IAEA/IRAN: RUSSIA AND CHINA SEE NO POINT TO VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000673

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR IO, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: KNPP IAEA AORC IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: RUSSIA AND CHINA SEE NO POINT TO VIENNA
P5+1 CONSULTATIONS

REF: A) STATE 151038 B) UNVIE 653 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charged'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b,d,h

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Summary
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1. (C) At a UK-hosted P5 1 Heads of Mission(HOM) meeting
November 5, UK Ambassador Smith sought to engage Russia and
China on next steps on Iran following the November 2 London
Poldirs' meeting. Russian and Chinese Ambassadors made it
clear that they intended to do nothing prior to the release
of the DG's new report on Iran, anticipated for November 15.
They were singularly uninterested in developing questions or
criteria ahead of the report, or in considering elements for
a French-proposed Board resolution, and saw no point to
meeting even at the experts-level prior to the report. The
U.S. shared ref a points and argued for a common approach to
the Secretariat/DG that would set a high standard for Iranian
cooperation. Given the lack of P5 1 agreement, France and
the UK intended to present their questions/criteria
bilaterally by Friday November 9. Offline, Mission also
informally shared possible BoG resolution elements with the
French but cautioned against setting a new deadline that
undercuts the P5 2 Ministerial declaration. The French
suggested that the EU-3 would take the lead in drafting a
resolution. End Summary.

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Russians and Chinese Await Report
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2. (C) UK Ambassador Smith called the P5 1 together to follow
up on Poldirs London meeting, focusing on two issues:
questions Iran should reasonably be expected to answer within
the framework of the November DG report, and second, possible
Board action in November. Smith distributed UK questions
(ref b),also circulated at the Poldirs' meeting, and noted
that the UK was not seeking line-by-line agreement (Note:
Russian and Chinese Ambassadors claimed they had not
previously seen the UK questions. End note.) He clarified
that the questions were intended, in the first instance, as
an informal means of assessing a "positive outcome," and
reminded HOMs that Poldirs/Ministers would look to
Vienna-based Missions for such an assessment. Smith asked
for views as to how they could best be communicated to the
Secretariat in advance of the Board. Because the next

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scheduled Board meeting after November 22 is not until March,
Smith also requested views on a Board resolution to require
another DG report in the intervening months.


3. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald remarked that the main
question is not historical but one of ongoing military intent
and relevance today. Certain gaps may be left to historians,
he claimed, and emphasized the need for practical criteria.
French Ambassador Deniau underlined that assessment of the
success or failure of the work plan cannot be based on
"atmospherics", a point the UK echoed, but on precise answers
to specific questions.


4. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky esponded by defending
the DG's prerogatives and argued that it was not the P5 1's
duty to impose on him, that he should be trusted, and that
Member States should pass to him any relevant information.
The DG wa not in a position to respond to questions or
criteria that were outside his mandate or Board decisions of
which he was well aware. Zmeyevsky called for patience and
insisted on awaiting the DG report before passing judgment.
Chinese Ambassador Tang associated himself with Russian
comments and touted the professionalism of the Secretariat,
arguing we should wait for the DG report, lest we give the
wrong impression. The Secretariat already has criteria, he
noted. China also preferred bilateral channels for any
communications with the Agency.

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We Cannot Sit on Our Hands
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5. (C) U.S. Charge assured the group of continued U.S.
support to the Secretariat and noted U/S Burns' comments to
the press following his November 1 meeting with DG ElBaradei
(septel). At the same time, the U.S. sought to encourage a
common understanding of the need for full disclosure by Iran.
Charge shared ref a points on criteria for the November
report, which he noted were not exhaustive, but are based on
previous DG reports and geared toward asking the right
questions of Iran. Regarding Russian concerns about taking a
stance before the DG's report, Charge emphasized that the

P5 1 could not allow Ahmadinejad's repeated claims about the
nuclear file being "closed" to go unchallenged.


6. (C) Smith agreed that the technical competence of the
Secretariat was not in question, that the intent was not to

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provide the Secretariat a "script," and that we could not
"sit on our hands" until the report is issued. The IAEA's
questions had been unanswered for years, he noted, and if
they remain so, we cannot conclude that the work plan remains
on track or assess "positive outcome." He reminded his
Russian and Chinese counterparts that the DG is at service of
the Board, which can provide formal or informal direction.
Deniau also countered the notion that asking questions was an
imposition on the Secretariat.

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Consideration of Resolution Contingent on Report
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7. (C) Deniau argued that the work plan could not be allowed
to drag on for months, and that a Board resolution would be
the best way to clarify the way forward. The DG preferred to
take instruction from the Board rather than individual
members, he noted. Zmeyevsky could not envisage a resolution
without first having seen the DG's report as to whether or
not progress had been achieved. Once we see the report, he
claimed, we can determine whether or not we are satisfied,
discuss further steps and try to find a common denominator.
He shared the view that any resolution should aim to
consolidate Board consensus. At this point, however, there
were too many unknowns to engage on resolution elements.
Zmeyevsky also did not exclude a last minute "surprise" from
Tehran. Moscow's assessment was that the Iranians understood
the seriousness of the situation but "nothing more" and would
try to find a compromise without detriment to their core
positions. China agreed with Russia on the need to see and
evaluate the DG's report, and claimed that we still have
time. Tang saw the content of any resolution as contingent
on the DG report.


8. (C) Gottwald saw the need to prepare for various
alternatives, and for the most likely scenario of a report
citing some progress but not enough. A resolution backed by
the P5 1 and the entire Board would stipulate what remains to
be done and set expectations for the future, he suggested.
Such a resolution would also help the self-perception of the
Board which maintains an important role on this dossier. The
UK agreed that any resolution must command consensus. Smith
advised that work on resolution elements, leaving
placeholders for issues covered in the report, be prepared in
advance given the short time frame between the release of the
report and the Board meeting. A resolution could reaffirm
unanimous Board decisions, including on suspension, and
reinforce deadlines for answers to specific questions by a
particular date, he noted. The Board could require a DG
report on these issues in the intervening months before the
regular Board meeting in March.


9. (C) Charge said he did not have cleared instructions but
one key element for a resolution would be to specify the
conditions under which the Board would return the Iranian
file to "routine" safeguards implementation. Germany and the
UK agreed that implicitly or explicitly a resolution would
refute Ahmadinejad's comments on the closure of the Iranian
file. Charge cautioned that that any Board action in Vienna
must be consistent with the September P5 2 statement, which
already sets a November deadline that is also reflected in
the work plan. Zmeyevsky argued that the P5 2 statement did
not set a deadline for Vienna, and that the Agency maintains
some flexibility. He clarified that he too was uninstructed,
and that certain issues were for New York not Vienna. In any
case, Russia would await the DG's report and base its
position on the concrete facts and assessments by the
Secretariat.

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10. (C) Deniau acknowledged that the P5 1 were not in a
position to pre-judge the DG's report but highlighted three
advantages to a Board resolution: first, it would demonstrate
that IAEA institutions were working and thus be helpful to
the Secretariat; second, it would build on previous Board
consensus; and lastly it would provide an assessment of the
report and future implementation of the work plan (a
placeholder until the report is released). The UK saw a case
for a resolution regardless of what the report says, and
Germany cited a need to reaffirm the role of the IAEA.

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No to Expert Level Consultations
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11. (C) The UK suggested P5 1 expert-level consultations by
the end of the week to consider questions/criteria and
resolution elements. Russia saw no point to such
consultations before the report, and China said it would not
have instructions in advance of the report. Smith tried to
argue, to no avail, that we were missing an opportunity by
doing nothing; that the report's content was not a mystery;
and that P5 1 Ministers would be looking to Vienna Missions
for a timely assessment.

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Next Steps
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12. (C) Following the meeting, the UK and France advised that
they would proceed on a bilateral basis to present questions
individually to the Secretariat by week's end. Deniau
suggested that based on past precedent, the EU-3 will take
the lead on drafting a possible Board resolution. We shared
some informal elements with the French offline and explained
our reservations about setting any additional deadlines. The
French agreed to hold off on this issue until after the
November 19 P5 1 Poldirs meeting. The Germans told us they do
not plan to seek a meeting with the Secretariat, as they do
not have a specific list of questions or criteria to discuss.

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Comment
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13. (C) Russia and China continue to hide behind Secretariat
/ DG pronouncements on Iran. Their unwillingness to set any
standards or criteria or pose any uncomfortable questions to
the Secretariat in advance of the report demonstrates that
they have abdicated their responsibility to assess Iran's
compliance. Their unwillingness to engage in P5 1
consultations also does not bode well for concerted action in
the Board. End Comment.
PYATT