U.S. - EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001043

SIPDIS

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SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, GENEVA FOR CD DEL - AMB ROCCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL EUN PTER KN IR IN CH
SUBJECT: U.S. - EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND
NONPROLIFERATION, FEBRUARY 22-23, 2007

Classified By: Classified by USEU PolMinCouns Larry Wohlers
for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

SUMMARY:
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1. (C) The U.S.-EU Troika disarmament and nonproliferation
consultations under the German presidency demonstrated many
common interests and a willingness to engage frankly but
cordially. They did not hide, however, the well known
divergence of views on how to approach these key issues. In
particular, the Europeans remained firm in their support for
the primacy of approaches based on formal agreements and
established institutions, while the U.S. made clear that it
preferred results-based arrangements. On specifics:
-- Both sides supported FMT negotiations at the CD,
but the U.S. made clear it would not agree to an Ad Hoc
Committee on outer space, even at the cost of no FMCT
negotiations.

-- The U.S. and EU place emphasis on positive momentum
in the NPT review process and hope to resolve procedural
questions quickly.

-- The IAEA,s Committee on Safeguards and Veriication
is in difficulty; its future may be decided by results at the
June Board of Governors, meeting.

-- The two sides agreed on the need for a strong
approach toward Iran and were pleased at progress on the
DPRK, although the U.S. made clear the process had only
started.

-- Preparations for the U.S.-EU Summit should begin
soon and should focus on a limited number of significant
items. The U.S. supported the inclusion of some actionable
items, which could enable measurement of progress.

U.S. - EU engagement remains key to progress on non-
proliferation and disarmament issues
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) February 22-23 U.S.-EU Troika discussions on
disarmament and nonproliferation (CODUN/CONOP) began with a
brief assessment of U.S.- European Union (EU) cooperation in
these areas, as well as a review of recent non-proliferation
and disarmament conferences.


3. (SBU) German Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament
Ruediger Luedeking opened discussions by emphasizing the
commonality of values shared by the EU and the U.S. on
nonproliferation and disarmament. These values should be
deepened, but reflect no difference in respective objectives
-- only differences on how to reach the objectives. He added
the EU and U.S. should not be "shy about where we differ."
EU Personal Representative on Nonproliferation of WMD
Annalisa Giannella suggested continued informal contact and
communication on key issues and earlier collaboration and
discussion prior to major conferences.


4. (C) U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament
Christina Rocca noted the important impact that informal
U.S.-EU brainstorming could have on substantive engagement,
especially in international forums. U.S. Deputy Assistant
Sec-retary of State for International Security and
Non-proliferation Andrew Semmel said that attempts should be
made to manage differences in a manner that is not overtly
pubQc. Neither side has a "monopoly on good ideas." EU
insight into respective opinions and positions among the 27
EU member states would be especially beneficial, he added.

Multi-lateral approach
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador Rocca noted a slight difference in the
dynamic of solving problems between the EU and the U.S.
The U.S. wants to confront problems and considers actual
results and tangible outcomes to be most important to the
achievement of non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.
The U.S. sometimes believes that the EU places all its
emphasis on agreed documents.


6. (SBU) Luedeking responded that multilateralism is a key
component of EU strategies. The multilateral treaty system


should ideally operate as the common denominator for all
countries and allow the UN the role of ultimate arbiter of
compliance. Luedeking dubbed this a &norms-based8 approach
to diplomacy. Europeans considered that they needed a legal
basis provided by such a system to provide legitimacy to such
result-oriented activities as the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI). Giannella added that the EU's attachment
to a multilateral treaty system is primary and pervades all
realms of EU undertakings. She noted that every country must
feel it is "in the system" and that the system cannot work
effectively if it is not truly multilateral.


7. (C) Portuguese Ambassador Carlos Frota asked whether the
Six-Party Talks, which were "somewhat multilateral," could be
replicated in other fora. Semmel reminded representatives
that in the case of the DPRK and Iran, negotiations and
strategies were worked through the U.N. Security Council
system.


8. (C) Ambassador Luedeking expressed the importance of an
established legal framework, fortified institutions and
common rules which have norms by which all countries must
abide. In the case of PSI, small arms and ammunition
proliferation in Africa and the recent Chinese anti-satellite
(ASAT) test, multilateral approaches are the only ones that
could truly be effective. Referencing the Chinese ASAT test,
Luedeking stated that we cannot unilaterally prevent
space-based assets. Instead, common rules on how space is
used and how to protect space-based assets are important.


9. (C) On the recent Chinese ASAT test, Ambassador Rocca made
clear that the U.S. would not support development of new
legal regimes to govern space activity. She argued that
appropriate treaties already exist.

U.S. - EU Summit Preparation: U.S. Focus on Action
-------------- --------------


10. (SBU) DAS Semmel led discussion on U.S.-EU Summit
preparation. He raised the following issues as possible
"deliverables" for the April 30 U.S.-EU Summit to be held in
Washington: Proliferation Financing; UNSCR 1540, Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty; U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative; Universalization of the Additional Protocol;
Global Partnership; Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism; Problems of IAEA Funding; Strengthening the NPT;
and Strong statements on Iran and North Korea. He solicited
EU responses and perspectives.

UNSCR 1540


11. (SBU) Semmel asked whether the Summit could be used to
spur UNSCR 1540 implementation.


12. (C) Semmel noted the U.S. considers 1540 implementation a
key priority that must go beyond gathering information and
progress to plugging gaps/implementation. He noted the U.S.
already has in place relevant programs, such as the Export
Control and Border Security program(EXBS),and said that 1540
reporting varies, and assistance in helping certain countries
writing reports is important. He said countries should be
encouraged to ask for assistance. Semmel recommended 1540
implementation be considered an "actionable" item at the
Summit and G8 meetings.


13. (SBU) Giannella said that 1540 is important because it
sets a universal standard for all countries, but the problem
is implementation. The EU, she said, has supported
implementation financially and politically and facilitation
of three regional 1540 seminars in Beijing, Accra and Lima.
This illustrates that the EU attaches a great deal of
importance to implementation.


14. (SBU) Giannella noted it has not been easy to convince
smaller countries that non-existence of a nuclear program in
a country should not lead to a "do nothing" stance. She
noted helping countries to draft reports would be a step
forward. The EU's December 2006 WMD Strategy (update) noted
support for national implementation of 1540 as well as EU
efforts on export controls, which help in 1540
implementation.


15. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said that Germany and Norway
have planned an export controls seminar to be held in New
York City on March 27. Luedeking asked Semmel the U.S. view


on the role of the 1540 Committee, its results to date and
its future. Semmel responded that one difficulty the
Committee has faced is recruitment of qualified experts --
including finding new experts with others' retiring. U.N.
self-imposed requirements for geographic balance hinders and
slows recruitment of qualified panel experts. While the
Committee's expiration is not immediate, the international
community must begin assessing whether the Committee should
be extended. Semmel emphasized the need for the Committee to
develop actual products.


16. (SBU) Ludeking asked whether development of a "Best
Practices Guide" would be helpful. Semmel responded it could
perhaps be helpful if broad enough to cover pertinent issues
for over 190 countries.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Global Initiative
to Combat Terrorism (GI)
-------------- --------------


17. (C) Luedeking and Giannella expressed concern that while
the EU fully endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI),it was never invited to participate &in its own
right8 as a member. The EU is disappointed it has not been
invited to participate in the Global Initiative to Combat
Terrorism (GI) given that it is a supranational body with a
special role to play. They argued that EU member states have
handed over sovereignty in some areas (e.g., EURATOM) to the
EU as an institution and expressed regret that Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Kislyak opposed EU involvement in the GI.


18. (C) Giannella noted the Commission is preparing a paper
on nuclear terrorism and that a stability instrument will be
adopted in June 2007. The instrument will address dual use,
export controls, trans-shipment, illicit trafficking, and
port issues.


19. (C) Giannella indicated the EU is willing to transmit its
relevant competencies and potential added-value consistent
with the principles of GI to the U.S. She stated that this
was done two years ago for PSI, but did not result in U.S.
agreement that the EU be included as a member of PSI. DAS
Semmel was amenable to the EU offer to transmit its
competencies.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
--------------


20. (C) Ambassador Rocca briefed the troika on informal
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) meetings held the week
of February 5 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
She indicated that the new structure will clearly show which
countries are obstructionist. Rocca added that the U.S.
would not agree to a PAROS Ad Hoc Committee, even if the
price was no FMCT.


21. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said he was not sure the
strategy to isolate a particular country would work.
Ambassador Rocca responded that this is the result of the new
structure put in place by the presidents. The real source of
opposition to moving forward on an FMCT is China and
Pakistan, both of whom are linking issues. The US will not
accept linkages. She also urged others to convince India to
support FMCT negotiations, as India has pledged to do as part
of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
-------------- ---


22. (C) Ambassador Luedeking questioned when the U.S. would
ratify all of the CCW protocols, as well as the amendment to
Article One, which extends its jurisdiction to internal
conflicts. Doing so would help in the campaign to get
non-parties to adhere. Alex Liebowitz (Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation) responded that
the Administration had put all the outstanding CCW measures
in the top category of agreements for which it was seeking
Senate advice and consent for ratification.

First Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty 2010 Review Conference
-------------- ---


23. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said that the EU's April 2005
Common Position for the last Review Conference remained


valid. The EU was committed to respecting the basic bargain
contained in the treaty as the review process went forward.
He appreciated the flexibility he had seen in recent
discussions with the U.S. and urged a quick resolution of
procedural issues, along the lines of the approach taken
during the last review process. The West should not be seen
as blocking substantive discussions.


24. (C) DAS Semmel said he was willing to discuss the agenda
issues before the preparatory meeting and said that the U.S.
will emphasize compliance and enforcement and will address
the issue of disarmament confidently and clearly. On the
issue of NPT withdrawal, he added it was important not to
amend Article 10 but to interpret it in a way that there were
known and expected adverse consequences a country would face
if it contemplated withdrawal, in effect, a deterrence to
withdrawal. Semmel also questioned whether the NAM should
always be entitled to the presidency of the review conference
or whether it should rotate among the groups. He also
suggested that one might consider ways of moving forward for
consideration by the plenary those agreements on issues
reached by different Review Conference committees.
Ambassador Luedeking believed the rotation issue was very
delicate.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
--------------


25. (C) Ambassador Luedeking emphasized the EU was firmly
committed to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),and
felt it was particularly important given North Korea's
nuclear tests. He hoped the U.S. would continue to work with
the CTBTO Prepcom and noted the problem of the backlog of
U.S. dues owed to the organization. He cautioned that some
countries lost their right to vote as a result of non-payment
of dues. The EU wants the U.S. to remain involved,
particularly in the International Monitoring System. Rocca
and Semmel made clear that the U.S. position on the CTBT had
not changed and that Senate approval was not in the cards.

International Atomic Energy Agency Committee on Safeguards
and Verification, Preparation of the Board of Governors
-------------- --------------


26. (C) DAS Semmel led by stating that the IAEA,s Committee
on Safeguards and Verification (CSV) was intended to
strengthen inspections and safeguards. However, the
non-aligned had prevented it from reaching agreement on
recommendations from the IAEA Secretariat. The U.S. would
have to reassess its support if the CSV could not agree on
concrete proposals to present to the Board of Governors (BOG)
in June. Ambassador Luedeking said his impressions were the
NAM had "hijacked" the CSV to pursue its own aims. The EU, he
said, was supportive of an orderly "wind down" of the CSV.
EU Council representative Stephan Klement agreed with the
negative interpretation of NAM behavior and said in the event
there was no endorsement of the CSV mandate, it would
automatically expire in June. He added that Egypt and Syria
had not been helpful in the process. DAS Semmel said the
U.S. would look for a way to help until June, but there was
not yet a position on extension of the CSV for another two
years.

Multilateral Nuclear Approaches
--------------


27. (C) DAS Semmel expressed U.S. support for providing
reliable fuel services to countries which choose not to
pursue enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Luedeking
agreed and said the EU is also supportive of fuel supply
assurances but is awaiting the IAEA Report on the subject
expected in June. He said the international community needs
to make a greater effort to inform and convince countries
that the issue is important and would not nullify Article IV
rights in the NPT.


28. (C) DAS Semmel said no surprises were expected in the
IAEA report. He understood, however, that the IAEA is
seeking additional assistance. He added that commercial fuel
supply did not appear to be a problem, but there is a need to
develop a system that puts the IAEA at the core.


29. (C) Luedeking said efforts to convince NAM countries of
the advantages of such a system would be worthwhile. The EU
will make this point at the NPT preparatory committee.


Semmel emphasized the importance of a strong EU statement on
the matter and highlighted again the importance of states
clearly understanding they would not be asked to forfeit
Article IV rights under the NPT.

U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Initiative
--------------


30. (C) EU reps were very interested in where things stood on
the initiative. Luedeking asked specific questions about the
Hyde Act and how the Act's conditions matched with India's
"clear refusal to accept more conditions." He indicated the
EU was informed that Indian Prime Minister Singh is under
pressure domestically and interprets the Act's requirements
as "recommendations" that are non-binding and that should not
be part of a bilateral agreement.


31. (C) DAS Semmel provided a detailed update on the legal
and technical processes and the various steps and procedures
underway or needed to complete the initiative as well as the
legal safeguards included in U.S. law. Luedeking indicated
the EU has no Common Position on the Initiative. All want to
integrate India into the nonproliferation mainstream; they
differ on how to do so. Semmel urged the EU to support the
Initiative and promised to keep the EU fully informed.

Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC)
--------------


32. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said participation in HCOC
meetings was diminishing. He said that Germany would host a
seminar in Vienna on May 30 to focus on implementation
concerns and noted that the EU attaches a particular
importance to confidence-building measures. He said that the
issue of U.S. non-compliance with pre-launch notifications
was a concern. If there were no progress on this issue, we
might see the end of HCOC. He encouraged U.S. participation
at the seminar.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
--------------


33. (SBU) During a brief discussion of this issue, Luedeking
thanked the U.S. for supporting membership by EU states that
were still not MTCR members.

Iran
--------------


34. (C) Luedeking said that, given Iranian lack of
compliance, the EU is ready to go beyond UNSCR 1737, with
further action possibly including travel bans; expanded
coverage of sanctions (to include all items on the Missile
Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Supplier Group lists);
and separate autonomous lists. Luedeking noted that Iran's
Arab neighbors are concerned that they are in a "tougher spot
than Israel" because they have no nuclear deterrent and fear
that Iran will become the dominant regional power.


35. The EU continued to believe negotiations with Iran were
important, Luedeking continued. He said the fact that Iran
was unable to divide the EU-3 (France, Germany, United
Kingdom) plus 3 (China, Russia, U.S.) was important, albeit
surprising to Iran. Iranian President Ahmadinejad was
playing on his public's broad support for a nuclear program.
The EU did not want its position to be portrayed as
contributing to the misery of the Iranian people. It must
remain clear, he added, that EU actions were not meant to
punish the Iranian people.


36. (C) DAS Semmel said there is real concern that Iran may
have acquired the nuclear knowledge, skills and technology to
indigenously develop centrifuges. At stake, Semmel added,
were the reputations and credibility of the UN and the
International tomic Energy Agenc. Semmel suggested that
aditional listings and export credits be considered and
argued that unity and steadfastness are critical. Sanctions
must be multi-lateral, meaningful and represent some "bite."
He concluded by stating that the consequences of a lack of
success with Iran would be monumental.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea
--------------


37. (SBU) In discussions on Six-Party Talks on DPRK, DAS


Semmel characterized the recent Agreement as a "victory for
diplomacy," but noted the U.S. had "been down this road
before," and was, therefore, cautiously optimistic.
Luedeking said the EU remained concerned due to DPRK's
performance in the past and noted that a troika of EU
political directors plans to visit DPRK in early March. The
troika will have broad terms of reference, he said, including
human rights.


38. (C) The EU has internally discussed how it can be
involved in support of a solution given the EU is outside of
the Six-Party framework. The overall sentiment, he said, is
supportive of the Agreement, but there are concerns the EU
has been "left out" of the negotiating process, but will at
some point be asked "to go to the cashier."


39. (C) Semmel responded that the Agreement benefits all EU
countries and the EU, as well as its member states who are
important implementers of UNSCR 1718. The EU troika trip to
Pyongyang should make clear to DPRK representatives that the
EU will strongly implement financial sanctions, be
unequivocal in solidarity with the Six-Party process and
should not lead o "leaks or gaps" in support, Semmel said.


40. (C) A brief discussion on the future of the Korean
Economic Development Organization (KEDO) ensued with
Ambassador Frota asking if there was a possibility that KEDO
might be kept in being, even as a paper organization.
Luedeking indicated there were financial claims outstanding
and that Japan was worried due to loans it had made and the
issue of liability. He understood Japan was considering
financing limited staff support to "wind down" KEDO in an
appropriate manner. The next opportunity for KEDO decisions
to be taken would be at the next Executive Board Meeting
scheduled for March 29. Semmel responded that the U.S. was
not supportive of continuing KEDO.


41. (SBU) Luedeking closed by commenting that the meeting
contributed to a better understanding between the two sides.
It showed the U.S. and EU had the same objectives, even if
sometimes different recipes for moving forward. He urged
that the two sides keep in close touch, especially in light
of the U.S.-EU Summit on April 30.


42. (U) Amb. Rocca and DAS Semmel have cleared on this cable.

MCKINLEY