Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07UNVIEVIENNA742
2007-12-07 13:56:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: LIKE-MINDED AMBASSADORS REGROUP POST-NIE

Tags:  IAEA AORC PARM KNPP IR 
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DE RUEHUNV #0742/01 3411356
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071356Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7259
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0543
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0489
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0450
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0464
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1025
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000742 

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DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: IAEA AORC PARM KNPP IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: LIKE-MINDED AMBASSADORS REGROUP POST-NIE

REF: A) STATE 162558 B) UNVIE 734 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons
1.4 b, d and h

Summary
-------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000742

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DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: IAEA AORC PARM KNPP IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: LIKE-MINDED AMBASSADORS REGROUP POST-NIE

REF: A) STATE 162558 B) UNVIE 734 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons
1.4 b, d and h

Summary
--------------


1. (S) In the aftermath of the Iran NIE our priority in
Vienna has been to maintain IAEA and Board member government
pressure for full disclosure of Iran's past activities and
compliance with UNSC requirements. Like-minded Ambassadors
shared concerns about the NIE and next steps on Iran in a
December 6 strategy session. Ambassador Schulte underlined
that the NIE findings reinforce the lack of confidence in
Iran's nuclear program. The UK and France downplayed the
significance of the NIE but Japan expressed concern that we
not underestimate its impact on the Secretariat, the NAM and
Iran. Like-minded Ambassadors shared concerns about the
Secretariat's methodology on the work plan, the lack of

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transparency, adherence to deadlines and possible
equivocation in reporting to the Board in January. At the
same time, they agreed that the work plan should not be given
overarching importance as it is only a small part of the
larger issue of confidence; that a "confession" about the
past is insufficient and that Iran needs to make a strategic
decision to abandon any nuclear weapons option. As to next
steps in the UNSC, the French favored quick adoption of a new
UNSCR, and Japan reported the DG's opposition to a Security
Council resolution. Like-minded Ambassadors were uneasy
about the prospect of the DG's trip to Tehran and complained
about his public statements that they felt could undermine
the safeguards system. End summary
--------------
Comment
--------------


2. (S) While the NIE has taken some wind out of our sails in
Vienna, we plan to refocus the Vienna diplomatic community
and the IAEA on the finding of "high confidence" that there
was a nuclear weapon program in Iran up until 2003. This
coincides with the inspectors' upcoming (week of December 10)
trip to Tehran to hopefully receive Iran's answers to
questions regarding "contamination," the Gachin mine,
polonium 210, and, most importantly, the alleged studies.

While we have little expectation that Iran will admit the
military dimension of all those items, we need to ensure that
the DG does not close these issues or even declare that
Iran's information is "not inconsistent with" the Agency's
findings as he has with the plutonium and centrifuge issues.
Then we would be at odds not only with Iran, but with the DG
and his many supporters.


3. (S) We and our close allies in Vienna will continue to
insist that the IAEA's credibility is at stake, even more so
now that the findings of the NIE have been made public. Iran
still has no credibility regarding the history and original
purposes of its nuclear program. Until those are fully
disclosed there can be no confidence in its current program
-- Iran will remain in non-compliance with its safeguards
obligations and the confidence building measure of suspension
of proliferation sensitive activities will still be required
to overcome the "confidence deficit." Only with full
disclosure and adherence to the Additional Protocol will the
Secretariat be able to conclude, to the satisfaction of the

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Board, that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for
peaceful purposes. Until then, the questions about Iran's
program which arose and caused the Board to report Iran's
file to the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, remain unresolved.

Recommendation
--------------


4. (C) Mission recommends a demarche to Board members
focusing them on the NIE finding of the original military
purposes of Iran's program, and calling on members to insist
on full disclosure from Iran as the only way to begin to
resolve the impasse. We will continue reminding the IAEA
leadership of the DG's announced intention to have the work
plan largely resolved by year end, and the risk to the IAEA's
credibility if it allows Iran now to waffle on its work plan
obligations.

Impact of the NIE
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador Schulte hosted a meeting of like-minded
counterparts, EU-3 plus Australia, Canada and Japan December
6 to discuss the implications of the NIE and next steps on
Iran. Ambassador Schulte dispelled rumors that the timing of
the release had been politically motivated, and clarified
that the process was driven by intelligence and a
Congressional mandate. Mission highlighted certain
judgments: less confidence since mid-2007 that Iran had not
restarted its nuclear weapons program, which also coincided
with the Agency's diminishing knowledge of Iran's current
activities; Iran's continued development of dual-use
technologies while keeping open the option of a nuclear
weapons program; the timeline for Iran to produce sufficient
fissile material for a weapon had not changed since the 2005
NIE; and the fact that the 2003 halt as well as suspension of
enrichment and implementation of the AP at that juncture were
the result of concerted international pressure.


6. (C) UK and French Ambassadors downplayed the significance
of the NIE, but Japan was more circumspect. UK Ambassador
Smith observed that the NIE changed nothing on fundamental
questions, such as the lack of confidence and any economic
rationale for Iran's enrichment program. Ambassador Schulte
agreed that the NIE's findings reinforce this fundamental
lack of confidence. In France's view, the NIE's focus on
Iran's intentions as opposed to facts is misplaced. French
Ambassador Deniau underlined the fact that Iran had a covert
program; that enrichment had no economic rationale and that
Iran had consistently developed dual-use aspects of the fuel
cycle. He highlighted the first key judgment in the NIE
confirming that Iran had a military program as an important
new element. Deniau disagreed with the Estimate's definition
of a nuclear weapons program limited to covert activities
since dual-use technology could be so applied. German
Ambassador Gottwald also noted the NIE's assessment of Iran's
continuing to develop dual-use technology.


7. (C) Japanese Ambassador Amano cautioned that the NIE's
negative impact and willful misinterpretation by the
Secretariat and the NAM should not be underestimated. There

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is a tendency to see the U.S. administration as divided and
to focus on the assessment that Iran does not now have a
nuclear weapons program. DCM reported that the Secretariat
is also concerned the NIE accentuated the sense of
triumphalism in Iran and called in the Iranian Ambassador to
reiterate the end 2007 deadline for the work plan.

Secretariat Not Playing Ball

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8. (C) The IAEA's November correspondence with Iran on P1/2
issues and the U-metal document, the former of which the IAEA
"removed from the list of outstanding issues," caused
consternation among like-minded Ambassadors. Nuclear
Counselor noted that while the IAEA cast the letters as a
bureaucratic step necessitated by the sequential nature of
the work plan, Iran had used them to declare the issues
"closed." Smith was "singularly unimpressed" by the
Secretariat's handling of the letters, and took issue with

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the use of language that differed from that used by the DG in
reporting to the Board. He understood that the letters were
not intended to be categorical and DDG Heinonen had told him
that he could revert to P1/P2 issues in dealing with the
uranium contamination issue. Deniau observed that the
Secretariat's behavior demonstrated a lack of transparency

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and institutional difficulty; when asked for the letters, the
Secretariat had claimed they were confidential and no

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different from the DG's report, only to have Jalili spring
them on Solana in their November 30 meeting. (Note: The EU-3
will demarche the DG separately regarding the incident with
Solana, and Ambassador Schulte has already raised the issue
(ref b). End note).


9. (C) For the French, P1/P2 remained an outstanding issue.
French DCM Gross questioned the Secretariat's methodology,
and its apparent lowering of standards in the context of the
work plan. He noted that Iran had not answered all the
questions and had not provided access to a single individual
outside AEOI, nor to archives or facilities despite the
numerous references to military and other agency involvement
in nuclear activities. Gross worried that once it confronted
Iran with intelligence regarding the alleged studies, the
Secretariat would accept Iran's responses without requiring

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follow-up. He underlined that the Board must give an
independent judgment of the work plan. Nuclear Counselor
also expressed concern that the Secretariat could deal with
the remaining outstanding issues in the same way as it had
plutonium and P1/P2 issues, and simply declare Iran's
non-answers to be "consistent."


10. (C) UK Msnoff noted that it was unclear whether or not
the Secretariat would report to the Board in January.
Heinonen had said that he expected Iran to address
contamination issues, alleged studies and the AP before
Christmas. If not, the DG would report in January. If the
Secretariat was satisfied, however, there might not be a

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report. The UK understood that the Secretariat was using the
prospect of a report as leverage on Iran, but was still
uneasy about this equivocating and leaving the decision to
the Secretariat. Japanese Ambassador Amano observed that
Heinonen's technical briefing prior to the November Board had
been extremely frank and useful on points such as the fact
that items related to the 1993 offer had originally been
ordered by Libya and were diverted to Iran instead. He
suggested that the Secretariat distribute Heinonen's power
point presentation and follow up with another briefing.
(Note: The Secretariat refused Msnoff's request for a copy of
this presentation, which we have reported in detail via
email. End note.)

Confession is Not Enough
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador Schulte recounted that when he informed
the DG about the NIE, he had emphasized the importance of the
work plan and pushing Iran for a "confession." Gottwald
observed that we cannot leave any impression that the NIE
lessened the relevance of the work plan and must continue to
demand clear answers. At the same time, confidence cannot be
rebuilt absent the AP and the re-establishment of a robust
verification regime. He underlined the need to remain united
and not give Iran any absolution.


12. (C) Ambassador Smith was lukewarm about a "confession"
from Iran. A confession would only address the past, not the
future and would also require some "penance" from Iran to
redress fundamental concerns about its nuclear program, he
argued. Amano noted that we should not be satisfied with a
"confession" about the past when what was needed was a
strategic decision from Iran. Smith observed that we must
strike a fine balance between adherence to the deadline for
completion of the work plan, and giving the impression that
the work plan is all important. The work plan is only a
small, necessary but insufficient part of building
confidence, he noted. Ambassador Schulte agreed that even
as we press the Secretariat to maintain deadlines and
standards, the work plan is still only one element; current
programs must be addressed through implementation of the AP
and Code 3.1. Australian Ambassador Shannon was likewise
concerned that the work plan had come to dominate the
international debate, and that we must move beyond the
history, which created the lack of trust and confidence, and
focus on the present. He underlined that Iran's violation of
its Chapter VII obligations jeopardized the UN Charter.

Next Steps in the UNSC
--------------


13. (S) Deniau relayed Solana's oral report to P5 1 PolDirs
that the Jalili meeting produced "even less" progress "if
that is possible," than his October meeting with Iranian
negotiators. In Paris December 1 PolDirs discussed new
resolution elements and the French are poised to move quickly
on a UNSCR, based on agreed (if weaker) elements, to reassert
Security Council requirements. The Security Council could
also require a report from DG ElBaradei on completion of the
work plan.


14. (S) Amano reported that the DG opposed a new UNSCR. In a
November 19 discussion, ElBaradei had told Amano that the
Secretariat was convinced Iran would discontinue any

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cooperation on the work plan, if the Security Council adopted
a new resolution. Rather than moving forward in the Security
Council, Amano expected the Secretariat to plead for more
time on the work plan. The DG had said it would take four to
five weeks but there is no firm deadline and this is, as
ever, a moving target.
Reining in the DG
--------------


15. (S) Ambassador Schulte reported that the DG is planning
on going to Tehran in the new year. Like-minded Ambassadors
agreed with Amano's assessment that such a visit is
inherently "very risky." Australian Ambassador Shannon noted
the DG's tendency to speak "loosely" even if the PR is
carefully crafted. Shannon and Canadian Ambassador
Gervais-Vidricaire also took issue with the triumphalist tone
of the DG's press statements on the NIE, particularly the
use of the term "vindication" in his December 5 press
conference. Such rhetoric created unrealistic expectations
about the capacity of the safeguards system, and Shannon
believed we need to "come down hard" on the DG.
SCHULTE