ISRAEL/LEBANON UPDATE ON THREAT RESOLUTION, WEOG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000435

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, IO/UNP, ISN, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017
TAGS: PREL IAEAK EUN IS EG LE
SUBJECT: ISRAEL/LEBANON UPDATE ON THREAT RESOLUTION, WEOG

REF: UNVIE 421

UNVIE VIEN 00000435 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for 1.5 reasons b, d

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Summary
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1. (C) Israel Ambassador Michaeli told Ambassador Schulte
that he hopes the EU can head off an Israel-specific agenda
item at the September General Conference (GC),but he was not
optimistic. Despite divisions within the Arab group,
Michaeli thought that a Israeli threat resolution would
likely be added to the GC agenda. Israel was &reluctant8
about a U.S. suggestion that the Director General revive the
Forum on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ),
but did not want to close the door either, as long as it were
based on the agreed 2004 agenda. Michaeli also raised
concerns about the Secretariat,s annual report to the GC on
the Middle East, which he thought should take the Iran
situation into account. The Ambassador, as WEOG Chair (and
based on the previous chairs efforts) offered to invite
Israel to join the group. Michaeli welcomed the offer.


2. (C) Summary Continued: Lebanese Charge Kabalan reported
that the Arab Group had found the EU proposals unsatisfactory
and was moving ahead with a request for an Israeli Nuclear
Threat Agenda item. He reported that most Arab Group members
wanted to "ring the bell" on Israel but were open to
compromise. The Lebanese hoped a creative solution could be
reached before the General Conference and was open to the
idea of reviving the Middle East Forum on a NWFZ. Lebanon is
likely to be the President for the General Conference. End
Summary.

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Israeli Nuclear Threat
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3. (C) Israeli Ambassador Michaeli briefed the Ambassador
July 10 on the status of EU negotiations with the Arab group
regarding a possible General Conference Agenda Item on the
Israeli nuclear threat (reftel). IAEA Israeli Ambassador
Israel Michaeli recounted his latest discussions with
Portuguese Ambassador Durante, who is negotiating on behalf
of the EU to deflect a potential Arab group-sponsored General
Conference agenda item on the &Israeli Nuclear Threat8
(reftel). According to Durante, the Arab group is still
insisting on a second agenda item, in addition to the Middle
East Safeguards resolution. Duarte reportedly asked Michaeli
if another agenda item on the Middle East that does not
single out Israel in the title would be acceptable. (Note:
In earlier discussions with the EU, Israel had rejected
dropping the word &threat8 as insufficient because the
agenda item would still single out Israel. End note).
Michaeli told Durante that he would not be in a position to
support such a proposal without instructions, but that the
Portuguese could go ahead and float it with the Arab group.
Michaeli expressed skepticism about a second Middle East
agenda item because Israel could still be singled out in the
text of a resolution. He noted that last year's GC
resolution on Middle East safeguards, which Israel and the
U.S. voted against, included a factual reference to Israel as
the only Middle East country that has not signed the NPT. In
any case, the Arab group is rumored to have rejected this
latest proposal. Michaeli urged Durante to not renounce the
threat of a procedural move by the EU, the Arab group's main
concern, to scuttle a resolution as happened in last year's
GC. He noted the mere threat of a procedural motion had been
enough to prevent Arab group action in the CTBTO. Durante
took this point under advisement.


4. (C) The Arab group appears to be split on the &Israeli
Nuclear Threat8 issue. Michaeli reported that the Maghreb
countries would just as soon give it up while Egypt would
like to defer the agenda item until next year.
Interestingly, before leaving on vacation, the Omani Arab
group chair will hand off negotiations on this issue to
Morocco and Algeria, who are more inclined to compromise.
However, Iran is pushing Syria forward and Egypt has a
strategic connection to Syria. Thus Michaeli saw no reason
for optimism, but he did note a willingness among the Arab
group to do things &differently8 in last year's UNGA First

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Committee and the NPT Review Conference. He had no new
information on timing but expected the Arab group was just
waiting for the conclusion of the July 9 Board of Governors
meeting before submitting the agenda item (Note: so that it
would not be raised in the Board session).


5. (C) The Ambassador related that he had expressed U.S.
concerns to the EU and advocated a single resolution and
single agenda item adopted by consensus. He reminded them
that last year's GC had clearly voted the &Israeli Nuclear
Threat8 item off the agenda. He advised the EU that
changing the title to drop the word &threat8 was not
helpful and that Iran was much more deserving of a country
specific resolution. Michaeli stipulated that no the Prime
Minister himself would determine Israel's position on a
specific proposal.

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Arab Group Moving Ahead
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6. (C) In a July 11 meeting with the Ambassador, Lebanese
Charge Bilal Kabalan said the Arab group had resubmitted the
second agenda item on Israel, including the word "threat."
According to the Secretariat, however, the Omani Arab Group
Chair subsequently asked, for a second time, for the item to
be held. The Secretariat noted the more than usual Arab
Group hesitation on this second agenda item, but nonetheless
fully expected that it would be re-submitted very soon. The
Lebanese reported that Arab group members had been
dissatisfied with EU proposals because they received nothing
in return. Not mentioning Israel by name was a non-starter
for Lebanon. The Arab group wanted to "ring the bell" on
Israel, but most were open to compromise. He said four
(unnamed) countries were leading the debate in the Arab
group, two hardliners and two "liberals." Last year Syria
and Sudan had led the charge, and part of the problem was
that there had been no good alternative proposal, he said.
Arab group members had misperceived compromise Presidential
Statement language (actually drafted by South Africa) as a
U.S.-Israeli initiative. Kabalan appealed for "creative" and
constructive solutions but noted that most Arab group
Ambassadors were not outside-the-box thinkers. Lebanon did
not want to legitimize the Israeli nuclear program nor draw
any links between this issue and that of Iran.


7. (C) Kabalan hoped that an understanding could be reached
before the September General Conference (Note: The next GC
President is likely to be from Lebanon. The Lebanese
government will nominate Mouin Hamzi, head of the National
Council on Scientific Research. End Note ). He recommended
demarching capitals, particularly Cairo. He also noted that
there would be several new Ambassadors in Vienna, including
from Syria, Egypt and Lebanon.


8. (C) The Ambassador agreed that early action was needed to
prevent a debacle in the General Conference. If need be,
however, we were ready to repeat last year's vote. The
Ambassador advised that the U.S. preferred a single agenda
item and one resolution. He warned against politicizing the
GC by singling out Israel, and noted that this could lead to
pressure for an Iran resolution. Several constructive
solutions were possible, including a single resolution that
advances the forum for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ),
but he feared that not everyone was interested in a
constructive outcome.

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Forum on MENWFZ
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9. (C) The Ambassador asked Michaeli about reviving the
Middle East Forum on a NWFZ, on which Egypt and Israel came
close to agreement in 2004. Michaeli said that his
government would not be &very happy8 about a Forum but they
did not want to close the door either. He noted that
tensions had increased in the Middle East since 2004,
especially on Iran. However, if such a Forum were based on
&known elements,8 meaning the agreed 2004 agenda, Israel
could countenance it. Speaking on a personal basis, Michaeli
did not see many points of leverage with the Egyptians,
except U.S. pressure to agree to a Forum. The fact that
there would soon be a new Egyptian Ambassador to IAEA, and

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that Egypt seemed inclined to take a different approach on
Iran in other fora were hopeful signs. For example, he noted
that the Arab group had agreed to include text on compliance
in the NPT conference, which they had not done in the GC.


10. (C) The Ambassador also raised reviving the Middle East
Forum with the Lebanese. Kabalan was well-disposed and said
he had also raised the idea with the Arab group last March.
Even the Iranian Ambassador was (unofficially) open to a
Forum, according to Kabalan. The Syrians and others believed
that the Israelis would not agree.

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DG,s Middle East Report to GC
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11. (C) Michaeli also related his discussions with EXPO
Director Vilmos Cserveny regarding the DG,s annual report to
the General Conference on Middle East Safeguards. Israel had
harshly criticized last year,s report because it did not
adequately reflect rising tensions in the region due to
Iran's nuclear program, or discuss the latter,s impact on
safeguards. At a minimum, the report should refer to UNSCR
and BOG resolution language on this subject (references which
Israel did not support). The Secretariat was unwilling to
reflect Israel's position that a NWFZ is linked to the ME
peace process. Michaeli nonetheless believed that the report
could &do a lot8 and offered to share Israel's recommended
language with the U.S. (Note: He seemed to be angling for
U.S. support on this issue.)

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WEOG
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12. (C) The Ambassador noted that previous WEOG Chair, UK
Ambassador Macgregor, had asked members for opinions about
inviting Israel to be a member. The Ambassador told Michaeli
that, since there were no complete objections, he was
inclined to proceed with the invitation at some point during
U.S. chairmanship during the next six months. Michaeli
welcomed US efforts. He said had held a series of
consultations. In addition to the U.S., Germany had
expressed support and the UK promised to do so. The
Australians expected New Zealand to be problematic (though
not formally object) as they had been in the UNGA First
Committee. Norway has problems with Israel's nuclear policy;
Ireland and Italy have sometimes raised issues; and many of
the Mediterranean countries are closer to the Arabs, he
surmised. However, in all other UN organizations, no WEOG
delegation has formally objected to Israel's WEOG membership,
including in UNGA, Geneva, OPCW, etc. It should be even
easier in the IAEA, he argued, since WEOG does not have an
electoral function in terms of nominating Board members.
(Note: Under the IAEA statute, Western Europe and North
America are represented separately on the Board of
Governors.) He acknowledged concerns expressed by some
delegations over WEOG deliberations on the General Conference
Middle East agenda item(s) but offered to sit out those
deliberations.


13. (SBU) Outgoing WEOG Chair, UK Ambassador Macgregor sent
the following letter to WEOG members on this issue on June 29:

Dear Colleagues:

I am grateful to members of WEOG for their cooperation during
the six months when I have been Chair. We have had a number
of useful briefings and exchanges.

The main piece of outstanding business is the request of
Israel to become a member of the group. I have mentioned
this twice during my Presidency, and asked group members to
let me know whether they support or oppose this idea.

I thought I would let you know that no-one has expressed
complete opposition, and two have expressed support. Others
have raised the question of how one would tackle Middle East
questions in the group e.g. in connection with the General
Conference, if Israel was a member.

So this is simply to record that no decision has been taken
on this point and the matter therefore remains to be pursued

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under Greg's Chairmanship of WEOG, as appropriate.

Many thanks again for your help and support.

Yours,

John Macgregor

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Comment
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14. (C) We will continue to work with our EU and Middle East
colleagues in Vienna to underscore that we think an
Israeli-specific agenda item at the CG is inappropriate
absent a similar Iran agenda item. Furthermore, the Board
has already linked the Iran issue in its February 2006
resolution, to a MENWFZ. Per reftel, demarches in capitals
and a high-level approach to Egypt could help move this issue
in the right direction. Since the UK has prepared the ground
for inviting Israel to join WEOG, it is incumbent on us to
follow-through during our chairmanship. We are, however,
still considering whether to make the invitation before or
after the General Conference.


SCHULTE