UPDATE ON EU AND MEMBER STATE LOOKOUT SYSTEMS

S E C R E T USEU BRUSSELS 001157

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2032
TAGS: CVIS PTER BE EUN
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON EU AND MEMBER STATE LOOKOUT SYSTEMS

REF: A. 06 BRUSSELS 04123

B. 06 BRUSSELS 01839

Classified By: Senior Consular Representative Paul Fitzgerald
for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (S) Summary. A recent survey of the European Union and
Member States' terrorist and immigration lookout systems
revealed a situation still in a state of flux (see reftels).
While the EU develops its updated Schengen Information System
II (SIS),and pursues an interim system (SIS One-4-All) that
will allow new Member States to meet Schengen border control
standards sooner, there is still nothing planned that would
be analagous to either the NCTC or TSC databases. However,
the EU and national authorities are focused on making their
linked systems as seamless as possible given their financial,
operational and legal constraints. This cable uses the
Belgian system as one example of how a Member State
integrates its lookouts with the EU system. End Summary.


2. (S) Belgium uses two concurrent databases to screen
travelers at ports of entry: a national-level database called
the National Judicial Database and the European Union-managed
Schengen Information System (SIS). Belgium's primary
screening tool, the National Judicial Database, is available
at utilizes optical characte` flatbed scanners to captu`ation
in the machine-reports. The bearer's if birth, paspport
num through Belgian and SIS wa`ive wants or warrants.

st is incorporated intoicial Database as a "nal
copy", updated twiceIS server in Strasbourg,np h`@cdpwatchlist
request. tirely user-driven, relyiiles sent via e-mail; insion
of "hits" at ports Typical response tim%hours.
Belgian authoh is the lingua franca isQnce.


5. (S) Legal consQvel data hinder the
immigration systems. to EU privacy laws, thr
storing entry and exiQ information for EU citizens. Only
after a pQrson is watchlisted will their travel begin to be
monitored and reported from the SIRENE syQtem. Should a
suspected terrorist be identifQed ex post facto to being
watchlisted, it wou,d be impossible to reconstruct that
individual's travel history without contacting the airline
directly.


6. (S) An SIS record can be etered by any participating
Schengen country, Qut only updated or removed by the nation
origQnally creating that record. In Belgium, an SIS record
can be introduced by Belgian intelligence and police
services. The SIS contains complete, actionable records on
lost and stolen passports, stolen car alerts, individuals
with arrest warrants, immigration violators, missing persons,
and witness appearances. SIS does not contain any case
information, rather is a hit/no hit database with specific
action codes assigned to each record. There are three basic
action codes that can be attached to a record, including: 1)
discreet surveillance (silent hit) in which a positive
encounter occurs and the Schengen country that created the
record is notified of the encounter 2) overt inspection
(secondary inspection) in which an individual that registers
as a hit against the SIS is rigorously inspected and 3)
arrest, where an individual that registers as a hit is
immediately arrested by the local authorities. SIS records
expire in 5 years but can be re-entered.


7. (S) While no Belgian system tracks entries and exits,
hotels are required to collect information on
guests-including name and passport number-that could be used
to track travel. In the past, a special unit within the
Belgian police collected this information on a weekly basis,
but manpower constraints have limited this actvity in recent
years. Belgian police now maintain liaison with the major
hotels whom they call on an as-needed basis for information
(Note: Recordkeeping at small hotels and guest houses, such
as the flophouses around the Gare du Midi train station, may
be lacking and police may have less ability to track
suspicious travelers who may be staying in this kind of
accomodation).


8. (S) Belgian Federal Police (BFP) officials have noted a
qualitative difference between records entered into the
domestic Belgian watchlist and SIS. A higher threshold for
inclusion is typically employed for the SIS, such as
requiring a complete name and date of birth, as lookouts can
trigger extraterritorial law enforcement action. For
example, a wanted criminal in Belgium could be detained or
arrested in Italy based on the contents of an SIS record.
The use of SIS for targeting criminals has expanded
considerably since the introduction of the European Arrest
Warrant in 2004.


9. (S) Belgian officials decide on a case by case basis, when
there is complete information, whether to introduce a lookout
into the SIS. Although SIS is an EU-level system, threshold
for inclusion into SIS is decided on a national level, as
regulated by current EU law. A result of this EU policy is
that some countries enter more records than others-creating a
disparity in the number of lookouts introduced, even among
nations with similar populations. The EU is aware of this
problem, but will not address it until three years after the
full implementation of SIS II, which is scheduled to be
operational by 2008/2009.


10. (S) However, lower thresholds apply to the National
Judicial Database where police choose to include "softer"
information such as subjects of preliminary investigations or
unsubstantiated threat reporting. Informally, Belgian Police
note an institutional reluctance of police and intelligence
services from inputting terrorist-related lookouts in SIS
because of operational sensitivities. Additionally, there
are no categories within SIS for listing suspected
terrorists/extremists. Instead, terrorist/extremist suspects
must be listed within SIS under an existing category, such as
an immigration violation or criminal offense. Belgian police
provided no specific examples to corroborate this assertion.


11. (S) Neither the National Judicial Database or the SIS
collect biometrics at this time. The European Commission, as
part of its effort to deploy the Visa Information System
(VIS) throughout the Schengen countries, proposed
fingerprinting all VIS applicants at both the time of
application and at the port of entry. Under this scheme, the
VIS would be a de facto database storing the travel history
of non-Schengen nationals that require a visa to enter the
European Union. Should this arrangement be approved by the
European Parliament later this year, it would prove a vast
improvement for tracking the arrival and departures of third
country nationals.

McKinley
.