Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USEUBRUSSELS2984
2007-09-24 13:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

DAS KRAMER'S QUAD CONSULTATIONS ON RUSSIA,

Tags:  ENRG ETRD EUN MARR OSCE PARM PGOV PHUM PREL 
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DE RUEHBS #2984/01 2671328
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241328Z SEP 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO
C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 002984 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: ENRG ETRD EUN MARR OSCE PARM PGOV PHUM PREL
RS, XH
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S QUAD CONSULTATIONS ON RUSSIA,
UKRAINE, MOLDOVA, AND BELARUS


Classified By: Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Lauren
ce Wohlers, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 002984

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: ENRG ETRD EUN MARR OSCE PARM PGOV PHUM PREL
RS, XH
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S QUAD CONSULTATIONS ON RUSSIA,
UKRAINE, MOLDOVA, AND BELARUS


Classified By: Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Lauren
ce Wohlers, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
--------------
1.(C) On September 18, DAS David Kramer met British, German,
and French counterparts (aka "The Quad") to coordinate policy
approaches to Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. During
the three hour consultations the Quad compared notes on
Putin's control of Russia's leadership transition, agreed to
coordinate strong messages on OSCE monitoring of elections,
and reaffirmed the need for robust engagement on a range of
Euro Atlantic concerns including Kosovo, Iran, and frozen
conflicts. U.S. Ambassador to Belarus Karen Stewart briefed
the Quad on the political and economic situation in Belarus
and expansion of U.S. sanctions there. Quad members agreed
to coordinate responses to any future good or bad moves by
the authorities in Minsk. Ukraine's domestic politica
situation remained an obstacle for deeper engagement, but
European Quad members were opimistic about the possibility
of WTO accessionby the end of this year. On Moldova, Kramer
noted the lack of Russian interest in engaging on
Moldova-related CFE i
ssues did not bode well for resolving the conflict there.
END SUMMARY

Participants
--------------
2.(C) Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs David
Kramer was joined by U.S. Ambassador Karen Stewart (Minsk),
USEU Polmincouns Larry Wohlers, and Poloff notetaker.
Germany was represented by Ambassador Hans-Dieter Lucas,
Special Envoy, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Caucasus,
Federal Foreign Office of Germany. The French delegation was
led by Aurelia Bouchez, Director for Middle and East European
Affairs, MFA, and accompanied by Maxime Lefebvre, Counselor,

Permanent Mission of France to the EU. The UK delegation
included Michael Davenport, FCO Director for Russia, South
Caucasus and Central Asia, Nicola Willey, FCO Director for
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, and Angus Lapsley, Political
Minister-Counselor, UK Permanent Mission to the EU.

--------------
Russia
--------------

Succession Issues
--------------
3.(C) Russian leadership succession and election issues
dominated the first half of the discussion. All assessed
that Putin's primary objectives were controlling the
leadership succession to ensure policy continuity and
maintenance of his own political and economic influence, and
to avoid lame-duck status as long as possible. Consequently,
Ambassador Lucas said the German MFA did not expect major
policy changes in the forseeable future. Lucas also dismissed
the idea Putin would attempt to retain the Presidency given
his earlier public insistence on following the Constitution.
UK Director Davenport pointed out that any new Kremlin
leadership in which a former leader still pulled the strings
would be a new development in contemporary Russian politics.
The French, with their Foreign Minister in Moscow the same
day, highlighted their concerns about the hollowing out of
Russian democratic institutions.

4.(C) While the appointment of Viktor Zubkov as Prime
Minister was surprising, his close ties to Putin were well
known to the Quad. The French considered Zubkov "not fit for
the job," but rather knowledgeable about Putin's personal
financial holdings. When asked to assess whether Putin was a
"king-maker" in his own right or merely "first among equals"
vying for political power, Bouchez pointed out that
competition was a "permanent tendency" in the Kremlin. The
French and UK shared the belief that Putin's power derived
from his ability to strike a balance between competing groups
and forces. Therefore, it was in Putin's self interest to
keep his options open until the last minute and others
guessing. While Lucas acknowledged the possibility that
Putin could try to provoke a crisis (e.g. with Georgia) as a
justification for staying in office, he believed that Putin

was "consistent in his words and actions," and so would
ensure a stable transition of power.

Election Monitoring
--------------
5.(C) Quad members agreed that Moscow was seeking to stymie
any OSCE effort to conduct independent monitoring of the Duma
elections in December. The U.S. and UK expected that Russia
would try to limit an ODIHR mission to a small number of
observers, for a short time period, and with limited access.
In any case, Quad members agreed with a U.S. suggestion to
urge Russia to issue an invitation to ODIHR to observe the
elections as soon as possible. The UK also noted the
importance of a consistent message to Moscow, including no
limitation or conditions on the ODIHR mission, or relaxation
of OSCE standards. Bouchez noted that French FM Kouchner was
to raise the issue that day in Moscow.

Security and External Issues
--------------
6.(C) Missile Defense and CFE: DAS Kramer provided Quad
members with a thumbnail sketch of bilateral consultations
with Russia on security issues. He pointed out that the
Moscow's pre-conditions for cooperation on Missile Defense -
that we suspend our negotiations with the Poles and Czechs --
were a non-starter, and that our work with Poland and the
Czech Republic continued. Meetings between U.S. and Russian
experts on CFE Istanbul Commitments were also inconclusive.
While the Russians had indicated a willingness to explore a
fact-finding visit to the Gudauta (Georgia) base, they
expressed no interest in moving forward on Moldova. All
sides attached importance to continued dialogue with Russia.
Lucas reaffirmed German support for the U.S. step by step
approach to the CFE, stating that Berlin was evaluating how
best to use its own channels to Russia to do the same. Lucas
said that Russian First Deputy FM Denisov recently told him
that "CFE construction was a problem but that Russia did not
want to dest
roy European security architecture."

7.(C) Kosovo: The Quad agreed to make the best possible
effort to pursue the Troika process, but to prepare in the
event of an unsuccessful outcome. Lucas urged the Quad to
take seriously Putin's linkage between Georgia and Kosovo;
noting that in a recent meeting, Denisov warned him that the
West "should not overestimate Russian leverage over South
Ossetia and Abkhazia." Bouchez said France fully expected
Russia to "ruthlessly exploit" Euroatlantic action on Kosovo
in the absence of a UNSCR to take action in many other areas,
although not necessarily in Abkhazia. She further assessed
that Russia believed it could control the risks for the
Northern Caucasus of its making Kosovo a precedent for
Georgia. However, Russia's paramount interest, was to create
a check against any future enlargement of NATO. All agreed
that the Kosovo precedent argument was a dangerous card for
Russia to play.

8.(C) WTO: Germany was concerned about Russia's increasing
reluctance to join the WTO, noting that it would complicate
Europe's economic relations with Russia. Davenport
underscored the Quad's collective interest in integrating
Russia into international structures -- especially the WTO --
but without lowering the standards for doing so.
Participants acknowledged a lack of insight into Russia's
internal policy debate on WTO accession but agreed that the
possible departure of Economics Minister German Gref from the
Russian Government would be a serious blow to Russia's
efforts.

Two-track Engagement Not Isolation
--------------
9.(C) The Quad concurred on the need for engagement, and not
isolation of Russia. Germany counseled patience in light of
anticipated difficulties through the next two years. The UK
assessed that while there might be resolution of some
(unspecified) issues in the spring of 2008, we might have to
agree to disagree on others, as there would be no fundamental
shift in Russian positions. Given concerns about the rise of
nationalistic trends in Russia, France believed it was
necessary to differentiate between Russian actions taken for

external or domestic interests. This also dictated the need
to talk to the Russians more, not less. Lucas noted that
(the West) "shouldn't lose Russia, though they may lose us."
The UK agreed that we should "use any and all existing tracks
to pursue our agendas."

10.(C) UK, France, and Germany generally supported the
development of a double track approach including a "positive"
agenda (with common objectives) and a "difficult" agenda.
Bouchez suggested the Quad consider identifying some of the
common goals for a positive agenda before the Russian
political transition, which could increase the possibility of
some elements in the agenda surviving. The French and
Germans also supported the UK call for a narrative on how
much Europe could push Russia without breaking the
relationship entirely. In the same vein, Germany indicated
frustration with continued (European) failures to look at the
overall relationship with Russia instead of that of
individual member states.

11.(C) Quad members concurred with the U.S. call to avoid
allowing Russia to dictate linkages between issues, as this
would drive up the price of solving any one of them.
Tradeoffs, they agreed, would not guarantee positive results;
each foreign policy issue - Kosovo, missile defense, CFE,
Iran, NATO enlargement, etc. - should be pursued on its own
track and on its own merits, not linked together. France and
the UK, however, noted the importance of prioritizing and
suggested that Georgia MAP was one area we did not
necessarily have to pursue. Germany agreed, noting a
Georgian MAP was not whether but when (but clearly not any
time soon).

12.(C) Members debated the idea of convening a G-7 Political
Directors meeting on Russia on the margins of the UNGA, an
idea originally from the UK, which strongly voiced continued
strong support. The French were unsure, and the Germans
worried Russia would view such a meeting as a provocation.

--------------
Belarus
--------------
13.(C) Ambassador Stewart reviewed the current political and
economic situation in Belarus, noting the recen rise in
arrests and harassment of opposition figures and the growing
difficulties for Belarus' economy in light of higher energy
prices. She also highlighted possible opportunities for
Lukashenka to improve relations with the West, including
through the release of political prisoners through a general
amnesty to be considered by parliament on October 2, and
noted the upcoming October 14 European March. In the event
that Lukashenka released some, but not all political
prisoners, the United States urged that the other members of
the Quad (and the EU as a whole) stick to its current hard
line policy on sanctions and contacts. DAS Kramer also
sounded a note of concern about the recent Georgian Interior
Minister's visit to Minsk. The other Quad members professed
to have been unaware of this development.

14.(C) Germany stated there would be no major changes in EU
policy. The UK stressed the importance of remaining united.
German and French officials expressed concern about growing
Russian influence in Belarus, with Lucas wondering aloud what
it meant for the Transatlantic approach to Belarus. Germany
and France agreed that Russia was pursuing a calculated
strategy vis-a-vis Minsk designed to ensure stability for its
energy assets and defense related cooperation with Belarus.
Russians were scooping up privatized Belarusian strategic
infrastructure and energy assets in lieu of cash for their
higher-priced gas. The UK was interested in exploring what
points of influence Europe could exploit to make inroads with
the GOB on economic issues. All agreed that we should
explore possibilities for getting more involved in Belarus'
privatization, possibly through the EBRD.

--------------
Ukraine
--------------
15.(C) DAS Kramer shared U.S. expectations for the Ukrainian
Parliamentary elections, noting that the outcome would likely

be similar to that of March 2006, but with a worse outcome
for the Socialists. The Quad agreed on the importance of
signaling to Kiev the need to stand up a government and get
on with the business of running the country. This included
the long-delayed constitutional reform needed to put into
place the checks and balances needed for stable democratic
governance. France and the UK expressed concerns about some
backsliding on reform, as well as increased Russian influence
in Ukraine. In the same vein, DAS Kramer summarized U.S.
concerns about corruption driven by the energy sector,
especially through RosUkreEnergo. France and the UK saw
rising Russian-supplied fuel prices as a possible problem
that increased the need for a capable government in Kyiv.
However, despite the political turmoil of recent months, the
WTO accession process had continued to move forward. It
needed to be kept o
n track.

--------------
Moldova
--------------

16.(C) The French complained that Chisinau was, on one hand,
pressing the EU to do more, but on the other, delivering
little in the way of political and economic reform and the
frozen conflict with Transnistria (where they sought EU
support against Russia). The UK worried that Voronin was
perhaps not receiving a full or accurate picture of Moldovan
inaction and EU action from his lower level staff. The EU
would have to find ways to go directly to him with clear
messages on these issues. Bouchez said that it was not in
Europe's interest to see Moldova become an economic,
corruption, and trafficking "black hole" in its midst, in
addition to its Transnistria problem.

17.(C) This message has been cleared by DAS Kramer.
GRAY
.