IAEA/IRAN: EXPLAINING THE NIE TO KEY BOARD MEMBERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000738

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: IAEA KNPP PARM AORC IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: EXPLAINING THE NIE TO KEY BOARD MEMBERS

REF: STATE 162558

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4, b,c and h

Summary
--------------


1. (C) South African Governor Abdul Minty told Ambassador
Schulte that the NIE is an opportunity for P5 1 negotiations
and offered President Mbeki as an intermediary with Iran.
Separately, Nuclear Counselor briefed key Board members,
including P5 1 DCMs/Counselors, on the implications of the
NIE, per reftel, and the need for continuing pressure on Iran
along the dual track strategy. UK, France and Canada were
supportive of staying the course on Iran, and agreed that the
NIE findings reinforced the continued lack of confidence in
Iran's nuclear program. Other Board members questioned the
nature and timing of the underlying intelligence. End
Summary.

South Africa Sees an Opportunity
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Schulte met December 5 with South African
Governor Abdul Minty to discuss the NIE assessments.
Ambassador Schulte argued that the NIE reinforces the need
for suspension and moving forward in the UNSC. Minty saw the
NIE as an opportunity to convince Iran to come clean on the
past and accept a more intrusive verification regime for
current programs. He recommended that the UNSC give Iran
"more space" by paring back sanctions and welcoming progress
on the work plan to reinforce the DG's efforts on outstanding
issues and implementation of the AP. He suggested that the
UNSC request the DG to provide a new report in February. To
restart negotiations, Minty recommended that the June 2006
P5 1 offer be made more specific to encourage Iran to accept
a temporary suspension of enrichment activities. He offered
South African President Mbeki to serve as an intermediary
with the Iranian Supreme Leader. Minty is going to London
where he will likely share these thoughts with the FCO
PolDir.

Key Board Members Listen Carefully
--------------


3. (C) Separately, Mission relayed reftel points to all Board
members December 4 and briefed DCMs/Counselors from key
countries: P5 1, Portugal (EU President),Canada, Australia,
Japan, India, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, South Korea and
South Africa. Nuclear Counselor and Msnoffs presented key
NIE judgments that underlined the continued lack of
confidence in Iran's nuclear program and the need to maintain
pressure on Iran along the dual-track strategy. France and
the UK made helpful interventions along the same lines.
France made clear that it would continue to press for a third
sanctions resolution in the UNSC. France called the
heightened confidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program
prior to 2003 "worrisome," noting that this would put Iran in
the same category as other NPT violators like Libya and the
DPRK. He called on the group to remember a number of
"facts," such as the history of clandestine nuclear
activities, the development of an enrichment program which is
inherently dual-use but has no economic rationale, and the
fact that the IAEA is not in a position to give assurances as
to the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Suspension
remained critical until the IAEA can provide such assurance,
he concluded.


4. (C) The UK downplayed the importance of the NIE, noting
that "nothing has changed." A clandestine nuclear weapons
program would have been in contravention of Iran's NPT
obligations, and the lack of confidence in Iran's program
remained the critical issue. If Iran admits to having had a
past nuclear weapons program, then the IAEA will need to
verify its declarations. Without greater confidence that its
program is entirely peaceful in nature, Iran should not have
a program which could be used for military purposes. The NIE
findings therefore should not change UK policy.


5. (C) Canada was also helpful, pointing out that the
conclusions in the Estimate reinforce the need for the IAEA
to resolve outstanding issues and for Iran to implement
additional transparency measures. Canada noted the potential
for Iran to still pursue a weapon capability.


6. (C) The German DCM inquired whether the Estimate extended
the timeline on uranium enrichment, giving us more time for
diplomacy. Nuclear Counselor noted that the timeline in
which the intelligence community assesses Iran could have one
weapon's worth of HEU is the same as in the last estimate.
He pointed out that the more important timeline is that in
which Iran develops the technology and know-how to enrich
uranium: that process needs to be stopped as soon as
possible. He said this leads the US to conclude that
pressure on Iran needs to be increased.


7. (C) A number of states asked for clarifications of
specific judgments that were unanswerable from the guidance.
South Korea asked about the nature of the new evidence that
had led the IC to the conclusion that Iran had halted its
clandestine program in 2003. Several countries queried
whether anything had changed in mid-2007 to account for the
only "moderate" degree of confidence that Iran had not
restarted its program. Mission referred states to the NSC
Hadley press conference for some additional details on how
the intelligence unfolded.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) While our closest allies strongly supported us,
Russia, China, India, Mexico, Argentina and others were in
listening mode and did not offer comments or ask questions.
They took on board the elucidation of the Key Judgments
leading to the conclusion that diplomatic pressure on Iran
must continue and increase. None argued when Nuclear
Counselor said it would be hard to conceive of the IAEA
closing the remaining outstanding verification questions
without a "confession" from Iran. Mission will continue to
explain to Vienna Missions that the NIE judgments, while
encouraging, do not, in any sense, mean the Iran file is
closed or that the IAEA Board Members can relax their
vigilance. We will need to be prepared, however, with
forceful arguments here and in capitals that rebut the
Iranian claim that the NIE clears the way for Iran's file to
move back to Vienna from the Security Council. We will also
need to assuage close allies who, as the South Korean
Ambassador told us, were "deeply embarrassed" by the sudden
change in our assessment.
SCHULTE