IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 DIVERGE AS RUSSIA AND CHINA SEE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000705

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017
TAGS: KNPP IAEA AORC IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 DIVERGE AS RUSSIA AND CHINA SEE
POSITIVE MOMENTUM

REF: UNVIE 694 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b, d, h


1. (S) Summary: P5 1 Ambassadors could not come to agreement
in a November 20 meeting on any common approach in the
November Board on Iran. The EU3 and the U.S. downplayed the
work plan as a tool and focused concerns on the Agency's
diminishing knowledge of the current Iranian nuclear program
and the concomitant increase in Iran's enrichment capacity.
Russia and China underlined the work plan's "positive
momentum", though they acknowledged that Iran should suspend
enrichment and implement the AP, as the DG report had urged.
In China's view, Iran had provided "sufficient" cooperation
to the Agency and P1 and P2 issues were basically solved.
Tang further questioned the urgency for another UNSCR and the
sincerity of U.S. diplomatic efforts in a separate meeting
with Ambassador Schulte. China and Russia also did not
support any Board resolution at this time, and declined to
consider a joint P5 1 press statement. End Summary.

Glass Half-Empty
--------------


2. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald invited P5 1 Ambassadors to
share their assessment of the DG's report on Iran. He
commented on the desirability of returning to a consensus
Board resolution but acknowledged that this was not
realistic, though French Ambassador Deniau still did not rule
out the possibility. He noted the EU and EU-3 statements
were not yet completed. Gottwald believed the Board should
reconfirm its decisions urging Iran to take decisive steps.
He underlined that the work plan was only one step and only
part if the overall issue.


3. (C) UK Ambassador Smith agreed with this assessment and
noted that the September Board had made the work plan too
much of the issue. The key question was not our satisfaction
with the work of the Secretariat but with Iran's cooperation.
He acknowledged that the work plan had brought one or two
new elements to light and that Iran had provided some
information and access, but cooperation remained grudging and
unsatisfactory. Given the modest results, work plan
implementation was far from positive. Smith also underlined
the DG's conclusion that knowledge of Iran's nuclear program
was diminishing. He too remained open to a resolution but
energetically so.


4. (C) Ambassador Schulte highlighted the DG report's
assessments that the Secretariat was not in a position to
draw conclusions as to the original nature and scope of the
Iranian nuclear program; that Iran had provided reactive
rather than proactive cooperation not having made a strategic
decision to change its relations with the IAEA; and that
knowledge of the current nuclear program had diminished, even
if some light was shed on the 1980s and 1990s. He also cited
the fact that since the last DG report in August, Iran had
increased the number of centrifuges by 50% to 3000 and was
feeding 80% more uranium hexafluoride. All in all, Schulte
concluded, this was not a positive report, and the Board
should recall its past decisions on suspension and the need
for full cooperation. He noted that for the first time, the
DG urged Iran to implement the AP and confidence building
measures, including suspension.



5. (C) French Ambassador Deniau argued that the dual track
was effective because international pressure was working to
an extent. He underlined the fact that the work plan was
only a tool, and only "part of a part" of the problem, and
that we should not lose sight of the big picture, including
suspension, and implementation of the AP and Code 3.1. to
assess present and future issues. In a nutshell, the report
demonstrated that enrichment had increased while the Agency's
knowledge had diminished. The work plan had not been much of
a success. Only the plutonium issue had been closed, and
despite the DG's expectations in September, no other
questions had been closed/resolved. Deniau argued that the
process cannot be allowed to drag on but must be brought to a
conclusion sooner rather than later. Ambassador Schulte
agreed that the work plan was a tool, which Iran had
unfortunately used to negotiate and limit its cooperation
with the IAEA. Iran had failed the DG's litmus test, and had
not met the DG or the Board's demands. The dual track could
only be effective, Ambassador Schulte noted, if fully
implemented. In that regard, a third UNSCR was long overdue
even as the IAEA process continues. The 60-day timeframe
envisioned in UNSCR 1747 had expired in May.

Glass Half Full

--------------


6. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky recalled how eager the
Board had been to extract something positive from Iran last
February-March. He assessed important positive momentum in
the implementation of the work plan, despite some weak
points, and noted the Iran was following up on its
commitments ahead of schedule. At the same time, Russia
shared the DG's view on the need for implementation of the AP
and confidence building measures. Zmeyevsky concluded that
we should encourage positive momentum on the work plan, while
sending a "clear signal" on Iran's other obligations. He
continued to favor an incremental approach. Russia agreed
that this was not the best time for a Board resolution, which
could "wreck havoc" on any Vienna consensus.


7. (C) Chinese Ambassador Tang was even more forward leaning
in his assessment of the "positive progress" on work plan
implementation. He observed that Iran had provided
"sufficient" cooperation to the Agency and that P1 and P2
issues were basically solved. Iran's cooperation was
sincere, in China's view, though not enough. Tang agreed
with the Russian stance on sustaining the positive momentum
and allowing the Agency to finish the work plan. China also
shared concerns in the DG report that Iran had not suspended
enrichment and construction of Arak. In response to Board
and UNSC demands, Iran should show some flexibility on
suspension, he noted. At the same time, Tang cautioned,
"other parties" must create favorable conditions for
cooperation and take no actions to escalate the standoff.
China continued to support the dual track approach, and saw
the results of the work plan as effective. China also did
not support a Board resolution at this time.


8. (S) Tang had provided Ambassador Schulte much the same
assessment in a November 19 meeting. He stressed that China
sought a diplomatic, not a military solution, and cautioned
that if the United States denies progress by Iran and the
IAEA, to a certain extent this denies the U.S.'s diplomatic
efforts. Tang acknowledged the need for diplomatic pressure
on two fronts, in Vienna and in the Solana-Iran talks.
Ambassador Schulte assured him of our support for a
diplomatic solution, explaining that the United States viewed
sanctions as a "third front" to pressure Iran to abandon its
nuclear aspirations. Tang questioned whether the sense of
urgency for a third UNSCR was warranted given, he claimed,
U.S. intelligence estimates that it would take Iran ten years
to produce sufficient material for a nuclear weapon. He also
noted that the P5 1 Ministers agreed not to proceed with a
resolution until both the DG and Solana's reports were
issued. Tang assured the Ambassador that China had always
worked to enforce UNSCRs, and emphasized our common
objective. China's position was that Iran should 1)
cooperate fully with the IAEA and make substantial progress;
2) show flexibility on suspension of uranium enrichment and
give serious consideration of freeze proposals; and 3)
conduct negotiations with EU as soon as possible to solve the
uranium enrichment issue.

Room for Common Ground?
--------------


9. (C) Gottwald observed several common points among P5 1
members, including the fact that that progress had not been
sufficient; that the work plan should not be the sole focus;
and that Iran must respond to Board and UNSC demands and
implement the AP, failure of which had led to the Agency's
diminishing knowledge. By underlining common principles, the
P5 1 could press Iran to negotiate. He cited Ahmadinejad's
recent flip-flop on the Saudi proposal as proof that Iranian
positions were fluid, and noted that the June 2006 offer was
not well know in Iran. Gottwald expressed some optimism
that, if so motivated, Iran could provide additional pieces
of the work plan "puzzle" in the next few weeks. The P5 1
must send the right message to induce cooperation on both of
the dual tracks. The New York process is also indispensable,
he said, arguing that Iran should be prepared to shut down
Natanz and "hand over the keys to the Swiss" now it has made
its point on enrichment.


10. (C) Deniau suggested a common statement on fundamentals
or a press statement, as an expression of unity among the
P5 1 Missions. Gottwald believed that a common denominator
existed and supported such an effort to mark a common sense
of purpose in Vienna. Russia was reluctant and China argued
that Missions should rely on the September P5 1 Ministers
statement, which Gottwald assured continued to be the
guideline. The UK cautioned that a P5 1 statement could not
set too low a common denominator and must de minimus convey
shared dissatisfaction with Iran's non-compliance with Board

and UNSC resolutions and concern over the Agency's
diminishing knowledge, points which he believed should also
be reflected in national statements to the Board. Upon
hearing this, Zmeyevsky doubted that a common statement could
be agreed upon, given "nuances" regarding positive and
negative aspects. Russia clearly intended to emphasize the
positive. The DG's report, he concluded, would have to serve
as the common denominato
r.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) We expect that P5 1 national statements in the Board
will underline core principles, in particular, the DG's
urging that Iran implement the AP and confidence building
measures in compliance with UNSC resolutions. However,
Russia and China will clearly give the DG's report a positive
spin in the hopes of delaying immediate UNSC action.
SCHULTE