors with the assistance of the
international community: The lack of effective rule of law
prevents adequate resolution of land tenure disputes, safe
reintegration of refugees and IDPs, prosecution of criminals,
and other issues directly affecting local communities. In
addition, the government must ensure that the space in which
the humanitarian community operates is respected in terms of
free movement, security, lack of unreasonable administrative
hindrances, and other threats that impede the delivery of
humanitarian assistance.


15. The full delegation was composed of the following US
participants: William Fitzgerald, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, PRM; Antoinette Ferrara, Director, Disaster
Response and Mitigation, Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, USAID; Jay Nash, OFDA Senior Program Officer,
Kinshasa; Wendy Henning, Program Officer, Central Africa
Region, PRM; Dana Francis, Refugee Officer, US Mission to the
European Union, Brussels; and George Frederick, Refugee
Coordinator, Great Lakes Region, Kampala. The European
Commission participants were Cees Wittebrood, Head of Unit
for Africa region, DG ECHO; Philippe Maughan, Desk Central
Africa, DG ECHO; Patrick Vercammen, DG ECHO, Kinshasa; Yves
Horent, DG ECHO, Dar es Salam; and Fausto Prieto, DG ECHO,
Bukavu, DRC.

GRAY
.