GERMAN PSC AMBASSADOR'S CONCERNS ABOUT IMPACT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001890

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2022
TAGS: PREL NATO EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: GERMAN PSC AMBASSADOR'S CONCERNS ABOUT IMPACT OF
IMPASSE OVER TURKISH OBJECTIONS TO NATO-EU DIALOGUE

Classified By: USEU POL M/C Laurence Wohlers for reasons 1.5 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: German PSC Ambassador (and current
presidency chair of the EU Political and Security Committee)
Clemens Von Goetze warned that Turkish refusal to allow
NATO-EU dialogue on the EU Afghan police training mission was
not only endangering the mission itself but risked damaging
the Turkish accession process as well. Agreeing that Turkey
had reason to be frustrated, von Goetze noted that the EU was
actively exploring how to give Turkey an upgraded role in
ESDP ("whatever we can do legally and politically, we will
do"). However, on Turkey's key demand for access to the
European Defense Agency, he said, the reality is that "no one
could deliver the Cypriots" in the short-term. In the
meantime, Turkish current tactics were a "miscalculation"
that were hurting their long-term objectives. Given that
neither Turkey nor Cyprus were prepared to consider
comprehensive solutions in the short term, he added, Turkey's
interest was to reinforce European perceptions that it was a
strong and reliable ESDP partner, not impeding EU missions in
Afghanistan and Kosovo. Von Goetze's pessimism about
near-term solutions to the current impasse, and concern about
the potential fall-out, were echoed by contacts at other
permreps and the EU council secretariat. End Summary


2. (C) Reviewing the state of play over Turkish objections to
NATO-EU dialogue on the EU Afghan police training mission, a
clearly frustrated German PSC Ambassador Von Goetze warned
that therewere no obvious solutions to the current impasse.
The German presidency and the EU secretariat, he said, had
been working for months to find a way to overcome competing
Turkish and Cypriot demands that have obstructed NATO-EU
dialogue. However, an early attempt at brokering a
reciprocal exchange of security agreements (Turkey with the
EU, Cyprus with NATO) had been rejected by both sides. As
urgency mounted to establish coordination procedures for the
EU Afghan Police training mission (scheduled for launching in
June 17),therefore, the EU had opted for an informal
approach that would skirt the Berlin Plus question and allow
the Turks a "face-saving" way to allow the NATO-EU
cooperation to move forward. In this vein, according to Von
Goetze, the aborted Solana invitation to an "informal"
NATO-EU meeting on June 7 had not been designed to "end run"
the Turks, but simply to provide all parties with a
face-saving way forward.


3. (C) Turkish objections, von Goetze continued, created
several problems. First, it throws the EU Afghan police
training mission into jeopardy. While the mission could go
forward in Kabul, the real value-added of the mission
(expansion to the PRTs) could not go forward absent a clear
understanding of questions of support from the NATO ISAF
mission, including medical assistance, security etc. Second,
and more importantly, the impasse risked doing real damage to
the Turkish accession process, as it was providing fuel to
Turkey's opponents in the EU and irritating its friends. The
German presidency, he noted, had hoped to open three new
accession chapters this month and had been working hard to
overcome Cypriot objections. The anger generated by
perceived Turkish "blackmail" tactics would make it harder.
If the Turks continue to object to similar provisions for
the Kosovo mission, where the EU's role is much more
critical, Von Goetze noted, Turkey's friends in the EU would
be really challenged.


4. (C) In response to our query as to whether the real
question was Turkey's desire for access to the European
Defense Agency, Von Goetze agreed that Turkey "should have
been in the EDA yesterday". But the reality was that "no one
could deliver the Cypriots" on EDA right now. In the
meantime, although Turkish ire was fully understandable,
their present tactics were a "total miscalculation" as they
were angering everyone in the EU and hurting their own
long-term objectives.


5. (C) To respond at least partially to Turkish frustrations
in the short-term, von Goetze continued, the EU was exploring
how to give Turkey an upgraded role in ESDP, including
setting up regular "Turkey-only" ESDP consultations rather
than including Turkey in the larger group of ESDP contributor
nations. Whatever we can do legally and politically, we will
do, he said. He added that he personally had spoken
regularly with the Turkish permreps to both NATO and the EU.
However, his impression was that their "hands were tied" by
Ankara. Indeed, he added, the recent EU-Turkey troika had
been disappointing, with the Turks sticking to a tough,
uncompromising line. (This last comment echoes separate
comments by an adviser to Enlargement Commissioner Rehn.)


6. (C) Looking longer term, von Goetze was equally
pessimistic about a global solution. Although in principle,
one could envisage a larger deal that would satisfy both

Turks and Cypriots, he thought it would take quite a while
before a new Turkish government would be ready to negotiate,
and in the meantime, the military and secularists were not
going to change their position. That taken together with
impending Cypriot elections meant that conditions for any
larger deal were not good in the short-term.


7. (C) Given the lack of good current options, von Goetze
continued, the only viable way forward for the short term was
for all sides to "keep their nerve" and not throw up further
obstacles. In the run-up to the December EU Council meeting,
he noted, the Turks had stayed "relatively" calm, and as a
result Turkey's friends had succeeded in paving the way for
opening new accession chapters (comment: the Cypriots
nevertheless were able to take eight chapters off the
table.). The important thing now was to keep that process
moving forward, however slowly. In that vein, Turkey's
interest was to reinforce European perceptions that it was a
strong and reliable partner on ESDP issues. However, if
Turkey now was intent on exercising its option to block
NATO-EU, and thereby impede EU missions in Afghanistan and
Kosovo, it "would not be doing any of us any favors".


8. (C) Comment: von Goetze has impressed us over the past
months as a straight talker and a personal proponent of
Turkish accession. His pessimistic comments here were echoed
in other conversations we have had this week with Dutch,
Danish, Italian and UK missions as well as with Council
Secretariat. Across the board, our contacts have worried

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that an extension of the current impasse will only reduce
sympathy for the Turks in the EU. No one saw much hope of
getting the Cypriots to yield on Turkey's interest in EDA
access, or even a security agreement. In an earlier
conversation with us, the Cypriot PSC ambassador said as
much, emphasizing Cyprus's long list of grievances against
Turkey and suggesting that EDA membership would only be
traded for something significant (such as access to Turkish
ports). At this juncture, the polarization of attitudes we
are seeing, coupled with the potential for further escalation
over the question of opening additional accession chapters
later this month, and anticipation over a possible hardening
of French positions suggest that Turkish-EU relations will
remain strained, if not worse, in the coming months. These
conversations indicate, however, that not only are there
increasing challenges for the Turkey -EU relationship itself,
but the negative atmosphere is increasingly impacting
"separate" security objectives like the Afghan and Kosovo
missions. Clearly, the Europeans are struggling in their own
attempts to find a way forward.

McKinley
.