TURKS MAINTAIN THEIR CONCERNS OVER ESDP ARE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 002000

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM AND EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS EUN TU
SUBJECT: TURKS MAINTAIN THEIR CONCERNS OVER ESDP ARE
SERIOUS AND REAL

REF: A. ANKARA 1538 AND PREVIOUS B. BRUSSELS 1890 C.

BRUSSELS 1736

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: According to the Turkish Mission to the EU,
Ankara's treatment and status within ESDP represents a
serious problem, and their list of demands does not
constitute a bargaining ploy related to other political
issues. They stress the EU has committed itself to a number
of initiatives, and Ankara wants only to see these decision
implemented. Access to EDA and a Security Agreement with the
EU are two of Ankara's main demands. They deem initial EU
thinking about a package of gestures to Turkey to be
insufficient. End summary.


2. (C) In a blunt conversation June 14 with Tolga Kaya, the
officer responsible for ESDP at the Turkish Mission to the
EU, we were told that Ankara views its concerns over Turkey's
role in ESDP as serious and "very, very real." While Kaya
acknowledged -- after considerable prodding -- that the
specific issues related to ESDP can be viewed in the context
of the overall Turkey-EU relationship, he sought to hammer at
specific ESDP commitments undertaken by the EU and never
fulfilled. The two items from the long list of "concerns and
frustrations" that Ankara is most insistent upon are the
conclusion of an EU-Turkey Security Agreement, and
administrative arrangements that will allow Turkish
participation in the European Defense Agency (EDA).


3. (C) Kaya denied that there has been any particular
precipitating event to the ongoing display of Turkish
displeasure with the EU. Rather, it is the culmination of a
long series of failures on the part of the EU to live up to
"existing commitments" that has produced an atmosphere of
suspicion and frustration in Turkey. He ascribed this view to
the civilians in MFA as well as to the military and the
public at large.


4. (C) Kaya went into considerable detail concerning the
background of negotiations over a Security Agreement, which
figured prominently among the Turkish complaints. He said
that such an agreement was first proposed by the EU a number
of years ago, and Turkey finally agreed to accept a
"standard" text despite a number of concerns. In January of
this year, the EU concluded -- based upon a veto by Cyprus
(and Greece) -- that it was no longer willing to enter into
such an agreement with Turkey. According to Kaya, the Cypriot
veto was explicitly made on political grounds, rather than
any technical issue related to the agreement itself. (Note:
Predictably, the Greeks and Cypriots have a significantly
different interpretation of events. See ref C for additional
details. End note)


5. (C) Ankara insists that it has a "right" to establish
administrative arrangements with the European Defense Agency,
based on Turkey's pre-existing membership in the Western
European Armaments Group (WEAG) under the Western European
Union. Since ESDP is in most respects, the successor
organization to the WEU, the rights and privileges enjoyed by
Turkey under the previous umbrella should carry over to the
new structures. Norway and Turkey -- as non-EU European
members of NATO -- both applied for EDA access when the
agency was established in 2005. Their applications were
initially treated -- and blocked -- jointly, until early 2006
when the applications were separated and Norway was given the
right to sit on the Consultative Committee of the EDA. Ankara
has been furious ever since.


6. (C) Kaya stressed that Ankara has shown great flexibility
and patience in NATO-EU fora by allowing several informal
meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the
Political and Security Committee (PSC) to take place with
Cyprus and Malta present. Under the terms of agreements
between NATO and the EU for strategic cooperation, only EU
members which belong to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
have a security agreement with NATO can participate. Neither
Cyprus nor Malta qualifies, and are therefore excluded from
meetings or information exchanges related to EU-NATO
strategic cooperation. (Comment: Ankara has taken a very
broad view of what constitutes "strategic cooperation"
thereby narrowing the scope of contact between the two full
organizations in any formal setting. End Comment)


7. (C) According to Kaya, Ankara -- at the "highest level"

-- expects real solutions to their demands for a greater role
in the decision-making process of ESDP. Turkey rejects any
suggestion that there is a linkage between the political
problems with Cyprus and the EU's failure to meet its
obligations. Kaya made the point repeatedly that many of the
things Turkey is demanding were proposed and approved by the
EU but never put into practice. Kaya said that the limited
internal administrative measures apparently under
consideration as a gesture from the EU were unacceptable and
will not resolve the issue. He said that Ankara had no
problems concerning the EU's missions to Kosovo or
Afghanistan, but Turkey would not permit the necessary
NATO-EU agreements to proceed until their concerns related to
ESDP have been addressed.


8. (C) Kaya insisted that the "political elements" of the
Cyprus dispute and the commitments to Turkey by the EU were
not comparable and could not be linked. The only concession
he would make to a possible political process to address
these concerns, was to recognize that a "positive atmosphere"
would be more conducive to flexible interpretations of
existing policies.


9. (C) Comment: We pointed out that Ankara has made its
point loudly and clearly and that we support closer ties
between Turkey and the EU. We also noted that we share a
number of Ankara's practical concerns about exercising
influence within EU structures as a third-party contributor
to ESDP missions. We also made the point that neither NATO
nor the US can be expected to fix this problem. At this
stage, the "feel good package" of gestures the EU is
reportedly preparing is probably DOA, since any real or
meaningful change in Turkey's ESDP status would require
European Council approval -- thereby being subject to Cypriot
veto. Internal changes in procedure, such as additional
Turkey-only consultations -- have already been rejected by
Ankara as insufficient. Nevertheless, we don't see many signs
here that Cyprus is feeling any heat for its stance. This is
because EU member states tend to perceive that access to EU
programs such as ESDP are questions for the member states to
decide exclusively and not subject to any bargaining with
outsiders. Thus, a majority of member states see no
contradiction between accepting at face value Cyprus's
"right" to veto Turkish ESDP participation, while viewing as
"blackmail" Turkey's pressure to force more access to ESDP
and EDA. Our Cypriot contacts here in turn have given us a
long list of perceived grievances and say they doubt that
Turkey would reciprocate any "concessions" by Cyprus. None
of our contacts have indicated that any major EU actor is
actively engaged in seeking a solution.

Gray
.