CYPRIOTS DODGE AND WEAVE ON TURKISH DEMANDS FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001736

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS EUN NATO CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS DODGE AND WEAVE ON TURKISH DEMANDS FROM
ESDP

REF: A. ANKARA 1232 B. ANKARA 1192

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Cyprus responds to Turkish concerns within
ESDP by citing its own litany of grievances against Ankara.
Any meaningful change in Turkey's status within ESDP requires
Council approval, thus being subject to veto. There is no
visible
pressure being exerted by major Member States on Nicosia,
despite
German Presidency engagement. Cyprus expects to participate
in
both the Kosovo and Afghanistan ESDP missions. The Cypriots
will
accept the NATO-EU Technical Arrangements provided they can
remain
below the political-level radar screen. End summary.

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Examining the Turkish Demands
--------------

2. (C) POLMINCOUNS and Pol-Mil chief met May 23 with
Ambassador Costas Militiades, Cypriot Ambassador to the
EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) to get a sense of
the
parameters of the EU's ability to address Turkey's
grievances about its treatment within the structures of
ESDP. Militiades, described to us by (Greek) PSC
colleagues as reasonable and relatively open, clearly
welcomed the contact. He said he could not comment
definitively on Ankara's demands because he had not
"formally been made aware of them." He complained that
Ankara had made selective demarches to a small group of
member states, and that he had not seen their points. He
was clearly aware of Ankara's concerns, however, and
implicitly acknowledged that some of Ankara's demands were
legitimate -- specifically, access to the European
Defense Agency and a Security Agreement with the EU -- and
that Nicosia had vetoed them because of the broader
political problems between Cyprus and Turkey. Other
Turkish demands constituted over-reaching, he maintained,
and implied a status with respect to the EU that Turkey
does not enjoy. We have heard this same formulation from
senior EU officials within the ESDP structures.

--------------
A Litany of Counter-Grievances
--------------

3. (C) Militiades then produced a six-page paper entitled
"Turkey's Persistent Vetoing of Cyprus Membership in
International Organizations, Arrangements, Regimes and
Treaties." He also presented us with a non-paper on
"Cyprus' Participation in and exclusions from ESDP," and
the points of an EU demarche to Ankara urging admission of
Cyprus to the Wassenaar arrangement. He said the purpose
of citing these Turkish vetoes was to make the point that
the current dispute over Turkey's role within ESDP was part
of the larger political context related to the Cyprus
question.

--------------
Few Prospects for Reversing the Spiral
--------------

4. (C) In an effort to gauge the dimensions of a possible
package that could begin to reverse the downward spiral of
tit-for-tat obstructionism by both Ankara and Nicosia, we
asked if there was any domestic political willingness to
reexamine the question of a Turkey-EU Security Agreement --
one of Ankara's key frustrations. He said that he saw no
advantage in "treating a political problem as a technical
issue," but also hinted that political timing was also a
factor. Militiades pointed out that Qprus is already in a
"pre-election" phase, with voting schQuled for February

2008. He pointed out that the Communists are opposed to any
concession to Anara, and that President Papadopoulis will
nee Communist support to win the election. Following the
election, some package of positive gestures might be more
possible. He said he was not sure it would soon be
possible to reverse the downward spiral, but he was hopeful
that, at least, it could be kept from going any lower.

--------------
Cyprus to Participate in ESDP Missions
--------------

5. (C) Militiades told us that Cyprus planned to contribute
to both the Kosovo and Afghanistan ESDP missions. Nicosia

will offer a small number of police officers for the Kosovo
mission and proposes to provide diplomats to support reform
of key ministries as part of the Afghanistan mission. This
decision reflected a desire in Nicosia for Cyprus to play a
fuller and more active role in issues related to European
security concerns.

--------------
On the Ground Arrangements
--------------

6. (C) Militiades said that Nicosia was willing to accept
the technical arrangements agreed by NATO and EU at the
staff-to-staff level, so long as these arrangements were
designed
to facilitate "on the ground" cooperation between commanders.
(Note: The presence of Cypriot officers within the ESDP
mission
could complicate communication and information exchange
between
the EU mission and KFOR under a strict application of the
NATO-EU
Security Agreement - to which Cyprus and Malta are not
parties.
End Note.) He said that he felt comfortable that the
necessary
information would flow as needed to ensure security and
operational
effectiveness. He implied that Nicosia would object if the
arrangements
were put before the NAC and PSC for political-level approval.

--------------
Cyprus in PfP?
--------------

7. (C) Militiades, speaking strictly personally, hinted
that a Cypriot application to join PfP might not be out of
the question. He voiced appreciation for USNATO Ambassador
Nuland's positive comments at a February 26 informal session
of the NAC-PSC welcoming the presence of all 32 European
representatives at the table. He said that if Cyprus took
the step to apply for PfP, it should be with the
understanding that it would be a full step predicated on
meaningful participation. In this vein, he dismissed the
idea of negotiating a security agreement with NATO merely
in order to gain greater access to deliberative fora.

--------------
Comment
--------------

8. (C) Militiades reacted to Turkish concerns
much as we anticipated, by reciting his own litany of
complaints against Ankara. Although Militiades seemed genuine
in stressing that the priority was to ensure that "lives were
not endangered" on the ground in Kosovo and Afghanistan by
artificial obstacles to information sharing, neither did he
see
any likelihood of flexibility in Cypriot positions. This
tracks
with a separate conversation with the German PSC ambassador
this
week, who told us that the German Presidency had tried to
broker
a deal involving a reciprocal signing of security agreements
-- Turkey with the EU and Cyprus with NATO -- which would have
facilitated cooperation between the EU and NATO. However,
both
countries had rejected the idea of this "technical" solution.

Consequently, the German continued, there was little appetite
among major EU Member States to put pressure on Cyprus now.
First, he said, pressure from other MS would not work as long
as the Cypriots could fall back on both Greek support and its
right of veto of Council decisions. Second, there was little
inclination to go out on a limb for Turkey as long it failed
to demonstrate any real flexibility itself.


9. Comment Continued. In the immediate term, therefore both
Cyprus and the German presidency in Brussels are pinning
their
hopes on the technical solution of an agreement in the field
that avoids a formal PSC debate. Neither sees an opportunity
for a larger package. Even after the Turkish and Cypriot
elections,
this looks problematic absent a push from an honest broker
with
credibility and clout on both sides.

McKinley

.