IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL FOR COOPERATION,

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000384

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL FOR COOPERATION,
NOTE CONCERN OVER FADING INSIGHT INTO IRAN'S PROGRAM


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Summary
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1. (SBU) Director General ElBaradei's opening statement noted
that Iran has continued to place additional limitations on
IAEA verification activities, which has resulted in a
"deterioration" of the IAEA's knowledge of some aspects of
Iran's nuclear program. Almost all country and bloc
statements called on Iran to improve its cooperation with the
IAEA, and even the NAM and Venezuela asked Iran to continue
cooperating. Thirteen statements, including the EU and EU3
statements, called on Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions on
Iran and almost a dozen states asked Iran to reconsider
recent decisions to suspend Code 3.1 of its Safeguards
Agreement, to end Design Verification Inspections at Arak,
and/or to de-designate IAEA inspectors.


2. (SBU) A number of NAM countries gave tougher statements
than in the past, calling on Iran to increase its cooperation
with the IAEA. Russia delivered a fairly strong statement,
stating its regret that Iran has not complied with BOG or
UNSC resolutions and expressing its hope that Iran would
reconsider its decision to move Arak outside of IAEA
verification. China, however, provided a very weak statement
that only noted UNSCR 1747 as "a development" and said that
sanctions and pressure would not yield a solution. The
Chair's summary, while not accurately reflecting the weight
of opinion against Iran, was far more balanced than in the
past, accurately describing the various points against Iran.
End Summary

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DG: "Deterioration" of Knowledge
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3. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's opening statement on June 11 noted
that Iran continues to provide the IAEA access to its nuclear
material and facilities and that the Agency has been able to
verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but
quickly turned to highlight concerns over Iran's reduced
cooperation. He reiterated that Iran has not taken the steps
called for by the Board or the UNSC, and is continuing
"steadily to perfect" enrichment-related knowledge, is
expanding its enrichment capacity, and has continued
construction on its heavy water reactor at Arak. He
emphasized that Iran has continued to place additional
limitations on IAEA verification activities which has
resulted in a "deterioration" of the IAEA's knowledge of some
aspects of Iran's nuclear program. The DG also urged that
dialogue and diplomacy are the only way to achieve a
negotiated solution.

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Chairman Petric Calls the Meeting to Order
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4. (SBU) Board Chairman Petric, noting the UNSC resolutions,
the DG's report, and the June 6 technical briefing, opened
agenda item 6(e) to discuss the implementation of safeguards
in Iran on the afternoon of June 13. Country statements
immediately ensued.

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NAM Reads Ministerial Statement
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5. (SBU) The Cuban Ambassador, representing the NAM, provided
a verbatim reading of principles from the September 2006 NAM
Ministerial: states' rights to peaceful nuclear cooperation
in conformity with their legal obligations; that voluntary
confidence-building measures should not be construed as legal
obligations; that the IAEA is the sole competent authority
for safeguards verification; a pitch for a Middle East
nuclear weapon free zone; Israel's need to join the NPT;
opposition to threats of attacks against nuclear facilities
devoted to peaceful purposes; and support for negotiations
without preconditions. She highlighted Iran's voluntary and
continuing cooperation with the IAEA and positive aspects of
the DG's report, including that the Agency has no evidence of
diversion, that no reprocessing is taking place, and that
Iran has allowed unannounced inspections of Natanz.

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But Some NAM Country Statements Much Tougher
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6. (SBU) Many NAM counties associated themselves with the NAM
statement, but virtually every one called on Iran to
cooperate with the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues.
South Africa said Iran's cooperation has deteriorated and
called on Iran to comply with the UNSCRs and to reconsider

its implementation of the Additional Protocol and DIV access
to Arak. South Africa recalled that it had warned the
international community that moving Iran's file to the UNSC
would escalate the crisis and reduce the information
available, which had happened.


7. (SBU) Other NAM states also called on Iran to increase
cooperation with the IAEA, but were not quite as strong.
Thailand emphasized positive statements from the DG's report
including Iran's continued provision of access, expressed
hope for diplomacy and noted that Thailand is complying with
UNSCR 1737. Belarus and Indonesia (under Rule 50, which
allows non-Board members to speak) delivered short statements
that said the issue should only be resolved through
diplomacy. Indonesia stated Iran should cooperate to resolve
outstanding issues. Belarus more vaguely called on states to
be transparent. Egypt said that Iranian cooperation was
important to show that it has a purely peaceful program,
which is within its rights, though half of the statement
reiterated its familiar calls for an international focus on
the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle
East including the denuclearization of Israel. Libya called
the ignorance of Israel's nuclear program discriminatory,
called for a freeze of UNSC
action, and said that the UNSCRs left no leeway for the
Board or the DG to convince Iran to be more cooperative,
though it encouraged Iran to be more transparent with the
IAEA.


8. (SBU) Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela (which spoke under Rule
50) were Iran's only defenders at this Board meeting. Syria
delivered a short statement focusing on positive elements of
the DG's report such as non-diversion and Iran's continued
cooperation and argued Iran has ceased only voluntary
measures and not legal obligations. Syria reiterated the
NAM's claim of a double standard in the Board and noted that
Israel's reactors are not under safeguards. Cuba delivered a
long country statement that claimed that political interests
are driving international actions on Iran and that these
actions are discriminatory and threaten international peace
and security. Cuba also called US actions a violation of the
"multi-polar" system Cuba endorses and said that US
anti-ballistic missile activities threaten peace. It claimed
Iran is being used by a pretext for nuclear weapons states to
develop arsenals. Cuba called requests for the Board to be
constantly informed of Iran's cooperation and activities an
"unacceptable
" change in procedure. Venezuela echoed the NAM and Cuban
statements, but said it wanted continued Iranian cooperation.

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Germany Delivers Strong EU Statement
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9. (SBU) Germany, representing the 27 EU countries and some
dozen associated countries, "deplored" Iran's failure to
cooperate with both the IAEA and the UNSCRs, noting
specifically that while UNSCR 1737 made an enrichment
suspension mandatory, Iran has instead expanded its
activities. The statement highlighted that Iran cannot
unilaterally modify Code 3.1 of its Safeguards Agreement and
urged Iran to comply with requests for Design Information
Verification (DIV) inspections at Arak given the Agency's
continuing right to verification at the facility. Germany
listed a number of outstanding issues that are still awaiting
Iranian clarification, including polonium activities and
Iran's work on a missile reentry vehicle, and called on Iran
to reconsider the de-designation of 38 IAEA inspectors. The
EU reiterated with concern the DG's statement that the IAEA's
knowledge of some of Iranian nuclear activities is
deteriorating. The EU reaffirmed it support both for the UNSC
process and diplomacy, noting that the P5 1 offer is still on
the table as a basis for negotiations.

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EU3 and "Like-minded" Echo EU Themes
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10. (SBU) The UK (speaking for the EU3 and EU High
Representative Solana) focused on Iran's increased
restriction of the IAEA's access and how this -- in
combination with Tehran's "race" to complete nuclear
capabilities not necessary to fuel Bushehr instead of
returning to negotiations -- is making it more difficult to
confirm that Iran's program is peaceful. The EU3 also
reiterated that its members are still interested in a
negotiated solution and had addressed Iran's desire for
nuclear technology again in Madrid two weeks ago during
Solana's meeting with Larijani. The UK closed by making clear
that if Iran did not increase its cooperation in compliance
with the UNSCRs, they would "return to the UNSC."


11. (SBU) Canada's statement noted that there has been no
progress in resolving a long list of outstanding issues and
that Iran continues nuclear activities proscribed by the IAEA
and UNSC resolutions. Canada went further than other
like-minded states in stating that ending DIV inspections at
Arak called into question the access Iran will provide in the
future and will make it difficult for the IAEA to develop a
safeguard approach for Iranian facilities. Canada stated
that although Iran promised cooperation and transparency in
October 2003, over the next two years, few of these issues
were resolved and more issues arose, implicitly questioning
Iran's attitude toward cooperation. Australia made a strong
statement along these themes that called Iran's rejection of
DIV inspections "unacceptable," called for cooperation to
resolve outstanding issues, and asked that the DG report to
the Board on the implementation of Technical Cooperation with
Iran and Iran's involvement in IAEA projects. Norway, the
Republic
of Korea, and Japan also made short but fairly strong
statements on these themes. New Zealand under Rule 50
reiterated these themes.

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Russia Pushes Iran, China Says Sanctions Will Fail
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12. (SBU) Russia stated its regret that Iran has not complied
with the IAEA or UNSC resolutions, including suspending
enrichment and its heavy water projects, and expressed its
hope that Iran would reconsider its decision to move Arak
outside of IAEA verification. However, Russia did highlight
Iran's agreement to additional safeguards at Natanz as a
positive step and noted that this should allow an adequate
level of insight into the facility. Nevertheless, Russia
called on Iran to cooperate more fully as it had in the past
and said that resolution of the Iran issue could only be
achieved through negotiations and with respect for the rights
of NPT signatories to peaceful nuclear technologies. Russia
did not mention the possibility of additional UNSC action if
Iran does not increase its cooperation or comply with
existing UNSCRs.


13. (SBU) China provided a very weak statement that only
noted UNSCR 1747 as "a development" and said that sanctions
and pressure would not yield a solution. The remainder of
the short statement emphasized dialogue, patience, and the
P5 1's willingness to enter negotiations.

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South American States Back UNSC
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14. (SBU) The Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile) each delivered tough statements calling on Iran to
cooperate and requesting compliance with the UNSCRs, which
Brazil called "mandatory." Chile mentioned Iran's positive
step of allowing unannounced inspections at Natanz though
stated that questions about Iran's activities remain. Both
Brazil and Argentina mentioned Code 3.1 and the cessation of
DIV inspections at Arak in passing, but Brazil said that
there was no statement, presumably by the IAEA, on whether
DIV inspections should take place between when the initial
design information was given and 180 days before the
introduction of nuclear material.

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Iran: Aggrieved Victim
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15. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh endorsed the NAM
statement and cherry-picked positive aspects from DG reports
over the past several years; e.g., he cited every instance
the DG had said there were no indications of diversions of
declared material. He emphasized that Iran has declared all
of its nuclear activities as requested. He argued that there
is thus no reason for Iran to remain on the Board agenda.
Soltanieh also claimed Iran has mastered enrichment. He then
reiterated Iran's rationale for its continued nuclear
activities, stressing that it has a right to peaceful nuclear
activities, that it has learned it needs to be
self-sufficient in nuclear technology, that it had to reduce
cooperation with the IAEA to abide by a law passed by its
parliament, and that the EU3 has created a "confidence
deficit" and escalated the situation. Nevertheless,
Soltanieh said Iran is fully prepared to cooperate but will
not stop its peaceful nuclear activities, including uranium
enrichment.


16. (SBU) Soltanieh warned that UNSC involvement in the issue
needed to end and that Iran will promptly react to any UNSC
actions in accordance with the mandate by its parliament.

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Chairman Provides Balanced Summary
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17. (SBU) Chairman Petric noted that some countries expressed
concern that progress has not been made in resolving
outstanding issues in Iran, that Iran has further restricted
its cooperation leading to a deterioration of knowledge about
Iran's program, and that it has not complied with UNSCRs. He
noted that countries asked Iran to reconsider its
de-designation of IAEA inspectors, and its suspension of Code
3.1.


18. (SBU) However, he then noted "other country" concerns and
themes from the official NAM statement, including states'
rights to peaceful nuclear activities, calls for a nuclear
weapons free zone in the Middle East, and that the IAEA is
the sole authority to consider technical nuclear issues. He
ruled that, per country requests and no objections, the DG's
report would be made public.

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U.S. Statement, As Delivered June 13
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19. (U) Mr. Chairman,

The United States Government thanks the IAEA Secretariat for
its thorough and professional efforts to execute the Agency's
safeguards mandate in Iran and to verify Iran's compliance
with the requirements of the UN Security Council.

The Director General's report and his opening statement
confirm that Iran has failed to comply with multiple
resolutions of the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council.

The Director General describes two disturbing trends:

first, Iran's continued pursuit of capabilities to
enrich uranium and produce plutonium in direct violation of
UN Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, and 1747; and

second, Iran's progressive withdrawal of cooperation
with the IAEA, causing a troubling deterioration in the
Agency's knowledge of Iran's nuclear activities.

The latest two instances of Iran withholding cooperation from
the IAEA are its suspension of Code 3.1 and its denial of
inspector access to conduct Design Information Verification
inspections at Arak.

Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's Safeguards
Agreement was part of the Board's efforts to strengthen the
safeguards system. Iran was the last state with a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and significant nuclear
activities to accept the current Code 3.1 and now, despite
the Board's serious concerns about Iran's nuclear activities,
has announced its unilateral decision to suspend it.

Code 3.1 requires Iran to provide early declaration of any
decision to construct a new nuclear facility or to modify an
existing one and to provide early design information on the
facility. The IAEA has informed Iran that Code 3.1 cannot be
modified unilaterally and that there exists no mechanism in
the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions
agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

The Director General's report also describes Iran's refusal
to permit the IAEA to conduct a Design Information
Verification inspection at the heavy water reactor under
construction at Arak. Iran claims that this decision is
based on its suspension of the early declaration provisions
of its Subsidiary Arrangement. Yet, the Arak reactor has
already been declared to the IAEA and, as the Director
General's report authoritatively states, "the Agency's right
to verify design information provided to it is a continuing
right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction
of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility."

Iran's latest denials are cause for serious concern for a
number of reasons.

First, these new denials constitute new violations of Iran's
international obligations.

Iran has no right to unilaterally suspend Code 3.1 or to deny
inspections at Arak. The Director General makes this clear
in his report. Iran's denial of inspections at Arak is an
apparent breach of its Safeguards Agreement, and its refusal
to provide early design information on any new nuclear
facilities shows a clear willingness to commit future
breaches.


Moreover, the denial of access to IAEA inspectors violates
Resolution 1737 of the UN Security Council, which requires
Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in addressing
outstanding issues.

Second, these new denials cast new doubts on the nature of
Iran's nuclear activities and the intentions of its
leadership.

By denying early design information, Iran's leaders are
indicating that they will not inform the IAEA of new nuclear
facilities until just before nuclear material is introduced.
This signals the possibility of Iran building new, sensitive
nuclear facilities in secret and only informing the IAEA just
before operations begin.

This is of serious concern given Iran's past record of hiding
nuclear installations like Natanz from the IAEA, Iran's
repeated failures to declare sensitive nuclear activities,
and Iran's continued refusal to provide the IAEA information
on all aspects of its centrifuge activities, including its
work on advanced centrifuges.


By denying inspections at Arak, Iran is preventing IAEA
inspectors from verifying that the facility is being built as
Iran has declared. The IAEA is being denied the ability to
ensure effective safeguards implementation that covers all
aspects of the reactor's design, such as irradiation
channels. This is especially serious given Iran's proven
history of undeclared irradiation of uranium targets that
were later used for reprocessing experiments. Moreover, the
continued denial of access would mean that the IAEA would not
know until shortly before the reactor begins operations
whether Iran has installed hot cells or the capability to
reprocess spent fuel and extract plutonium on a scale
sufficient to produce nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, let's recall the heavy water reactor under
construction at Arak is well designed to produce plutonium.
This is why the UN Security Council has required Iran to
suspend work at this facility and why this Board denied
technical cooperation in its construction.

Mr. Chairman, if Iran's leaders claim their pursuits are
transparent and peaceful, why do they persist in violating
their international obligations and refusing cooperation with
the IAEA? If Iran's leaders want the world's confidence, why
are they keeping inspectors out of Arak and refusing to
provide early information on new nuclear facilities?

The United States joins with other Board members in
supporting the Agency's request of April 18, 2007, that Iran
both reconsider its decision with regard to Code 3.1 and
permit the Agency to carry out Design Information
Verification at Arak at the earliest opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, Iran's latest refusals to cooperate only add to
a long list of previous refusals by Iran to provide
necessary, and in many cases required - cooperation,
information, and access to the IAEA. Another recent example
is Iran's denial of designation for 48 inspectors to Iran.
The Director General reports that this remains an unresolved
matter.

The United States firmly supports the Secretariat's request
to reverse the denial of inspector designations. This is
particularly important now that an unannounced inspection
regime has been established at Natanz, a regime that will
presumably impose additional requirements for Iran-designated
inspectors.

My delegation asks the Director General to report to the
Board immediately if Iran's denial of inspectors hinders the
implementation of safeguards in Iran. We also ask the
Director General to report immediately if there are
additional Iranian denials of any IAEA requests.


Mr. Chairman, we are disappointed that Iran's leaders have
ignored international concerns and violated Iran's
international obligations. We are disappointed that Iran's
leaders have not taken advantage of the willingness of the
United States, Europe, Russia, and China to engage in
diplomatic negotiations on the basis of last June's
six-country offer.

The six-country offer and the offer of direct talks with the
United States remain on the table. Iran's leaders need only
to comply with their international obligations to the IAEA
and Security Council.


Thank you, Mr. Chairman
SCHULTE