RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN AND SYRIA: EU

S E C R E T USEU BRUSSELS 003227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PARM ETTC PREL IR IZ RU SY EUN
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN AND SYRIA: EU
REACTION TO NON-PAPER

REF: A. SECSTATE 146794

B. BRUSSELS 3121

C. BRUSSELS 3081

Classified By: Laurence Wohlers, Political Minister Counselor, for reas
ons 1.5(d) and (e)

THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPH 3.

1.(S) Per REF A instructions, USEU DCM Murray met with Helga
Schmid, Director of the Policy Unit of the Council
Secretariat on October 24 to deliver our non-paper on Russian

SIPDIS
Arms Transfers to Iran and Syria. DCM outlined U.S. concerns
and requested that EU High Rep Solana's intervention on the
issue at the October 26 EU-Russia summit could be helpful.
Schmid assured DCM that the EU shared U.S. concerns and
undertook to convey the information to High Representative
Solana immediately. She stated that Solana would have the
opportunity to raise the matter in a bilateral meeting with
President Putin at the summit in Mafra, Portugal. Moreover,
Schmid remarked that she had raised the issue repeatedly with
Russian counterparts, including separately with the Russian
Ambassador to the EU Chizhov and the Russian MFA Political
Director -- both times in the context of Syria. Israel had
also made its concerns about Russian arms transfers to Syria
known to the Council Secretariat.

2.(S) Schmid confirmed that she would travel to Beirut and
Damascus in mid-November in order to assess the prospects for
cooperation on a new border security mission for Lebanon and
Syria. Her assessment was intended to help the Council
determine whether to follow up on Spanish FM Moratinos'
proposal for a new border mission. She confided that she was
under heavy pressure from the Spanish and the Portuguese EU
Presidency to recommend that a fact-finding mission be
deployed. However, Schmid readily acknowledged the
challenges of any such border mission. First, the Lebanese
government remained critical of the plan. In addition, there
were several problems inherent in the Moratinos plan,
including lack of full EU control along a 400 plus km border,
the potential for Syria to use such a mission to "blame" the
EU for any incidents on the border, and the safeguarding of
sensitive monitoring equipment. In any case, Schmid said she
would deliver a three-part message to Damascus: 1) be a
constructive partner in Iraq; 2) stop supporting Hezbollah
and Hamas; and 3) stop interfering in Lebanon.

3.(S) DCM took the opportunity to solicit Schmid's
understanding of the problem of "foreign fighters" transiting
through Syria to Iraq. Schmid expressed interest in pursuing
the issue with Syrian counterparts during her trip to
Damascus and requested more information on the subject. She
observed that Syrian cooperation in the matter could be a
significant "win-win" in the short-term for both Damascus and
the West. ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department provide
talking points as well as appropriate background information
on this subject, in accordance with the U.S.-EU classified
information sharing agreement. END ACTION REQUEST
GRAY

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