Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07UNVIEVIENNA778
2007-12-21 16:02:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: UK AND FRANCE LOOK FORWARD, DG TO MEET

Tags:  IAEA KNPP PARM IR 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0778/01 3551602
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 211602Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7324
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0549
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1034
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000778 

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DEPT FOR IO/T, IO/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: IAEA KNPP PARM IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: UK AND FRANCE LOOK FORWARD, DG TO MEET
MILIBAND

REF: DOHA 01195

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d and h

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000778

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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, IO/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: IAEA KNPP PARM IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: UK AND FRANCE LOOK FORWARD, DG TO MEET
MILIBAND

REF: DOHA 01195

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d and h


1. (S) Summary: UK Ambassador Smith discussed DG
ElBaradei's forthcoming trip to London with Ambassador
Schulte December 21. He expected Foreign Secretary Miliband
to underline the central message that international pressure
on Iran must be maintained. The UK was leery of the DG's
possible travel to Tehran in January and of ElBaradei playing
the role of "international savior" rather than that of
"international servant" and his supplanting Solana's
negotiating role on behalf of the P5 1. Smith believed that
the Secretariat should report to the Board prior to March or
provide a technical briefing, but agreed that much would
depend on UNSC action. In a separate meeting December 20,
French Ambassador Deniau suggested, in light of the NIE
findings, a new operative para in the next UNSCR that would
broaden the IAEA's investigative authority on Iran's past
weapons program. Deniau also raised the possibility of a
Board resolution in March after the adoption of a new UNSCR.
End Summary.

--------------
UK Wary of "International Savior"
--------------


2. (S) Ambassador Schulte December 21 reviewed next steps on
Iran with UK Ambassador Smith, and discussed DG ElBaradei's
planned January 7 meeting with Foreign Secretary Miliband as
well as the DG's possible travel to Tehran. Ambassador Smith
reported EU-2 buy-in and active engagement post-NIE. He
welcomed positive signals out of Berlin, but expressed
concern that the message had been diluted in some quarters,
most notably by the German Ambassador in Tehran (who had
served previously in Vienna). Smith had just returned from
an annual non-proliferation conference in Wilton Park and was
encouraged that there was consensus on the need to keep the
pressure on Iran.


3. (S) Ambassador Schulte briefed Smith on his discussions on
the NIE in Qatar (reftel) and with ElBaradei on December 19.
ElBaradei is still focused on the need for a "confession" but
was short on specifics and wobbly on suspension. Smith
agreed with Ambassador Schulte that confession was not just
providing answers to questions posed. On the work plan,

Ambassador Schulte reported that the DG was also no longer
committed to a December 31 deadline and planned to report in
February for the March Board. Depending on the outcome of
the Secretariat's talks with Iran, the DG had told Ambassador
Schulte that he may travel to Tehran to meet with Ayatollah
Khamenei in mid-January after his London trip. The DG also
indicated that he hoped to carry a message from the P5 1.


4. (S) Smith preferred that the DG not travel to Tehran but
saw no way to stop him. Such a trip increased the risk of
ElBaradei once again assuming the mantle of "international
savior" rather than "international servant." He agreed with
Ambassador Schulte that we must keep ElBaradei focused on his
job and mitigate unhelpful political statements. The UK took
particular exception to ElBaradei's post-NIE remark that Iran
had been "vindicated," and would convey that in the DG's
meeting with Miliband. Ambassador Schulte recommended that
the DG be reminded of how the Iranians had exploited his last
trip to Iran in the spring.


5. (S) According to Smith, the Foreign Secretary's central
message to ElBaradei will be the need to maintain
international pressure. The "big picture" remained that we
are in a "highly unsatisfactory" situation and all options
remain on the table. The DG must understand that we cannot
get to a more satisfactory level by letting up pressure on
Iran. The NIE did not make the Iranian threat less imminent,
and the UK agreed the timeline remained the same. Ambassador
Schulte did not expect a confession from Iran, and EU
diplomats in Tehran also did not believe the regime was ready
to negotiate (ref a). For Smith, what mattered was a
confession at the "macro-level" and an unequivocal decision
not to pursue a weapons' program. Such a decision, like that
made by the DPRK or Libya, was more difficult now, he opined.
The Iranians were not convinced, were not ready to come
clean, and were inclined to keep their options open; in this
context, it made sense to keep the pressure on. Smith was
unsure how he would recommend the Foreign Secretary address
the need for suspension with ElBaradei. ElBaradei was
"infuriatingly inconstant" on the issue, and it may be more
useful to revert him to his technical role, i.e. leaving the
Agency out of the debate on suspension. He acknowledged,


however, that ElBaradei's support for UNSCRs on suspension in
his last report was useful.


6. (S) Ambassador Schulte cautioned that ElBaradei would look
to Miliband for a message to carry to Tehran, perhaps some
type of amnesty he could offer in exchange for confession.
Smith observed that ElBaradei should not usurp Solana's role
and doubted there would be any "rabbits out of the hat",
sweeteners or tangible inducements Miliband could suggest to
ElBaradei. Ambassador Schulte suggested that it might be
useful to have the Secretary and Miliband speak in advance of
the UK meeting with ElBaradei, and for our governments to
formally demarche ElBaradei before any trip to Tehran.

--------------
Next Report to the Board
--------------


7. (C) Regarding next steps in the Board, Smith was not
inclined to allow the Secretariat to sit on its hands until
March, and felt that the Board was owed an update on the
Secretariat's dealings with Tehran. Ambassador Schulte noted

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the possibility of piggy-backing on a Special Board meeting
on India, if one is held in January; asking for a DG report
absent a Board meeting (to which the Secretariat could
object); or requesting a technical briefing from the
Secretariat. Smith observed that a technical briefing could

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keep the Secretariat from further backtracking on the work
plan deadline. He agreed with Ambassador Schulte that much
also depends on UNSC action in January. If a UNSCR were
adopted prior to the March Board, there may be an opportunity
to consider the French proposal for a Board resolution.

--------------
France: Moving Forward in the UNSC
--------------


8. (S) Ambassador Schulte also met with French Ambassador
Deniau on December 19 to discuss the way forward on Iran, to
provide a readout of his trip to the Gulf (ref b),and review
discussions with ElBaradei on the Iran NIE. Deniau agreed
that we should not accept further "delay" in the year-end
work plan deadline but was not sure we had a choice.
France's position remained unchanged post-NIE. If the NIE is
"true," he observed, it created real concerns that Iran had a
nuclear weapons program without the IAEA's knowledge, and we
must now verify that those activities no longer exist.
Deniau advised we use the new situation created by the NIE to
press the IAEA to uncover the pre-2003 weapons program. He
proposed that the next UNSCR include an operative Para
broadening the IAEA's mandate to conduct a thorough
investigation. Asked by Ambassador Schulte about the
likelihood that Russia and China would agree, Deniau
suggested that this language be "wrapped into" something
else, such as calls for greater cooperation and
implementation of the Additional Protocol and Code 3.1. He
noted that South Africa and Indonesia may pose the greatest
obstacles in the Security Council. He agreed that it was
important to get a third UNSCR soon in order to show Iran
that the Security Council still is engaged and to repeat the
requirement for suspension. Deniau also said we should not
rule out the idea of a Board resolution in March, especially
if the DG's February report is negative. He noted that we now
have a good Board and should take advantage of it.


9. (C) Deniau reported that the DG is now expected to go to
Paris sometime in February to meet FM Kouchner.
SCHULTE